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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the reception and treatment of the refugees from 
Hungary and Egypt who arrived in France and in Britain after the Hungarian 
revolution and the Suez crisis. The thesis argues that the reception of the 
refugees from Hungary and from Egypt was primarily linked to the French and 
British immigration policies and influenced by the Cold War context. 
 
The first part deals with the creation of the Hungarian refugees and their 
reception in France and Britain. Chapter two gives a brief account on the 
Hungarian revolution and what led 200,000 Hungarians to leave their country. 
Chapter three deals with the reception and treatment of the Hungarian refugees 
in France, and sets out to demonstrate how the revolution and the refugee 
situation were first exploited for propagandistic purposes and national political 
interests. It also examines immigration policy in France and how the 
Hungarians were to serve France's economic and demographic interests as 
candidates for immigration. French-Jewish responses to the refugee situation 
are also explored. Finally, it discusses the effects of the Cold War in the 
resettlement process. Chapter four explores similar questions about the 
Hungarians with respect to Britain.  
 
The second part of the thesis studies the expulsion of the French, British and 
stateless Jews from Egypt and their resettlement in France and Britain. Chapter 
five deals with who the refugees from Egypt were, and the unusual nature of 
their nationality and cultural background. Chapter six deals with the reception 
 3
and treatment of refugees from Egypt in France, and focuses on how the 
French government and administration oscillated between obligation and desire 
to provide relief to the French Jews of Egypt, as they were not considered to be 
suitable candidates for resettlement in France according to immigration 
policies and practices. As most of the refugees from Egypt were Jewish, the 
chapter also looks at the Jewish specificity of the resettlement policy and how 
their resettlement made the refugees question their French identity. Chapter 
seven discusses the reception of the refugees from Egypt in Britain. It analyses 
the different domestic context regarding the Suez crisis and its impact on the 
refugees. The question of identity and cultural background is also explored. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Hungarian revolution on 23 October 1956, and its repression by the Soviet 
army on 4 November, created 200,000 Hungarian refugees. At the same time in 
Egypt, the Israeli military intervened on 29 October, joined by France and 
Britain on 31 October to claim back the Suez canal, precipitated the expulsion 
of approximately 40,000 Jews, mainly French and British nationals by the 
Egyptian government. Out of this total of 240,000 refugees, 52,000 sought 
refuge in Britain and France. Almost 22,000 refugees from Hungary and 6,000 
from Egypt went to Britain, while 13,000 Hungarians and 11,000 refugees 
from Egypt went to France.1  
 
This thesis deals with the creation of these two groups of refugees and their 
reception by France and Britain, and the refugees' responses. This study of two 
groups of refugees, which arrived in France and in Britain within a few weeks 
of each other, interrogates the links between immigration policies and two 
major Cold War events. Moreover, it uncovers the similarities and differences 
in the treatment of two different groups of refugees in two different countries, 
and the reasons for that. The reception and treatment of these two waves of 
refugees have been left almost unexplored, and aside from the politics of 
Hungarian refugees and the disappearance of the Jewish community in Egypt, 
                                                 
1
 Michael M. Laskier, The Jews of Egypt, 1920-1970: In the Midst of Zionism, Anti-Semitism 
and the Middle East Conflict (New York, 1992), p.264; Centre des Archives Contemporaines 
(CAC), 20050590, art. 120, Situation of Hungarian refugees on 15 December 1957, 28 
December 1957; The National Archives (TNA), AST 7/1623, R.A. Butler statement at the 
House of Commons on Hungarian refugees in Britain, 20 February 1958; COJASOR 
(COJ).R.Egy.A1, Dix ans d'action sociale en faveur des Réfugiés d'Égypte (1956-1966), n.d.; 
TNA, HO 240/5, Anglo-Egyptian Resettlement Board (AERB), final report, March 1960. 
These numbers do not include diplomatic and Suez company staffs.  
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the historiography is sparse.2 This thesis draws on unutilised archives as well 
as original interviews of former refugees to add to our knowledge of the 
Hungarian and Egyptian refugee immigrations in France and Britain. This 
study deals both with the politics and organisations concerned with the 
reception of refugees, and refugees' reflection on their reactions to their 
treatment.  
 
One hundred and eighty thousand Hungarian refugees crossed the Austrian 
border, while about 20,000 refugees escaped to Yugoslavia, as they fled the 
Soviet repression of the revolution. In those two countries, Hungarians were 
placed in improvised refugee camps, while waiting to emigrate to another 
country, as Austria and Yugoslavia did not want to provide asylum for such 
large populations. The Hungarian refugees arrived in France and in Britain 
before the refugees from Egypt. On 7 November, the French government 
granted asylum to 10,000  Hungarians, while the British government decided to 
accept 2,500, although, by the end of the month, they both claimed that they 
would accept any Hungarian refugee who wished to resettle there.3 Once in 
France or in Britain, refugees were placed in camps, or hostel, usually old 
military barracks or abandoned buildings, until they secured employment and 
permanent housing, or re-emigrated. The arrival of Hungarian refugees in 
France and Britain was extensively reported in the national press, and was 
                                                 
2
 Ruth Tolédano-Attias, 'La dénationalisation des Juifs d'Egypte', in Shmuel Trigano, (ed.), La 
Fin du judaïsme en terres d'islam (Paris, 2009), pp.51-85; Stéphane Dufoix, Politiques d'exil: 
Hongrois, Polonais, Tchécoslovaques en France après 1945 (Paris, 2002); Laskier, The Jews 
of Egypt; Michael M. Laskier, 'Egyptian Jewry under the Nasser Regime 1956-1970', Middle 
Eastern Studies, 31:3 (1995), 573-619. 
3
 CAC, 19990260, art. 35, Minister of Defence to Minister of Interior, 29 November 1956; 
TNA, HO 352/144, Memorandum on the admission of refugees, 5 December 1956.  
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generally welcomed.4 It also coincided with a great popular welcome in both 
countries as large amounts of money, food, and clothes were collected to 
support the Hungarian refugees. 
 
In contrast with the conditions of departure of the Hungarian refugees, most of 
the refugees from Egypt did not escape, but were expelled by the Egyptian 
government. In response to the joint French, British and Israeli military action, 
the Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, declared on 22 November that all 
French and British nationals, as well as stateless Jews, were to be expelled 
from Egypt since the country was in a state of war with France, Britain and 
Israel. The majority of the expellees were Jewish, most of whom had French or 
British nationality.5 Unlike the immigration policy for Hungarian refugees, the 
French and British governments did not accept unlimited numbers of refugees. 
Apart from their own nationals, both governments accepted stateless refugees 
only on condition that they already had close relatives established there, with 
Britain applying this policy in a stricter manner than France, nor did refugees 
from Egypt benefit from the official and popular welcome Hungarian refugees 
enjoyed.6 The focus in the press was on the Suez crisis itself rather than on the 
refugees from Egypt. There was little popular support for this group of 
refugees as they were considered to be the responsibility of the French and 
                                                 
4
 Tony Kushner and Katharine Knox, Refugees in an Age of Genocide: Global, National and 
Local Perspectives during the Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1999), p.244. 
5
 Michael M. Laskier, 'Egyptian Jewry under the Nasser Regime 1956-1970', Middle Eastern 
Studies, 31:3 (1995), pp.573-4; see Chapter 5, pp.199-203. 
6
 Ministère des Affaire Etrangères (MAE), Levant 1944-1965, Egypte 1953-1959, 514, Note of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affaires on the evacuation of Port-Said, 8 December 1956; London 
Metropolitan Archives (LMA), ACC/3121/B/06/002/034, Meeting at FO, 30 November 1956. 
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British governments for their involvement in the Egyptian campaign.7 The 
refugees from Egypt were placed in hostels in Britain and hotels in France. 
 
Focus will now shift to the terms in which the refugees were legally defined. 
The status of the Hungarians and Egyptians as political refugees was 
problematic. Refugees from Hungary and Egypt arrived at a time when 
international refugee law was still relatively new. The 1951 Geneva 
Convention's definition of a refugee imposed strict geographical and temporal 
limits:  
 
The term 'refugee' shall apply to any person who… as a result of events 
occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result 
of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it.8 
 
In order to make sure that Hungarians could benefit from the protection of the 
Convention, the General Assembly of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) debated whether they fell within the mandate of the 
                                                 
7
 TNA, AST 7/1621, Refugees in Britain, 8 January 1958. 
8
 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, pp.137-84. Accessed at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3be01b964.html 
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UNHCR and if the 1951 Geneva Convention applied to them.9 Auguste Lindt, 
the High Commissioner, considered that the Hungarian situation was linked to 
political changes which took place as a result of the Second World War.10 It 
was argued that since Hungary became under Soviet influence following the 
end of the war, the refugee situation and the revolution had their origins before 
1951. Lindt thus concluded that the Hungarians fell under the protection of the 
1951 Geneva Convention and were under the mandate of the UNHCR. The 
Geneva Convention, which was originally designed with the aim of solving the 
Second World War refugee and Displaced Persons (DPs) problem, was 
reinterpreted in the light of the Cold War in order to give international 
protection and recognition to the Hungarian refugees. It was also a way to 
support the Hungarian revolution, and to condemn its repression by the Soviet 
army. France and Britain accepted this interpretation. 
 
As far as the refugees from Egypt were concerned, those who were stateless 
fell under the 1951 Geneva Convention and mandate of the UNHCR. The 
French authorities linked the expulsion of stateless Jews to the creation of the 
State of Israel in 1948 and interpreted as the Egyptian response to it.11 On the 
other hand, Britain decided to apply the Convention to them, despite linking 
the expulsions to the British retreat from the Canal zone in 1951, and Nasser's 
policy regarding the Suez Canal.12 Although different, both interpretations 
focused on the Egyptian government's responsibility for the expulsions and 
implies that the French, British and Israeli intervention served as a pretext to 
                                                 
9
 Ivor Jackson, The Refugee Concept in Group Situations (The Hague, 1999), pp.114-9. 
10
 Louise Holborn, Refugees: A Problem of our Time: The Work of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, 1951-1972 (Metuchen, 1975), p.394. 
11
 CAC, 19810201, art. 1, Report on a OFPRA meeting, 21 January 1957. 
12
 TNA, HO 352/158, Home Office, minutes, 21 May 1957. 
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expel Jews from Egypt. There again, the reading of the Geneva Convention 
was done to serve Cold War interests.  
 
The British and French refugees did not benefit from the protection of the 
Geneva Convention. They were expelled from a country of which they were 
not nationals, and still benefited from the protection of their respective 
governments. They, nonetheless, experienced the challenges linked to the 
resettlement in another country after losing all their assets and property. Due to 
their British or French nationality, this category of refugees was also 
sometimes referred to as 'expellees' by the British Foreign Office and 'rapatriés' 
by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If the word 'expellees' is accurate, 
the use of the word 'rapatriés' is debatable. The word 'rapatriés', despite its 
occasional use by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and also its use by a French 
person from Egypt to distinguish herself from other non-French refugees, does 
not reflect the situation of the French nationals expelled from Egypt since they 
were born in Egypt and lived there all their life.13 The word 'rapatriés' implies 
the rediscovering of the 'patrie', bringing back someone to his or her homeland. 
The use of this word was to make the French nationals from Egypt feel as 
though they were full members of the French society. It was also to make a 
distinction with the Hungarian refugees who were foreigners. Yet, the thesis 
shows how this status was put to a test when they resettled in France or Britain 
since they were still considered liabilities while Hungarians were seen as 
assets.  
 
                                                 
13
 Interview with Renée Hakoun, 5 November 2009. 
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The implications linked to this work on definitions and recognition of refugee 
status shows that the two groups of refugees represented a political stake for 
France and Britain following the Suez crisis and the Hungarian revolution, in 
the Cold War context. In this thesis, the word 'refugee' refers to those 
individuals who fled from Hungary and Egypt in 1956 as a result of the 
political upheavals discussed, and takes into account the particular 
circumstances of their departure in each case. 
 
 
 
-Analysis 
 
The thesis establishes that refugees from Hungary and from Egypt were 
accepted in France and Britain on the basis of immigration policies and 
practices in a process of change and development which were challenged by 
the Cold War context. Hungarian refugees were accepted in France and Britain 
without limits while this was not the case for the refugees from Egypt. The 
difference in reception between the Hungarian refugees and the refugees from 
Egypt as groups in France and Britain is significant as they were considered as 
assets and liabilities in both countries. Yet, the two countries had different 
immigration policies as well as a different record during the Second World 
War regarding the Jews of Europe and the Holocaust. In a more immediate 
context, Paris and London shared a common involvement in the Suez crisis, 
and adopted the same position during the Hungarian revolution, not only 
towards refugees, but also in condemning its repression by the Soviet army, 
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while refusing military intervention to help insurgents.14 This thesis argues that 
the reception of refugees from Hungary and Egypt was framed by immigration 
policies and practices adapted, for the occasion, to the Cold War context. There 
are three main themes revolving around the characterisation of refugees as 
assets and liabilities affecting the refugees' treatment and reception: political, 
economic, and national identity. 
 
As far as politics are concerned, this is linked to both international, Cold War, 
issues and to domestic considerations. We see the political instrumentalization 
of Hungarian refugees, even while there was silence on the situation of the 
refugees from Egypt. The thesis analyses the impact of the Cold War on the 
decision by Paris and London to accept unlimited numbers of Hungarian 
refugees while limiting asylum to their own nationals in the case of the 
refugees from Egypt. The Hungarian refugees represented multiple political 
advantages for Paris and London. They were considered to be of possible use 
for propaganda purposes: welcoming them without limitation in numbers was a 
way for the two countries to assert their support to anti-Soviet movements. 
Their reception was also the reassertion of France and Britain as members of 
the 'free world' against 'Soviet imperialism', as Cold War rhetoric would phrase 
it.15 As far as internal affairs were concerned, Hungarian refugees were used in 
Britain as a way to distract, temporarily at least, public and political criticism 
of the handling of the Suez crisis. In France, Hungarian refugees were used by 
left and right-wing political parties to weaken the French Communist Party 
(PCF). Refugees from Egypt, as reminders of the Suez campaign failure, were 
                                                 
14
 György Litván, The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolution, Repression 1953-
1963 (London, 1996), p.94. 
15
 TNA, FO 371/122387, UN British delegation to Foreign Office (FO), 10 November 1956. 
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barely visible in the press, and their situation was less discussed in the French 
and British parliaments. They were political liabilities for Paris and London, as 
viewed by the press and public opinion.16 
 
The thesis shows also that French and British immigration policies determined 
the reception of the two groups of refugees. The thesis demonstrates that 
because many were working-class, Hungarians as migrants were preferred to 
refugees from Egypt as they could be considered for labour. In a context of the 
need of manual labour in both France and Britain, Hungarian refugees 
represented a large and immediately employable workforce, as the bulk of 
refugees were composed of single young men.17 Many of the refugees from 
Egypt, because they were British or French nationals could not be refused 
entry. The fact that the refugees from Egypt were mainly composed of middle-
class family units and mostly entrepreneurs and businesspeople played a part, 
as they were not considered suitable candidates for immigration according to 
French and British immigration rules and practices in 1956.18 
 
Finally, national identity varied greatly as far as the two groups of refugees 
were concerned. In 1956, both France and Britain privileged immigration from 
European countries. As colonial powers, the two countries experienced 
immigration from colonies or former colonies after the Second World War, 
                                                 
16
 TNA, AST 7/1621, Refugees in Britain, 8 January 1958. 
17
 MAE, Europe 1956-1960, Hongrie, 97, Francois Seydoux to Christian Pineau, 7 December 
1956; TNA, LAB 8/2580, Notes for Sir Arthur Rucker, 3 January 1957. 
18
 Alexis Spire, Etrangers à la carte: l'administration de l'immigration en France 1945-1975 
(Paris, 2005), p.107; Gary P. Freeman, Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial 
Societies: The French and British Experience 1945-1975 (Princeton, 1979), pp.136-7; TNA, 
AST 7/1621, Refugees in Britain, 8 January 1958. 
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which both governments were trying to find a way to control.19 Hungarian 
refugees were associated with European immigration, which was favoured. On 
the other hand, refugees from Egypt were considered to be a colonial type 
group of North African and Jewish immigrants. The North African identity was 
a considerable drawback for the refugees from Egypt who were considered to 
be undesirable immigrants.20 In practice, it meant that refugees from Egypt 
with nationalities other than French or British were denied access to France and 
Britain, while stateless refugees were accepted on the strict conditions of 
having relatives already established and who could financially provide for 
them.21 Their Jewish identity was also a problem since France and Britain each 
had a record of restricting or discriminating, officially or by practice, Jewish 
immigration.22 This study will also show that the memory of the Second World 
War played out in different ways in France and Britain. While Britain restricted 
Jewish entry to Palestine during the Nazi period, it could still boast of having 
helped 70,000 Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany, while France participated 
in the deportation of Jews.23 The thesis will show how these two different 
memories affected the reception of the refugees from Egypt in France and 
Britain. 
 
                                                 
19
 Spire, Etrangers à la carte, pp.124-5; Ian R. G. Spencer, British Immigration Policy since 
1939: The Making of Multi-Racial Britain (London, 1997), pp.46-8. 
20
 Patrick Weil, La France et ses étrangers: l'aventure d'une politique de l'immigration de 1938 
à nos jours (Paris, 1991), pp.84-5; Freeman, Immigrant Labor, pp.136-7. 
21
 CAC, 19900353, art. 17, Ministry of Interior, circulaire n°595 on admission of foreign 
nationals from Egypt in France, 29 December 1956; TNA, HO 240/1, Persons eligible for help 
from the Board, 7 May 1957. 
22
 Louise London, Whitehall and the Jews, 1933-1948: British Immigration Policy and the 
Holocaust (Cambridge, 2000), pp.38-9; Zig Layton-Henry, The Politics of Immigration: 
Immigration, 'Race' and 'Race' Relations in Post-war Britain (Oxford, 1992), pp.5-6; Vicki 
Caron, Uneasy Asylum: France and the Refugee Crisis, 1933-1942 (Stanford, 1999), pp.358-
61; Patrick Weil, Qu'est-ce qu'un Français ? Histoire de la nationalité francaise depuis la 
Révolution (Paris, 2002), pp.208-13. 
23
 London, Whitehall and the Jews, p.9; Michaël Marrus and Robert Paxton, Vichy et les Juifs 
(Paris, 1981), pp.473-4. 
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Each of these three themes are deeply intertwined. All of the chapters of this 
thesis deal with these themes and their relation to the refugee groups in France 
and Britain. The refugees from Hungary and Egypt were two very different 
groups. The Cold War politics associated with them as well as their 
geographical origins and the groups' composition framed the way they were 
treated in France and in Britain.  
 
To uncover the impact of immigration policies and the Cold War on the 
refugees this thesis examines the treatment of each group of refugees and the 
organisations that helped them and the dynamic relation between organisations, 
governments and the refugees. The resettlement strategies in both countries 
reveal the attitudes of the authorities towards the two groups of refugees. 
Finally, the thesis studies the history of the refugees from the start of their life 
as refugees until they left refugee camps. 
 
 
 
-The Comparative Approach 
 
This thesis is a comparative study of two refugee groups in two different 
countries. The reason why it is a comparative work is to establish the reasons 
for having similar responses to the refugees from Hungary and Egypt in two 
countries with different immigration policies and practices. Comparison will 
also uncover the refugees' different reactions to their reception in France and 
Britain. 
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In order to carry out comparative work, valid units of comparisons must be 
selected to explain the phenomena studied. William Sewell, in analysing Marc 
Bloch's theories on comparative history, argues that history can only be fully 
understood when relationships between phenomena are established and 
explained.24 The comparative method is a way to assess the validity of 
explanatory hypotheses and to discover the uniqueness of different societies. 
Bloch thus calls for the selection of an appropriate geographical framework, in 
which the study of the units of comparison can be done, while Sewell argues 
that the choice of units of comparison depends on the explanatory problem 
addressed, and does not need to be limited to geographical frontiers.25 
 
Yet, a different approach to the choice of units of comparison exists. Jürgen 
Kocka argues that units of comparison can be separated from each other, and 
do not necessarily need to have anything in common. Cases for comparison are 
not determined by continuity or mutual influences between two phenomena. 
Units of comparison are independent cases analytically brought together by 
asking for similarities and differences between them.26 Kocka's approach 
supposes that anything is comparable and that temporal and geographical limits 
are not necessary. 
 
Units of comparison, in the case of this thesis, refugees from Hungary and 
Egypt in France and Britain, are not the only choices to make. The comparative 
approach also calls for the choice of the phenomenon to explain and the choice 
                                                 
24
 William H. Sewell Jr, 'Marc Bloch and the Logic of Comparative History', History and 
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of the level of analysis. Nancy Green claims that the comparative method fits 
particularly well immigration studies and that several levels of comparison are 
possible: past and present immigrants, immigrants and the State, immigrants 
and society, and immigrants as a group. Comparison helps the understanding of 
specific and general aspects of the phenomena being studied, and the causes 
and origins of these phenomena.27 According to Green, 'la comparaison doit 
nous permettre de dégager les contraintes structurales de l'expérience 
individuelle, de distinguer la différenciation dans les parcours de groupes ainsi 
que de dégager si possible l'essence du phénomène migratoire.'28 In the case of 
this thesis, comparison will help to uncover the differences and similarities in 
treatment of the refugees from Egypt and Hungary in France and Britain, but 
also, why these two groups were considered to be liabilities or assets in both 
countries. 
 
Comparison helps us to understand the causes and origins of phenomena, as 
well as analyse the specificity and generality of these phenomena.29 Comparing 
different groups of immigrants within a nation-state can help us to deconstruct 
the notion of nation-state for migration studies.30 It thus helps us to understand 
that the frontier between national and foreign, as immigrants, as well as 
refugees, are defined by their nationality and their cultural attributes.31 This is 
especially important in the case of the refugees from Egypt, as many 
considered themselves to be culturally French or British. The way the two 
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refugee groups were treated helps to define the frontier between foreign and 
national when other attributes are taken into account. The fragmentary nature 
of the frontier between foreign and national is further exposed in the case of the 
Hungarians, who could be seen as assets despite their absence of French or 
British culture or nationality, while refugees from Egypt were seen as 
liabilities. 
  
Comparing the reception of Hungarian refugees as assets in France and Britain 
to refugees from Egypt as liabilities implies comparing their experiences as 
groups but also as individuals before they became refugees until the moment 
they left refugee camps. Therefore, the thesis will compare how the two groups 
of refugees were created and the circumstances in which they left their original 
country. The French and British public and political reactions to their arrival 
will be analysed. The conditions and legal framework in which they were 
accepted to their country of asylum will be studied. It will also compare the 
role of governmental and non-governmental organisations in their reception: 
both those affecting the context from which they came and those affecting their 
reception. All this comparative work will be done without losing the focus that 
this thesis is about refugees, so it will include refugees' reactions to their 
treatment in France and Britain. The aim of this comparative work is to 
understand the political and cultural contexts of the immigration of these two 
groups of refugees in France and Britain, the effects of these contexts on their 
reception and treatment, while acknowledging the specificities of their 
experience depending on the country of origin and country of asylum.32 
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-Methodology 
 
A range of evidence is used in the thesis. In Britain, there is a great volume of 
material available at the National Archives. As well as materials issued by the 
Home Office and the Foreign Office, the National Archives holds all the files 
relating the Anglo-Egyptian Resettlement Board (AERB), an official body 
created to organise and coordinate the reception, accommodation and 
employment of the refugees from Egypt in Britain. It also holds papers of the 
National Coal Board (NCB) which have been consulted along with files of the 
Labour and Employment Departments, to examine employment plans for 
Hungarians, and Cabinet files on Commonwealth immigration. 
 
In France, the Archives Nationales and the Archives Diplomatiques proved to 
be rich in material on the creation of refugees in Egypt and Hungary, and the 
French reactions to it. Other governmental bodies, such as the Office Français 
pour la Protection des Réfugiés et des Apatrides (OFPRA) and the British 
Council for Aid to Refugees (BCAR), had little material to offer. The OFPRA 
archives are still in the process of being classified, while the BCAR kept very 
little of its original material on the subject. The Service Social d'Aide aux 
Emigrants (SSAE), on the other hand, has rich sources in papers now kept at 
the Archives Nationales. As foreigners, the refugees from Hungary and the 
stateless refugees from Egypt in France had to report to the police. The 
archives of the préfecture de Police in Paris offer a great range of material on 
the refugees from Hungary in Paris and the related political activity of the 
French Communist Party (PCF). However, nothing is to be found on the 
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stateless refugees from Egypt, who seem not to have caught the attention of the 
police. The Archives de la Ville de Paris was a good source of information on 
the accommodation of refugees in Paris. All these archival sources have been 
read alongside British and French parliamentary debates which not only point 
to the main flaws and successes of their national policies of asylum, but also 
allow for the comparison of the two cases. For reflections of public opinion, I 
sought out parliamentary debates and articles about refugees in the national 
press covering right and left-wing political opinion. I also looked at Jewish 
publications such as L'Arche.  
 
Papers from the Central British Fund and the Board of Deputies of British Jews 
give a good insight into Jewish relief for refugees from Hungary and Egypt, 
and divergences from government plans. This aspect was correlated to the 
material provided by the Comité Juif d'Action Sociale et de Reconstruction 
(Cojasor).  
 
However, what all the material mentioned above lacked was the 'voice' of the 
refugees themselves. As the period treated in the thesis is fairly recent, it was a 
good opportunity to seek the experiences of the former refugees in their own 
words. During the Forty Years Crisis conference on refugees in the twentieth 
century that took place at Birkbeck, University of London, in September 2010, 
speakers mentioned how rare it was for oral history to be included in refugee 
history and how hard the task is. I tried to take up this challenge and the thesis 
includes interviews with many former refugees from Egypt and Hungary. 
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The former refugees from Egypt were found through three main associations: 
the Association pour la Sauvegarde du Patrimoine Culturel des Juifs d'Egypte, 
the Association des Juifs Originaires d'Egypte, and the Association of Jews 
from Egypt. Other interviewees were found by advertising at Holland Park 
Synagogue in London, and via the Association of Jewish Refugees, composed 
of former refugees from Nazi Germany. 
 
Finding former refugees from Hungary proved a much harder task. Only one 
former refugee from Hungary in Britain has been interviewed for the thesis and 
repeated attempts to advertise or find networks were unsuccessful. In France, 
advertising in the newsletter of the Mardis Hongrois, a Hungarian social group, 
reached four interviewees. Other efforts were unsuccessful. As a consequence 
Hungarian individuals tend to be less represented in the thesis than the refugees 
from Egypt. However, the majority of the interviews explored British and 
French culture before migration, and its influence on resettlement. As this 
phenomenon existed only in Egypt, the thesis should not suffer from the 
difference in the number of interviews between the two groups of former 
refugees. 
 
No matter how useful these interviews are, they must be treated with critical 
awareness. The events related by the refugees happened more than sixty years 
ago. Thus, the interview material depends on the memory of the refugees. 
Daniel Schacter, in his work on the theory of oral history, discusses the 
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problems inherent to memory as 'a process of remembering'.33  Individual 
memory is not a ready-formed story but a process creating meanings of past 
facts, also framed by the public memory of the period remembered. Moreover, 
what the interviewees may hold to be true may be contradicted by other forms 
of evidence, as memory is a narrator's interpretation of their experience.34 Paul 
Thompson argues that oral history, as any historical evidence, is framed by 
'individual perception, and selected through social bias, conveys message of 
prejudice and power'.35 According to Thompson, depending on the fields, 'oral 
history can result not merely in a shift in focus, but also in the opening up of 
important new areas of inquiry.'36 The author does not mention immigration 
history as an example, although it makes sense to use oral history in this case. 
It enables us, for instance, to discover how immigration policy was perceived 
by immigrants. Moreover, refugees' opinions are voiced and it can be assessed 
whether they felt grateful or rejected, and how it affected their experience as 
refugees. I have dealt with all these issues when including interviews in the 
thesis. 
 
As far as the structure of the thesis is concerned, it is divided into two parts. 
The first part deals with the creation of the Hungarian refugees and their 
reception in France and Britain. Chapter two gives a brief account on the 
Hungarian revolution and what led 200,000 Hungarians to leave their country. 
Chapter three deals with the reception and treatment of the Hungarian refugees 
in France, and sets out to demonstrate how the revolution and the refugee 
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situation were first exploited for propagandistic purposes and national political 
interests. It also examines immigration policy in France and how the 
Hungarians were to serve France's economic and demographic interests as 
candidates for immigration. French-Jewish responses to the refugee situation 
are also explored. Finally, it discusses the effects of the Cold War in the 
resettlement process. Chapter four explores similar questions about the 
Hungarians with respect to Britain.  
 
The second part of the thesis studies the expulsion of the French, British and 
stateless Jews from Egypt and their resettlement in France and Britain. Chapter 
five deals with who the refugees from Egypt were, and the unusual nature of 
their nationality and cultural background. Chapter six deals with the reception 
and treatment of refugees from Egypt in France, and focuses on how the 
French government and administration oscillated between obligation and desire 
to provide relief to the French Jews of Egypt, as they were not considered to be 
suitable candidates for resettlement in France according to immigration 
policies and practices. As most of the refugees from Egypt were Jewish, the 
chapter also looks at the Jewish specificity of the resettlement policy and how 
their resettlement made the refugees question their French identity. Chapter 
seven discusses the reception of the refugees from Egypt in Britain. It analyses 
the different domestic context regarding the Suez crisis and its impact on the 
refugees. The question of identity and cultural background is also explored. 
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-Historiography 
 
The history of the refugees from Hungary and Egypt has been little studied. 
There is no existing comparative study of their reception and treatment in 
France and in Britain. There is also little secondary literature on the subject of 
refugees from Egypt and Hungary. Secondary literature on what happened to 
these two groups of refugees after 1956 is limited, so as yet we know very little 
about the reception and the treatment of the refugees from Egypt and Hungary 
in Britain and in France. This thesis therefore aims to fill that gap. Although 
small in numbers compared to the 15 million displaced European civilians 
estimated to have been on the move directly after the Second World War, 
refugees from Hungary and Egypt nevertheless represented a real challenge to 
the French and British governments.37 The thesis aims to assess the nature of 
asylum for refugees in 1956, to explore government motivations to accept 
refugees and to understand how this affected their reception. 
 
Refugees from Hungary are only briefly mentioned in studies on the Hungarian 
revolution,38 and tend to form part of more general research on refugees in 
Europe in the twentieth century.39 There are also only a few mentions of 
Hungarian refugees in France and in Britain in secondary literature on 
immigration. For example, Colin Holmes, in A Tolerant Country?, mentions, 
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en passant, that refugees from Egypt and from Hungary generated little 
interest, while Black and Asian immigration captured almost exclusively all 
historical attention in Britain.40 Alexis Spire in Étrangers à la Carte uses the 
example of the Hungarian refugees in France to show the arbitrariness of the 
uses of circulars to favour one group of migrants over the others.41 Spire argues 
that the example of Hungarian refugees in France illustrate how post-war 
immigration policy on refugees could be interpreted in different ways in order 
to facilitate the employment of one group, while denying the status of refugee 
to another. Yet, it does not analyse the specificities of the Hungarian migration 
and their resettlement in 1956 and 1957, especially in the Cold War context. 
 
However, the politics of Hungarian refugees in exile have been researched. In 
Politiques d'exil, which is a comparative study with Polish and Czech exiles, 
Stéphane Dufoix studies how some of the Hungarian exiles recreated a political 
space outside their country of origin in an attempt to represent the true interests 
of the Hungarian people.42 Despite a very complete analysis of the question, 
Dufoix is more interested in the political activities of Hungarian exiles than 
their resettlement in France as a refugee group and how it was achieved, and 
the interests of the French government in letting a large number of Hungarians 
resettle. One of the drawbacks of such research is that it focuses on a smaller 
group among the refugees, not necessarily representative of the whole wave but 
more visible due to its political activity.  
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Another interesting aspect which has been very useful for this thesis is the role 
of French diplomacy during the Hungarian revolution. Gusztáv Kecskés has 
written a number of articles on this theme.43 He has shown that the French 
government saw in the Hungarian revolution and the refugee crisis a way to 
use them as propaganda against the Soviet Union. He uses NATO archives to 
show that the French government reacted to the Hungarian revolution and its 
consequences in accordance with NATO directives. Kecskés argues that the 
French government followed closely the events in Hungary, and considered 
that granting asylum to Hungarian refugees could weaken the position of the 
Soviet regime. Kecskés attempts to place refugees back into history by 
showing their importance in international political responses. However, while 
focusing on political issues and propaganda, the economic aspect of the 
Hungarian refugee immigration is ignored, as well as conditions of reception 
and relations to immigration policies. 
 
Despite a tendency to focus on the political aspect of the Hungarian refugee 
crisis, other works have been published on the reception of Hungarian 
refugees. Tony Kushner and Katharine Knox do not study the politics of 
refugees but the reasons and the conditions of asylum. Kushner and Knox 
dedicated an entire chapter on the Hungarian refugees in Britain in Refugees in 
an Age of Genocide: Global, National and Local Perspectives during the 
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Twentieth Century.44 They analyse the British political context of their arrival 
in the country, popular responses, as well as the temporary accommodation 
provided for the refugees. Many of their findings are useful for this thesis, 
notably on the conditions of the accommodation for refugees. Their main 
argument is that the British government accepted a great number of refugees 
because of popular pressure, without considering the Cold War context in the 
way Kecskés does. Kushner, in Remembering Refugees, has a totally different 
argument regarding the resettlement of Hungarians in Britain. He claims that 
the government was not in favour of resettling refugees, and that the Home 
Office had to be convinced by the Foreign Office to accept Hungarians. As a 
consequence Kushner argues that the resettlement experience of the 
Hungarians was not a happy experience for them as refugees were 
accommodated in abandoned or semi-abandoned buildings.45 
 
Humanitarian responses to the Hungarian situation played a role in the 
refugees' reception in France and in Britain. Peter Gatrell argues that 'in 
addressing the refugee crisis in Hungary in 1956, Western powers responded 
urgently in the light of Cold War rivalries'.46 He thus implies that France and 
Britain's humanitarian responses were framed by the Cold War context of the 
Western bloc opposition to the Soviet regime. Gatrell, however, sees another 
reason for this response as he claims that Western powers' actions 'affirmed a 
commitment to assist people who faced persecution, a stance that avoided 
acknowledging their belated and inadequate reaction to the plight of Europe's 
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Jews in the 1930s'. I will explore how the Holocaust informed French and 
British responses to refugee crises in 1956. But this thesis will also argue that 
humanitarian responses from the British and French governments to the 
refugee crises were largely dominated by a profit logic to exploit the situation 
to their own political and economic advantage, in line with both countries' 
immigration policies. 
 
As far as refugees from Egypt are concerned, existing secondary literature is 
very limited and their history has been left almost unexplored. Research done 
on this group of refugees focuses on their expulsion from Egypt, or on the 
Jewish community as a part of multicultural Egypt before 1956.47 Their 
expulsion is absent from work on the Suez Canal crisis, although it was one of 
the consequences of the joint military intervention by Britain, France and 
Israel.48  Apart from Michael M. Laskier, the core of the historiography on 
their expulsion from Egypt is by people who experienced or witnessed it, along 
with autobiographical or semi-autobiographical publications.49 The main 
exceptions are publications which focus on local experiences or on the process 
of expulsion from Egypt.50  
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On the subject of the expulsions from Egypt, Laskier's work has proved 
invaluable.51 He has thoroughly analysed the impact of the Suez crisis on the 
Jewish community in Egypt. His study covers the period from 1948 until 1970 
and the disappearance of the Jewish community in Egypt. Laskier argues that 
the anti-Jewish and anti-European measures conducted by Nasser in 1956 
accentuated a trend which started under the Egyptian monarchy. He has also 
analysed the responses of the International Committee of the Red Cross as well 
as Jewish organisations such as the American Joint Distribution Committee and 
the relief they brought to the Jewish community of Egypt. 
 
If there is little historiography available on refugees from Egypt and Hungary, 
there is rather more on immigration and refugees in France and Britain. 
Immigration policies, and the debates surrounding the adoption of such 
policies, cannot be separated from the questions of ethnicity and national 
identity. I aim here to contextualise and introduce the main issues regarding 
immigration, ethnicity, and national identity. 
 
The treatment of Jewish refugees in the 1930s is of importance for this thesis, 
for its impact in 1956. From 1933 until the Second World War, over 50,000 
Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany sought asylum in France. Vicki Caron 
argues that French refugee policy fluctuated during the six years before the 
war, depending on the government, public opinion, and the French Jewish 
community.52 Economic factors linked to the Depression led to calls for a more 
restrictive refugee policy at least until 1936. Yet, demographic shortfalls from 
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1934, pushed the military to call for a more liberal refugee policy with the view 
of incorporating refugees as conscripts. However, Georges Mauco and René 
Martial, demographic experts, asked the Ministry of Immigration to select 
immigrants who could be assimilated to 'safeguard the nation's ethnic, as well 
as its economic and military, health'.53 Middle-class responses to refugee 
immigration were very negative and motivated by antisemitism. Jewish 
refugees were largely urban and middle-class, and were considered by the 
French middle-class, and high-ranking members of the government, as 
ethnically inferior. The French Jewish community was itself divided over the 
Jewish refugees. Some considered that a restrictive refugee policy would 
prevent an antisemitic backlash, while others called for support to be given to 
the refugees.54 The Second World War marked an end to refugee immigration 
in France and in Britain, except for internal displaced populations in the French 
case. While Jewish refugees were safe from deportation in Britain, except for 
the Channel islands, it was the opposite in France. During the Vichy years 
more than 75,000 Jews were deported, of whom two thirds were foreigners, 
and only 2,500 survived.55 
 
Historiography shows that some of the Vichy laws affecting immigrants and 
Jews were abrogated with difficulty. Patrick Weil takes the example of the 
revocation in 1940 by Vichy of the Crémieux decree, which, in 1870, gave 
French citizenship to Algerian Jews.56 Yet, the decree was not automatically 
reinstated at the Liberation. Henri Giraud, head of the North African 
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administration from December 1942, abrogated all Vichy laws passed after 
July 1940, except for the Crémieux decree. Giraud believed that Muslims and 
Jews in Algeria should be treated equally, and yet, he held Jews responsible for 
the French defeat in 1940. It was only after protests from the French National 
Committee and the American press that the decree was reinstated in October 
1943. Similarly, the Minister of Justice, François de Menthon, did not want to 
reintegrate any 'éléments israélites douteux' into French nationality, as he 
believed that French Jews were responsible for antisemitism. Although in the 
end, most of the 15,154 denaturalised French got their citizenship back, the 
question of reintegrating Jews had been debated within the government. Thus 
there were different views within the government regarding Jews and French 
national identity.  
 
After the Liberation, new immigration policy was needed, especially after the 
racialisation of the question by the Vichy regime. On 2 November 1945, an 
ordinance was passed reaffirming the link between immigration and economic 
and demographic needs.57 Even if the Ordinance did not bear any mention of 
ethnic and national preferences, the theme was very much present in the 
debates during the drafting of the Ordinance. The question of immigration was 
indeed inseparable from the question of ethnicity and national identity. I will 
present here the main arguments presented during the debates of the Ordinance 
and their impact, as it defined French immigration policy after the Second 
World War and during the 1950s. 
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The first major argument is that the 1945 Ordinance followed a republican 
model and served not only national interests but also immigrants' interests. 
Patrick Weil establishes the foundations of the French immigration in 1938, 
when Georges Mauco became member of the Minister of Work's cabinet.58 For 
Mauco, it was important to select immigrants according to their ethnicity and 
the jobs they could occupy to make sure they would contribute to the 
demographic growth of France. During the Vichy years, Mauco further 
developed his theories to legitimise persecutions against Jews, and was a 
member of the French Popular Party until 1942. During the debate on the 1945 
Ordinance, there was, on one side, those in favour of ethnic selection of 
immigrants like Mauco, and on an other side, those in favour of a more liberal 
immigration policy, like Alexandre Parodi, Minister of Labour from September 
1944 to October 1945. Mauco's theories on ethnic preference were eventually 
defeated in favour of the adoption of a republican model of immigration, as 
Weil calls it. As a result, the 1945 Ordinance held no reference to national or 
ethnic preference. 
 
When it came to establish a new set of rules for naturalisation, Mauco, just like 
for the 1945 Ordinance on immigration, wanted to establish criteria based on 
ethnicity. The naturalisation and immigration questions were initially debated 
together. Thus, he produced a list of nationalities, and races, which were more 
or less compatible with French nationality. The aim of the list was to ensure 
that French character, or national identity, would not be transformed by 
introducing people who could not be assimilated. Despite having Charles de 
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Gaulle, Alfred Sauvy, general secretary of Family and Population at the 
Ministry of Public Health and Population, and Marcel Pagès, director of the 
foreigners division at the Ministry of the Interior, producing lists more or less 
similar to Mauco's, in the end, the naturalisation process was separated from 
the 1945 Ordinance debates, as a new code of nationality was established by 
the Ministry of Justice, which had no part in the debate on immigration 
policies.59 There was thus, according to Weil, no ethnic nor national preference 
for naturalisation from 1953, but a liberal interpretation of French national 
identity prevailed, and the contribution immigrants would make to the nation 
was the most important element.60 Weil thus downplays Mauco's influence in 
post-war French immigration policy, despite the endorsements of many of his 
ideas by prominent political and administrative figures. 
 
This dismissal of Mauco's influence is contested. Vincent Viet claims that, 
despite the fact that Mauco's proposals to include ethnic and assimilability 
criteria were rejected, a clear preference for European immigration persisted 
within the Ministry of Population.61 Viet argues that, when it came to admit 
immigrants in France, a cultural preference existed in every part of the 
administration dealing with immigrants until the 1970s. Alexis Spire explains 
the reasons for that. He argues that, while the new French government tried to 
dissociate itself with the Vichy regime, it was faced with pragmatic issues such 
as staff employment. The French government had no other option, following 
the adoption of the 2 November 1945 Ordinance than to use administrative 
structures and staff who were already in position during the Vichy years, which 
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had an effect on the interpretation of the Ordinance.62 Gérard Noiriel points out 
that the protectionist system adopted in the 1930s and perfected by the Vichy 
regime was reactivated by the 1945 Ordinance.63 There was thus a certain 
continuity with the Vichy regime in the administration dealing with 
immigration matters. In Immigration, antisémitisme et racisme en France, 
Noiriel analyses the 1945 Ordinance as a focus on assimilation and protection 
of French labour. Noiriel argues that there was continuity with Vichy in 
drafting the ordinance, notably with the maintenance of civil servants who 
were in place during the Vichy years, which led to an absence of the 
immigration question. Indeed, as the main authors of xenophobic and 
antisemitic discourses and policies were still in post after the Liberation, public 
debates on immigration policies were carefully avoided. He nevertheless states 
that ideas on racial preferences were defeated as Mauco and Sauvy's theses on 
racial superiority were rejected by the Conseil supérieur de l'immigration.  
 
Then, another argument regarding immigration in France lies in the selection of 
immigrants depending on their origins, with a focus on assimilation, and the 
country's economic needs. France, since the Third Republic, rationalised 
immigration in order to provide for its economic and demographic needs, while 
carefully choosing candidates for immigration but without proper structures of 
settlement to integrate immigrants. This argument is largely supported by 
Gérard Noiriel. The Third Republic, he suggests, created a new model of 
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immigration, whose functions were economic and social.64 This model was 
legally enforced after the two world wars, and until the 1970s. Noiriel calls this 
immigration model, one of 'integration/exclusion', and claims it favoured 
categories of immigrants according to labour skills and nationality, while 
excluding those who did not meet those criteria. Noiriel sees in government 
policies and structures in charge of immigrants an oppressive, and sometimes 
humiliating, system in which immigrants were seen as problems when they 
remained attach to their country of origins or culture.  
 
The main wave of immigrants in France after the Second World War came 
from Algeria, which was a French colony. Many experts and company leaders 
at the time spoke in positive terms about this Algerian immigration. Algerian 
labour was cheap, workers were mobile, and the movement of people between 
the colony and the metropole would encourage social and cultural assimilation, 
and so help secure the future of Algeria as a colony.65 Yet, as their numbers 
increased in France, and the independence movement grew stronger, Algerian 
immigrants were faced with greater discrimination, notably due to their origins, 
and the French administration became divided on the question of Algerian 
immigration. Noiriel claims that, after the Second World War, the discourses of 
'us' against 'them' no longer involved the same categories of foreigners as 
before the war. Before 1945, everyone not considered French could be 
regarded as 'them', including European immigrants and Jews. However, in the 
immediate post-war years, colonial subjects, and especially Algerians, were 
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treated as foreigners in France, despite enjoying full citizen rights since 1947.66 
Noiriel claims that the majority of the French population believed in a 
hierarchy of races, and that the French were superior to the Algerians. Thus, 
despite an official status aiming at giving Muslim Algerians the same rights as 
French citizens, they were not considered French. 
 
The policy behind the status of Algerians has been thoroughly analysed by 
Todd Shepard. According to Shepard, French policy towards Algeria was 
guided by assimilationism and coexistence until the Vichy regime. While 
acknowledging the particularity of different groups of people in Algeria, 
French officials believed that they would become full members of the French 
nation and eventually give up 'irrationality and religious fanaticism, Muslim in 
particular'.67 Shepard opposes the assimilationist policy of France in Algeria 
during the Third Republic with the Crémieux Decree to the implicit pursuit of 
coexistence, as no similar policy targeted populations under Berber or Muslim 
law.68 Despite the fact hat Muslim Algerians were only granted French 
citizenship in 1944, Shepard dismisses the arguments that it was because of 
racial exclusion or thanks to the conception the French nationality as 'race-
blind and egalitarian'. The exclusion of Muslim Algerian men from citizenship 
was because of resistance to assimilation of Algeria's Muslims by Algerian 
Muslims themselves and from racist attitude of officials in France and Algeria. 
Yet racism was counterbalanced by the assimilationist goal of the French 
government. Shepard claims that the introduction of  the status of 'Muslim 
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French from Algeria' in 1944 broke with the concept of unique and indivisible 
citizenship, as it endorsed both full political rights and the maintenance of local 
civil status. Yet, the introduction of this new status was felt by nationalist and 
Islamic organisations and Europeans in Algeria as covered colonial 
domination. Under such pressure, the new statute for Algeria was modified in 
1947 stating that Muslim Algerians residing in France enjoyed there all the 
rights attached to the quality of French citizenship, an important nuance. It 
meant that in France, 'French citizens with "local" civil status were… in theory 
politically equal to French citizens with common "French" status.' On the other 
hand, in Algeria, 'the statute left in place the existing local law court systems', 
which did not guarantee equality of rights. With the beginning of the Algerian 
War, Shepard argues that France 'attempted to reconcile republican values and 
imperial conquest' by redefining the nation-state. In an effort to guarantee that 
Algeria would remain part of the French Republic, France tried to extend 
political rights and economic assistance in Algeria.69  
 
Alec Hargreaves agrees with other scholars that immigration in post-war 
France favoured Europeans over Africans and Asians, despite the 1945 
Ordinance making no mention of ethnic preferences. State control over the 
recruitment of immigrants was guaranteed by the Ordinance, but, according to 
Hargreaves, was undercut by three main forces: the low inflows from European 
countries, the exemption of Algerians from formal immigration controls, and 
French employers using their own means to recruit rather than the Office 
National de l'Immigration (ONI). The ONI was created by the Ordinance with 
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the aim of controlling and organising immigration according to labour needs, 
and acted as a link between labour immigrants and French employers. The 
laissez-faire attitude caused the French government to lose control over the 
ethnic composition of the foreign population in France.70 Hargreaves claims 
that the preferences established by Mauco could be informed by the ideology 
of colonisation, which saw Arabs and Asians as inferior to Europeans. There 
was, at the Liberation, a widespread belief that colonised people differed far 
more from the French than Europeans.71 Hargreaves states that assimilation 
was the 'ultimate objective of the colonial project', as it promised equal 
political rights to the indigenous inhabitants of the overseas territories. 
However, in practice, political equality was reserved for a small elite among 
the indigenous populations as they were not acculturated enough to claim 
French citizenship as nationality did not mean full citizenship and political 
rights.72 
 
Gary Freeman, in Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies, 
argues that post-war French immigration policy went from an attempt to 
control of immigration by the State to laissez-faire.73 Freeman argues that the 
French government's decision to relate labour immigration to demography was 
the consequence of the post First World War situation, with the loss of 
1,500,000 military and civilians. As the loss figure reached more than 
2,000,000 in 1945, the French government called for immigration with 
economic and demographic goals. It was with this dual aim in mind that the 
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Ordinance of 2 November 1945 was passed, framing French immigration 
policy until 1980. Yet, the ONI failed to fulfil its role of organising labour 
immigration. Freeman argues that from 1947 to 1967, the French government 
barely had control of immigration, which became spontaneous and often 
clandestine.74 He attributes this situation to the fact that the ONI was unable to 
process the number of workers needed by France, and that many firms 
arranged for the arrival of foreign workers themselves rather than paying a fee 
to the ONI. Freeman, however, does not make any mention of the debate 
between Mauco and Parodi about ethnicity regarding the 1945 Ordinance.  
 
Another argument opposes Freeman's view that immigration from 1945 was a 
policy of laissez-faire. Yves Lequin argues that the years from 1945 to 1955 
were marked by a failed attempt to control immigration in France.75 Lequin 
states that, in contrast to the inter-war years, when immigration was controlled 
by the Société Générale d'Immigration (SGI), an employers' organisation 
selecting labour immigrants, the French government tried, with the 1945 
Ordinance and the new nationality code, to associate labour immigration with 
assimilation of migrants into French society. The creation of the ONI by the 
1945 Ordinance was a way to replace the SGI by a State-controlled 
organisation. Between 1945 and 1955, the French immigration policy was 
drafted with the aim of  assimilating immigrants into French society but 
progressively gave way to temporary immigration of unskilled single young 
men, due to the urgent need of labour. Lequin describes the years from 1945 to 
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1980 as a period when immigration was absent from public debate without any 
law defining French immigration policy.76  
 
In the case of refugees, Noiriel argues that the model of 'integration/exclusion' 
applies again. In Réfugiés et sans-papiers, Noiriel analyses the French 
government's policies on refugees from the French revolution to the late 1980s, 
and the effects of these policies on refugees.77 Refugees, just like labour 
immigrants, were subjected to national preference. This served to protect the 
French economy, and refugees were expelled if they were unemployed once in 
France, just like other labour migrants.78 After the end of the Second World 
War, Noiriel's main argument is that refugees in France had to prove that they 
fitted the definition of a refugee as understood by international law, and its 
interpretation by the French government and administration. From 1952, the 
Office Français pour la Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides (OFPRA) was in 
charge of establishing whether refugees fitted the definition and then 
determined whether or not they were allowed to remain in France and to work. 
According to Noiriel, the creation of the OFPRA changed the way refugees 
were perceived and controlled. From its creation, the OFPRA worked with 
embassies or the police to assess if refugees were indeed persecuted or not. 
Noiriel claims that the OFPRA assessed the political situation of refugees' 
countries of origin from a French perspective.79 Rather than supporting 
refugees, the OFPRA's mission was to refuse 'bogus' refugees any protection 
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and right of asylum, when it actually chose which refugees could be useful for 
French interests.  
 
As far as refugees are concerned, Patrick Weil argues that there was a 
republican tradition of asylum, interrupted from July 1940 to be replaced by 
ethnical hierarchy until the end of the war.80 Weil sees in the 1951 Geneva 
Convention a guarantee of the rights of refugees in France, and the end of 
precarious conditions for them. Finally, he argues that the policies regarding 
the status of refugee in France were drafted in a benevolent spirit of 
protection.81 
 
The discussion will now move on to the politics of immigration in Britain. Like 
in France, immigration questions were linked to national identity and ethnicity. 
British immigration policy in the 1950s was influenced by pre-war policies. It 
is important to understand under which context they were passed and who they 
targeted, in order to assess the legal framework in which refugees from 
Hungary and Egypt arrived in 1956. The arrival in Britain of Russian and 
eastern European Jews escaping pogroms at the end of the nineteenth century 
was the first big wave of contemporary immigrants. In 1903, the Royal 
Commission on Alien immigration published a report describing Jews as 
undesirable.82 At the time and since 1826, with only an interruption of two 
years in 1848, any foreigner could come and stay in Britain.83 Panikos Panayi 
claims that the political stability and relative prosperity of the mid-Victorian 
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period permitted this laissez-faire attitude, which started being questioned with 
the Great Depression of the late nineteenth century. At that point, Jewish 
immigrants of the East End of London became scapegoats for poverty, 
unemployment and overcrowding. Zig Layton-Henry claims that a campaign 
led by a small number of Conservatives, but supported by the Prime Minister, 
Lord Salisbury, and relying on existing antisemitism in British society, was 
launched to impose immigration controls.84 It was in with the aim of stopping 
this wave of 'undesirable aliens' that the Aliens Act of 1905 was passed. This 
Act is arguably the beginning of modern immigration control in Britain. Panayi 
argues that the more an immigrant group is visible the more it faces 
restrictions. He sees two main factors determining the level of immigration 
since the 1905 Aliens Act: Britain's economic needs, and an xenophobic press 
influencing public opinion.85 
 
The Aliens Act of 1914, passed in a single day during the First World War, 
went further and was designed to keep strict control over aliens during the 
course of war. It led to large-scale internment and deportations. Approximately 
30,000 aliens were expelled, including 7,000 Russian Jews. The power to 
deport aliens was made permanent under the Aliens Restrictions Act of 1919.86 
David Cesarani describes the debates of the Aliens Restrictions Act as blended 
with anti-German feeling, antisemitism and racism.87 This Act was passed in 
anti-alien hysteria. A year later, the Order of 1920 required work permits for 
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any immigrant wishing to settle in the UK, and entry was refused to 
immigrants who could not financially support themselves.88 Finally, the Aliens 
Order of 1925 targeted seamen, and made them subject to the 1920 Order. This 
time not only aliens were concerned, but also British-born Black people who 
were frequently arrested by the police at British sea docks. They had to register 
with the police and carry identification papers, and could be deported if they 
failed to prove their nationality.89  
 
The main groups of immigrants in Britain after the Second World War came 
from the Commonwealth. In The Politics of Immigration, Zig Layton-Henry 
argues that, unlike France, which tried to rationalise its immigration policy, 
colonial immigration in Britain was largely spontaneous and unorganised. 
Layton-Henry notes that, in 1948, the British government looked at the 
possibility of filling vacant positions in Britain with Caribbean immigration. 
Layton-Henry claims that, from an economic point of view, Commonwealth 
immigration was welcomed as it was used to fill positions otherwise left 
vacant, and for which British and European immigrant workers had little 
interest.90 He states that post-war immigration contributed to the economic 
growth of Britain and the improvement of living standards. As far as national 
identity is concerned, Layton-Henry dismisses as myth the idea that Britain, 
along with all European countries, was a homogeneous nation-state. Britain 
realised it had became a 'multiracial state with substantial non-European 
minorities' after 1948, and the first wave of Caribbean immigration.91 
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Absorbing large numbers of Commonwealth immigrants into British society 
became a concern for the British government in the early post-war years. 
Layton-Henry claims that the main reason not to call for colonial immigration 
was racial prejudice.92 He argues that, while post-war immigration contributed 
to economic growth, it was never considered as an asset, due to racial 
stereotypes found among the government and the working class.93 
 
Ian Spencer, in British Immigration Policy since 1939, goes further than 
Layton-Henry in his approach. Spencer argues that, in the post-war years, 
Black and Asian immigration was controlled in practice, despite the 1948 
Nationality Act. The decision to restrict entry to people from former  and 
current colonies was motivated by assumptions on the undesirability of 
'physically and culturally distinct groups'.94 Spencer shows that the government 
wanted to limit the number of non-white immigrants, arguing that the 
government blamed colonial immigration for racial disturbances.95 However, 
although ministers agreed on the need to introduce legislation regarding 
deportation and strict immigration policy, it was never properly drafted in the 
1950s. Spencer attributes this to the fact that public interest on 'coloured' 
immigration wore off in 1955, and that Anthony Eden, then Prime Minister, 
was not keen on legislating on the issue due to the political difficulties it would 
have caused. Spencer argues that, had a law restricting Commonwealth 
migration been passed in 1955, Britain's influence within the Commonwealth 
would have been jeopardised. It would have also damaged the still-emerging 
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Commonwealth of Nations as a whole at a time when the government was 
'preaching the virtues of multi-racialism and racial partnership to others'. 
Spencer claims that, in comparison with the welcome given to 750,000 Irish 
immigrants who came to Britain after 1945, the government's fears about 
immigration were more to do with Commonwealth immigrants than 
immigration in general.96 
 
As far as refugees were concerned, they, too, faced difficulties seeking asylum 
in Britain. From 1933 until 1940, a significant number of refugees from Nazi 
Germany sought asylum in France and in Britain. Louise London argues that 
the 70,000 Jewish refugees were only granted asylum in Britain on the 
condition they would not become a burden on public funds, which put 
considerable pressure on private organisations to financially support them.97 
The British government favoured the Kindertransport, which represented 
10,000 of the total of Jewish refugees, because 'Anglicisation would minimise 
the extent to which their ethnicity would be perceived as alien'.98 Moreover, 
Anglo-Jewish leaders and the government feared that a larger Jewish 
population in Britain would cause a rise in antisemitism.99 Louise London 
suggests that ethnicity and national identity played a role in accepting Jewish 
refugees from Nazi Germany.  
 
One of the most significant contributions in the field of refugee history is Tony 
Kushner and Katharine Knox's Refugees in an Age of Genocide. Kushner and 
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Knox argue that from the end of the nineteenth century and throughout the 
twentieth century, refugees were never welcome in Britain. Although the 
Aliens Act of 1905 included clauses to grant asylum to the persecuted, with 
this legislation 'asylum became a privilege granted by the state and not an 
automatic right'.100 The potential for anti-alien sentiment in British society and 
the State led to restrictions of the right of asylum, with the exception of Jewish 
refugees from Nazi Germany, and even with these it was given under certain 
conditions and without unanimous approval. Colin Holmes goes further, as he 
claims that there is an history of invoking a 'tradition of tolerance' to justify 
xenophobic events, such as the Nottingham and Notting Hill race riots. This 
invoked 'tradition of tolerance' serves to downplay racial hatred by labelling it 
an 'unfortunate aberration'.101 Holmes describes hostility towards immigrants 
and refugees as a complex intertwinement of forces such as the role of 
individuals, cultural stereotypes, immediate pressures, local and international 
influences.102 
 
A recurring aspect of the history of immigration in Britain in the first half of 
the twentieth century is that, when confronted by significant numbers of 
immigrants and refugees, successive governments repeatedly asserted that 
Britain was not a country of immigration. The Aliens Acts mentioned earlier 
were all in response of what was viewed by successive governments as waves 
of immigration that needed, if not to be stopped, to be strictly controlled.  
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When it comes to ethnicity, Hargreaves argues that definition varies from one 
country to the other. Hargreaves distinguishes three main strands to define 
ethnic groups: biological, politico-territorial, and cultural. The extent to which 
immigrants and their descendants are incorporated into nation-states depends 
on socio-economic processes, values and aspirations of ethnic minority groups, 
and on the attitudes of the majority population towards these groups both at 
state and society levels. In Britain, ethnic minorities are associated with skin 
colour and discrimination, with non-white groups defined as ethnic minorities, 
with the exception of the Irish, considered to be subject to discrimination.103  
 
The 1948 Nationality Act played on role on colonial immigration in Britain. 
This Act gave all imperial subjects the right of free entry into Britain. Robert 
Colls states that the passing of the 1948 Nationality Act was linked to the 
liberalist tradition of Britain.104 However, liberalism had its limits. Colls states 
that, although colonial peoples were considered British subjects, the question 
of national identity did not affect colonies but only Britain. Colls' argument is 
that, at the time, to be British in post-war Britain meant to be Anglo-Saxon, 
and the arrival of immigrants from India and the West Indies challenged this 
identity. In post-war Britain, many considered themselves superior simply 
because they were white Britons, and that 'mass immigration reactivated the 
invader thesis'. Yet, according to Colls, the British government, in the post-war 
years until 1962, believed that Britain could potentially absorb anyone from the 
Commonwealth. However, while many politicians had a firm belief in that 
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statement, local populations sometimes responded negatively to the settling of 
Black and Asian immigrants.105  
 
Wendy Webster, in Englishness and Empire, argues that, after the Second 
World War, Englishness was defined in opposition to the Commonwealth, as a 
result of the increasing immigration from former colonies. Webster claims that 
immigration set 'little England' in opposition to a multiracial 
Commonwealth.106 According to Webster, Commonwealth immigration in the 
1950s challenged the idea of Britain as a multiracial family. Webster shows 
that Black and Asian immigrants, despite being formally British citizens, were 
perceived as aliens. The idea of a racial boundary between Britain and the rest 
of the Empire was transgressed with Black and Asian immigration. On the 
other hand, European Voluntary Workers (EVW), an immigration scheme 
composed of Polish and Ukrainian prisoners of war, were seen as having 
greater claims to belong as white catholic immigrants. Thus the pre-war 
inclusive British identity, seen as a multiracial empire, changed in the mid-
1950s. The British nation then identified itself by excluding Commonwealth 
immigrants.107 Colonial immigration was thus a threat to Englishness, and 
Britishness, symbolised as a home. This construction of national identity, 
Webster argues, referred to home and family as white. 
 
Robin Cohen, in Migration and its Enemies, argues that immigration policies 
and practices serve to define what make English and British national identities. 
According to him, the study of rejected groups of immigrants because of 
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religion, language, economic competition, and race, enables to grasp the 
construction process of British national identity.108 Cohen called the period 
from 1945 to 1978 the 'racialization of immigration'. The British Nationality 
Act of 1948, along with the 1962, 1968 and 1971 Immigration Acts as 
supplementing the 1905, 1914, and 1919 Acts, aimed at extending the reasons 
for deportations and turned Commonwealth citizens into aliens.109 
 
Some historiographical work, like Adrian Favell, in Philosophies of 
Integration, compares the British and French models of immigration.110 Favell 
argues that France has a universal idea of integration, transforming migrants 
into full French citizens, while Britain manages public order and relations 
between communities.111 Favell describes France's philosophy of integration 
linked to its cultural past and heritage from the Third Republic and calls it 'the 
myth of republican citizenship'. Favell claims that the rules of immigration and 
integration are republican and citizenship-based. It means that France was a 
'universal nation of equal and free citizens', whose members did not belong to a 
particular ethnic group but were characterised by their willingness to adhere to 
the French nation. Immigration and naturalisation policies are thus what define 
who is French and who is foreign, and make integration dependent on how 
policies define the idea of associative membership to the French nation.112 
According to Favell, Britain's immigration and nationality policies are in sharp 
contrast to French ones. He calls it the 'myth of citizenship and social progress'. 
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British immigration policy is described as liberal, while British nationality is 
characterized by a feeling of belonging, and citizenship is defined as a 'quality 
of communal social life, of civilised behaviour'. In comparison with other 
European countries, ethnic and racial questions benefited from shared views 
from the Left and the Right in British politics. Thus, with the 1948 Nationality 
Act, the Left believed it was an appropriate response to Britain's 
responsibilities towards its ex-colonies. On the other hand, the Right saw in the 
Act 'the fulfilment of Britain's role as empire leader, and the preservation of 
sovereign rule'. Then, according to Favell, a political consensus existed on 
immigration and racial questions in post-war Britain.113 
 
 
 
-Immigration in France and Britain and the Cold War, 1945-
1956 
 
After the Second World War, refugees from Hungary and Egypt were not the 
first immigrants to arrive in Britain and France. The aim of this section is to 
present an outline of the main waves of colonial and postcolonial immigration 
in France and Britain from the end of the Second World War until 1956 and 
their relationship with the Cold War context. In contrast to France, Britain did 
not pass new regulations on immigration after the Second World War. Yet, 
they similarly adopted new rules regarding nationality, with the British 
                                                 
113
 Favell, Philosophies of Integration, pp.94-102. 
 55
Nationality Act of 1948. Understanding this Act and its impact on immigration 
in the 1950s is of importance for this thesis.  
 
The British Nationality Act confirmed an already existing situation: there was 
no distinction 'between the citizenship and nationality of the monarch's subjects 
resident in the different parts of the Empire or between the monarch's citizens 
and the monarch's subjects' living in the United Kingdom. Citizens from newly 
independent countries, like India and Pakistan, remained British subjects, 
regardless of them having Indian or Pakistani passports. The British 
government reaffirmed its faith in the imperial unity.114 In the debate on the 
Act, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, the Conservative spokesman on home affairs, 
was proud to announce that there were no colour bar restrictions in Britain 
thanks to this Act, and he described it as a commitment to a great tradition of 
hospitality to every member of the Empire.115 
 
The passing of the British Nationality Act coincides with the first time a 
memorandum was circulated to Cabinet members on the subject of what was 
referred to as 'coloured immigration'. The arrival of the Empire Windrush, a 
boat carrying 417 Jamaican immigrants, was widely publicised and also 
discussed within the Cabinet. A dichotomy between the government's public 
tolerance towards black immigration and private discourses of doubts and 
hostility took its roots back in 1948. The British Nationality Act became 
problematic as soon as it was passed, and soon the Cabinet debated the needs 
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and contents of measures to prevent Commonwealth immigration.116 Although 
this type of immigration existed before the Second World War, the Cabinet 
feared it would rapidly increase beyond control. 
 
In January 1951, an ad hoc committee of ministers appointed by the Prime 
Minister, Clement Atlee, and chaired by the Home Secretary, James Chuter 
Ede, reviewed the means to be adopted to check Commonwealth immigration 
to the United Kingdom.117 Three methods were considered to control it: to 
apply to British subjects the controls then applied to aliens, to deport British 
subjects who had been resident for not more than two years and had applied for 
national assistance or had been convicted of a serious offence or had attempted 
to create social unrest, to return stowaways to Britain to the territory from 
which they embarked or to which they belonged. However, the committee 
warned that these three methods were controversial and that introduction of 
legislation was not justified. It nonetheless recommended to maintain as 
effectively as possible the control of stowaways. This report shows that there 
was a fear that Commonwealth immigration would increase to the point of 
being uncontrollable. One of the main concerns was that this new immigration 
could be become a financial burden, but also could cause crime and social 
unrest.  
 
Although, the Cabinet considered it wrong to segregate what it called the 
'colonial community', further memoranda made it clear that there was a 
potential risk in leaving Commonwealth immigration unchecked for Britain's 
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economy and national identity.118 In 1954, the Lord President of the Council, 
Lord Salisbury, expressed his concerns that if this immigration was not 
controlled, Britain would face a much larger problem in 20 or 30 years.119 
Commonwealth immigration was described as opportunistic and economic. 
According to this argument, the British welfare state attracted immigrants who 
wanted to take advantage of social services. Moreover, there was an 
underlying, yet widespread, concern in the Cabinet that a large number would 
unbalance British society. These ideas were relayed to the press and in the 
public, and a campaign against the arrival of West Indians also emerged in the 
country, despite immigrant workers usually occupying the least desirable jobs 
and housing.120  
 
The discussion now moves on to North African immigration in France and the 
relationship with the Algerian war. As the review of historiography suggested, 
there was an increase in North African immigration to France, especially from 
Algeria due the status of Algerians as 'Français Musulmans d'Algérie'. This 
citizenship status gave them the right of free circulation between Algeria and 
France, as well as the same rights as French citizens.121 This status had a great 
impact in terms of immigration. Whereas, between 1946 and 1954, foreign 
immigration to France stagnated, immigration from Algeria increased from 
22,000 to 210,000. 
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Moroccans and Tunisians had the status of protected subjects since 1938. They 
did not need a stay permit, but had to have authorisation to migrate to France 
and go through a health check. They also needed an identity card mentioning 
their status, and the profession they were authorised to exercise. Their 
employment was thus dependent on labour needs. After the independence of 
Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, their nationals still did not need a stay permit, 
until 1959 for Moroccans and 1963 for Tunisians.122  
 
The beginning of the Algerian War, in November 1954, drastically changed the 
representations of Algerian immigration in France. The war was fought in 
Algeria but also in France, and many considered Algerian immigrants as 
potential enemies. Algerian workers became the objects of a press campaign 
associating them with criminality and terrorism. This press campaign existed 
prior to the beginning of the Algerian War. From 1947, left and right-wing 
newspapers presented the alleged Algerian criminality as a national issue. The 
association of criminal acts with the Algerians made them appear like criminals 
or terrorists supporting the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). Ultimately, 
the humiliations and gross exploitation of Algerian immigrants encouraged 
Algerian nationalism and the fight for independence, while immigrants of other 
nationalities lived in relative peace.123 
 
Following the insurrection that started the Algerian War, on 1 November 1954, 
the French press and those in the political sphere held Egypt and the Arab 
League responsible for it. They also saw the complicity of the Algerian 
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Communist Party, the PCF, and international communism in general.124 
Although, this association was the result of an amalgamation of nationalism 
and communism, relations between communism, the Algerian War, and 
immigrants were complex. Participation in strikes in France was associated 
with the Cold War context depending on the nationality of the immigrants on 
strike. Very often, the French government suspected strikes to be the initiative 
of Communists.125 
 
On 12 March 1956, Guy Mollet, Socialist Prime Minister, was voted special 
powers by the National Assembly, suspending individual liberties and sending 
troops to Algeria in an effort to suppress the war.126 The Left, including the 
PCF, which also voted in favour, and especially the French Section of the 
Socialist International (SFIO), became weaker following the special powers 
vote, seen as an abandonment of the Left's traditional values. Yet, the Left tried 
to cling on to its fundamental ideas by claiming that the aim was to protect 
local populations and to end the war. Despite those claims, and others in which 
the Left stated it still believed in the assimilation of Algeria to France and 
refused to talk about peoples or nations but talked rather of territories and 
'indigènes', the Left became associated with military repression, and Mollet 
was considered a traitor to socialism. However, it marked a stronger, more 
repressive approach, to the Algerian War by the French government. 
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Still in 1956, foreign workers were given the same rights as Algerian workers: 
they could be employed in France without the intervention of the ONI. 
Spontaneous immigration was then favoured, with the hope to slow Algerian 
immigration. The government considered that it would be beneficial to have 
more desirable immigrants, as the Algerian War seriously damaged the image 
of Algerians in France.127 The Cold War context only worsened the perception 
of the Algerian War and Algerian immigrants, confusing communism, as the 
PCF was against imperialism and colonisation, and nationalism. 
 
The Suez crisis also mixed communism and nationalism, and links with the 
Algerian War were made, as additional reasons for France and Britain to 
intervene military in Egypt. The French and British governments established a 
military plan to regain control of the canal, after its nationalisation by Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian president, on 26 July 1956. The plan of action was 
decided in Sèvres between 22 and 24 October, by Christian Pineau, French 
minister of Foreign Affairs, Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign Secretary, and 
David Ben-Gurion, Israeli Prime Minister. The plan was supported by Anthony 
Eden, the British Prime Minister, and Guy Mollet, as they believed that it 
would give the impression that France and Britain were acting as peacekeepers, 
when they actually wanted to regain control of the Suez canal and to overthrow 
Nasser. The plan called for Israel to attack Egypt on 29 October and to occupy 
the canal zone. It was followed by the French and British military intervention 
on 31 October, officially to end the military conflict.128 
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At the time of the Suez intervention, the alliance between Britain, France and 
Israel was an unexpected one. British relations with Israel were troubled at the 
time of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. Britain's defensive treaty with 
Jordan, signed in 1948, was a major source of tension with Israel. Since 1953, 
the situation deteriorated between Israel and Jordan, to the point that in 
October 1954, Britain started to plan how to fulfil their agreement with 
Jordan.129 From 1955, and even until during the planning of Operation 
Musketeer, a plan named Operation Cordage had been designed and modified 
as the situation in Egypt changed, in order to attack Israel. On the night of 28 
February 1955, Israel launched a raid near the town of Gaza. Following the 
raid, Nasser claimed that it had led him to conclude an arms deal with 
Czechoslovakia. The British held Israel responsible for the escalation of 
tensions with Egypt.130 Britain also reduced its supply of arms to Israel to 
eventually suspend it on 3 January 1956. David Ben-Gurion, the Israeli Prime 
Minister, considered that the arms balance was unfavourable to Israel, and that 
if nothing was done, it could not defend itself against Egypt.131  
 
It made the planning of the attack on Egypt all the more difficult as Britain had 
to prevent Israel from attacking Jordan. On 11 October, Israel launched an 
attack on the Jordanian town of Qalqilya in retaliation of the murder of two 
Israeli farmers. Israel and Britain were on the verge of military confrontation as 
King Hussein asked Britain to honour the defensive pact.132 Britain managed to 
avoid confrontation by sending forces from Cyprus. It was also made clear to 
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Golda Meir, the Israeli Foreign Minister, that Britain would stand by their 
treaty to protect Jordan.133  
 
The French attitude towards Israel was different from the British one. Despite 
being a signatory of the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950, France sold arms 
to Israel, in order to have a large share of the Middle East arms market, despite 
already selling arms to Syria.134 France continued to supply Israel with arms 
much to the discontent of Britain, until the nationalisation of the Suez canal.135 
There was, however, one exception as Israel faced an arms embargo after 
attacking Syrian positions on the lake Kinneret on 11 December 1955. The 
embargo was eventually lifted in February 1956.136 Moreover, France and 
Israel had a common enemy in Egypt. In 1954, connections were made 
between the Algerian War and the deepening conflict between Israel and 
Egypt. Israel could provide France with information about events in Algeria 
and the links with Nasser and the FLN, if France would in return support the 
Israeli by selling them arms.137 Despite a sometimes ambivalent foreign policy 
towards Israel, France became the intermediary between Britain and Israel in 
order to secure cooperation as needed for the military intervention in Egypt. 
Ben-Gurion and Eden agreed to collaborate if Britain promised not to attack 
Israel, and that Israel would not attack Jordan.138 
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The military action in Egypt was generally supported by the French 
government and the French public, except for Communists and Poujadists. 
However, the objective of the military intervention in Egypt was not just to 
regain control of the Suez canal.139 The Algerian war context, which started in 
November 1954, influenced the French government's decisions during the Suez 
crisis. When the Sèvres agreement was concluded, Guy Mollet and Christian 
Pineau hoped to overthrow Nasser, as the French government suspected him of 
providing the FLN with training and supplies.140 French patriotism was very 
high during the Suez crisis. Nasser was depicted in France as a new Hitler, and 
the nationalisation of the Suez canal had been compared by the French press to 
the German reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936. Many among the 
government thought that the FLN could not be defeated until Nasser had been 
removed. In solving the Suez crisis, the French government was thus hoping to 
make a major step towards the end of the Algerian War by weakening the FLN. 
 
In Britain, the reactions to the Suez military action were mixed. Press reactions 
were divided between support to the military action and Eden, and sharp 
criticism. The Daily Mail and the Daily Telegraph claimed that intervention 
was necessary to safeguard the British Empire or to avoid the world irreparable 
damage. In contrast, the Daily Mirror and the Observer strongly criticized 
Eden for acting, along with France, like 'gangsters'. The Times also questioned 
the intervention, while the BBC remained supportive of Eden's policy. On the 
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whole, the press was debating the rights and wrongs of the military 
intervention.141  
 
Reactions among the government were also divided. Eden had to deal with the 
resignation of two junior ministers, Anthony Nutting and Edward Boyle, when 
it became clear that military intervention in Egypt would take place. Other 
ministers also disapproved but did not resign. Parliamentary opposition, and 
notably Hugh Gaitskell, who had been elected Labour leader in December 
1955, strongly condemned the intervention and called for Eden's resignation on 
4 November 1956.142 
 
Although Britain's military intervention in Egypt was officially to act as a 
peacekeeper, the British Cabinet also had a second objective: a change of 
government in Egypt, although for a different reason than the French 
government.143 The British Cabinet hoped that the removal of Nasser would 
have enabled the installation of a new regime 'less hostile to the West'.144 
 
Only days before beginning of the military action in Egypt, the Hungarian 
revolution started. The French and British governments supported the 
Hungarian revolution but took no action. Christian Pineau declared to the press 
on 26 October that France would not seek to exploit the events in Hungary for 
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its own benefit, but nevertheless supported the demonstrations.145 On 1 
November, R.A. Butler, the Lord Privy Seal, announced at the House of 
Commons that the British government had no intention of exploiting events in 
Eastern Europe to undermine the security of the Soviet Union.146 One of the 
reasons given to explain why France and Britain did not offer support to 
Hungary was because they were distracted by the Suez crisis.147 There was also 
the practical issue of military support. Pierre Kende claims that, in 1956, the 
only terrestrial way to Hungary was via Austria.148 However, Austria's recent 
status as a neutral country prevented the use of this option. Moreover, 
European countries feared that military intervention in Soviet affairs could start 
a world war.149  
 
This introduction to the thesis has shown that there was a complex relationship 
between immigration policies, immigrants, and the Cold War context. The 
thesis will now explore these relationships and how it affected the refugees 
from Hungary and Egypt in France and Britain.  
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Part I 
2. Two per cent of the Hungarian population 
 
Before looking at the Hungarian refugee crisis itself and the French and British 
responses, this preamble to chapters 3 and 4 briefly introduces the context that 
led 200,000 Hungarians to seek refuge in Austria and in Yugoslavia after 
October 1956. Hungarian refugees fell under the protection of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention, as August Lindt declared that their situation was a consequence of 
the Second World War. I will discuss in this chapter the political context in 
Hungary since 1945.1 
 
Hungary did not become a Communist country immediately after it was 
liberated by the Soviet army in 1945. The coalition government and the 
National Assembly were both led by leaders of the Smallholders' party, while 
Communists remained a minority.2 The Paris Peace Treaty signed in February 
1947 gave a legal basis for the Russians to keep their troops in Hungary for an 
unspecified period of time. This situation improved the position of the 
Hungarian Communist Party and the Party was able to eliminate their political 
opponents. Elected in 1946, Ferenc Nagy resigned from his position of prime 
minister in May 1947, following political pressure, and the country thereafter 
was led by the Hungarian Communist Party.3  
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In early 1948, a Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship was signed in Moscow 
between the Hungarian government and the Soviet government. Shortly after, 
Hungary became a one party country and adopted the Stalinist political 
structure.4 The role of the State Security Authority (AVH) was instrumental in 
enforcing Stalinist values.5 The AVH eliminated political opponents in order to 
consolidate the Communist Party position in the country. Its methods were 
known to be brutal, and it terrorised the local population. 
 
Many of the leaders of the Hungarian Communist Party were Jewish. However, 
the Communist doctrine rejected religion, and the Soviet regime was known for 
being antisemitic. As a consequence, Mátyás Rákosi, First Secretary of the 
Hungarian Communist Party, Ernő Gerő, First Secretary of the Hungarian 
Workers' Party, and Gábor Péter, chief of the political police, all adopted 
Hungarian-sounding names. Charles Gati claims that 70 to 80 per cent of the 
leaders the AVO, the State Security Department, and then the AVH, were 
Jewish.6 As many political leaders were Jewish, there was a popular 
antisemitism directed against them, notably among anti-Communists. 
 
Despite having Jews occupying high-ranking positions, antisemitism was still 
present and tolerated in Hungary.7 This can be demonstrated by the fact that 
Hungarian Jewish leaders rejected their Jewish identity in order to be able to 
make their careers progress as leaders in a country under the control of the 
Soviet authorities. In 1952-1953, for example, there was a large campaign of 
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antisemitism in the Soviet Union, symbolised by the Slansky trial in Prague 
and the Doctors' Plot to murder Stalin in Moscow. Well-aware of the 
widespread antisemitism in the Soviet Union, Israel, since its creation, tried to 
negotiate the emigration of Soviet Jews.8 Although a large proportion of 
Hungarian Jews wanted to leave the country to emigrate to Israel or elsewhere, 
a minority of Communist Hungarian Jews viewed the Soviet authorities as 
liberators as they escaped deportation and death during the Second World War 
thanks to the arrival of the Soviet army.9 
 
In order to understand how the revolution started in Hungary, it is necessary to 
briefly look at Poland's relationship with the Soviet Union in 1956. The 
accession of Wladyslaw Gomulka to the position of First Secretary of the 
Polish United Workers' Party on 21 October was a turning point for both 
countries. In Poland, the reform movement, strengthened in July 1956 by the 
workers' strike in Poznań, was reinforced during the Eighth Plenum of the 
Polish United Workers' Party on 19-21 October when Gomulka was elected 
despite Soviet disapproval. Nikita Khrushchev, along with Anastas Mikojan, 
First Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union, Vyacheslav Molotov and Lazar 
Kaganovich, both First Vice-Premier of the Council of Ministries, attended the 
plenum. They threatened Poland with military intervention if Gomulka's 
election was confirmed. However, on 20 October, the Soviet Union, under the 
pressure of China, refused to intervene militarily. Gomulka made it clear to 
Khrushchev that his new role as First Secretary would not alter Poland's ties 
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with the Soviet Union. The new Polish Politburo, the executive body of the 
Polish Communist Party, was chosen on the closing day of the Plenum. It did 
not include any politicians of the Stalinist period and confirmed Gomulka as 
First Secretary who announced a 'Polish way to socialism'. In Hungary, 
students and some politicians believed the situation in Poland was an 
opportunity to obtain more independence in domestic political and economic 
affairs.10 
 
It is in such a context that the revolution in Hungary started. The League of 
Hungarian University Students (MEFESZ), an independent organisation 
opposing the Stalinist leadership of Gerő, then First Secretary of the Hungarian 
Communist Party, was re-established on 15 October by students of the 
University of Szeged. It opposed the government by formulating demands and 
publishing manifestos. Between 15 October and 23 October, student 
assemblies in universities were formed throughout all of Hungary. On 22 
October, a student assembly at the Technical University of Budapest voted to 
join the newly reformed MEFESZ. It also sent its spokesmen to deliver the 
resolutions to other universities, factories, and local and central offices. They 
actively sought the use of demonstrations and strikes to make themselves 
heard.  
 
On the night of 22 October, students were joined by people from all classes and 
asked for reforms: a multiparty system, free elections, civil rights, national 
economic independence, and the reinstatement of Hungarian national holidays 
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and symbols of state.11 A demonstration to promote those ideas took place in 
Budapest on 23 October, starting from the monument to General Bem, a Polish 
revolutionary who led Hungarian forces to victory against Habsburg and 
Tsarist military units in 1849. On that day, tens of thousands of demonstrators 
met at the monument, including students, workers and other sympathisers. Two 
hundred thousand people gathered in front of the Parliament building and 
around, calling for Imre Nagy to become the new leader of the country.  
 
Nagy was First Secretary from 1953 to 1955, but had been removed from his 
functions as his policy of reforms was considered threatening by the Soviet 
authorities. In 1956, he still appeared as a reformist and was considered to be a 
possible alternative to lead the country and weaken the influence of the Soviet 
authorities on domestic politics and economy.12 Nagy became prime minister 
on 24 October. In the streets of the city, 15,000 freedom fighters, as they were 
called, organised themselves in small groups led by commanders. They mainly 
included young skilled and unskilled workers, but some were also returnees 
from Soviet labour camps.13  
 
On 28 October, a military attack to suppress the demonstrations was cancelled 
at the demand of Nagy, enabling him to declare a truce and the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Budapest. He also declared that the revolution was national 
and democratic. On 30 October, Nagy announced that democratic parties could 
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be formed again, which was immediately done. On 1 November, he went on to 
announce that Hungary withdrew from the Warsaw Pact to protest against the 
moves of Soviet troops in Ukraine and Romania towards Hungary the night 
before. He also declared Hungary a neutral State, a decision taken just hours 
before. To ensure worldwide recognition of Hungary's new status, he requested 
the very same day that the United Nations acknowledged the country's 
neutrality. Janós Kádár, who was part of the Nagy government, flew to 
Moscow and was convinced to form a new Hungarian government with the 
help of the Soviet Union.  
 
On 2 November, Nagy sent a telegram to Dag Hammarskjöld, the General 
Secretary of the United Nations, to press for the international recognition of 
Hungary as a neutral state and that the UN mediated between Hungary and the 
Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the situation in Hungary was being discussed by 
Khrushchev in Bucharest with Romanian, Bulgarian and Czechoslovak leaders. 
Khrushchev declared that he decided to send troops in Budapest in the early 
hours of 4 November. The Soviet troops in Hungary counted 150,000 men and 
2,000 tanks. Houses were destroyed, forcing some people of Budapest to take 
refuge in cellars. The number of casualties in Budapest between 23 October 
and 1 December shows the violence of the repression: 13,000 were wounded 
and 2,000 were killed on the Hungarian side.14 Nagy sought refuge at the 
Yugoslav embassy, but was later handed in to the Soviet authorities. He was 
tried and executed in June 1958. Janós Kádár proclaimed a new Hungarian 
government on 4 November. 
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Pierre Latzko, who was 22 years old during the revolution, was involved in 
revolutionary actions in October and November 1956. He was in northern 
Hungary, in the city of Eger, and joined a revolutionary committee. His role 
was to patrol the city with a small armed group. During one patrol, he arrested 
a high-ranking civil servant. When the revolution was repressed, he felt he had 
no other choice than to leave because of his actions:  
 
[Un de mes collègues] a été arrêté. Il a été accusé de complicité, 
condamné à mort et exécuté. Alors qu'il avait fait beaucoup moins, entre 
guillemets, que moi. Avec une arme, j'avais procédé à l'arrestation [du 
premier secrétaire régional du bureau politique]. Il fallait partir. A mon 
avis, je n'aurais pas survécu aux premiers interrogatoires. Alors je suis 
parti pour l'Autriche.15  
 
After living clandestinely for several days, he crossed the border to Austria 
eventually to be accepted in France as a refugee. Pierre Latzko was among the 
category of Hungarian refugees for whom it was a question of life or death to 
leave the country. However, not all Hungarians left because of their 
involvement during the revolution. 
 
Suzanne Joseph remembers how she witnessed the demonstrations in Budapest 
as a 10-year old child, which although had been peacefully started were 
eventually violently repressed: 
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Les gens défilaient. Tout le début était génial. Il y avait une très bonne 
atmosphère, bon enfant, de la gaieté, des chansons… Cette allégresse n'a 
pas duré longtemps, parce que quand le gouvernement a appelé les 
Russes à l'aide, ça a été terrible… Ils ont tiré dans le tas. Il y a eu quatre 
morts dans notre immeuble, qui ne sont pas revenus de la manif'. Le soir 
même sur la place, on a trouvé les boucles d'oreilles de la voisine par 
terre, il y avait du sang. Cette voisine là, elle n'est pas revenue.16 
 
Despite these violent memories of the repression, Suzanne Joseph remembers 
enjoying the fact that there was no school, and that she was playing games and 
eating cakes while hiding in the cellar during the day. She left the country in 
early 1957 with her parents, who had tried before the revolution without 
success to emigrate to the United States. 
 
The experience was completely different for Anna J., a 18-year old Jewish girl 
at the time. She felt threatened by the demonstrations, as one of her friends had 
been a victim of antisemitic verbal abuse in her presence. Along with her 
relatives, she lived in the fear that the mass murder of the Hungarian Jewish 
community during the Second World War could happen again. She remembers 
how she managed to leave Budapest for Austria with relatives, in December 
1956:  
 
We came over to Austria during the night. At certain parts you had to go 
by train and then, afterwards, in the middle of the night, you had to go 
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over the railway lines. There were people helping you to escape. You had 
to pay and they just told you: 'you go that way, where the light is'. And if 
you were lucky, then you went over the border.17 
 
Anna J. left with no passport, just enough money to pay to cross the frontier. 
She took the chance with relatives to leave Hungary. They feared the 
consequences of the revolution, expecting that Jews would be turned into 
scapegoats. 
 
The Soviet repression of the revolution led to the departure of more than 
200,000 Hungarians, representing 2 per cent of the total population.18 One 
hundred and eighty thousand took refuge in Austria, while 20,000 went to 
Yugoslavia. Austria, which was neutral at the time, guaranteed that refugees 
would be protected from Soviet repression. The choice of Yugoslavia can be 
explained, firstly, by the geographic proximity of the border for some of the 
refugees who found it more convenient rather than to travel through Hungary 
to reach Austria. Secondly, it was a political stand for those refugees. 
Yugoslavia under Tito represented an alternative to Soviet Communism, as it 
was a Communist country out of the Warsaw Pact and not under direct Soviet 
influence. Moreover, Tito supported the Hungarian revolution in its early days 
and appreciated Imre Nagy as a contrast to the previous Hungarian leaders.19 
Some of the Hungarians who sought refuge in Yugoslavia wanted to show that 
they were not anti-Communist and certainly not fascist counter-revolutionaries 
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as the Soviet authorities would label them, but desired, to an extent, a situation 
similar to Yugoslavia for Hungary.  
 
Pierre Latzko explains the high number of refugees to be due to many 
Hungarians feeling like prisoners in Communist Hungary: 'La majorité des 
gens ont profité de la révolution pour sortir du pays. Les gens ne peuvent pas 
s'imaginer ce que c'est de ne pas être libre.'20 Among the refugees were 
students, engineers, artists, writers, workers and peasants, not just freedom 
fighters.21 Stéphane Dufoix established that most of the refugees from Hungary 
were living near the Austrian border when they left and were in fact closer to 
labour migrants than to political refugees, while some genuinely feared for 
their lives.22 The Comité des Réfugiés Hongrois, created in 1950 to help 
Hungarian refugees resettling in France, estimated in January 1957 that 30 to 
35 per cent were economic migrants, another 30 per cent were real victims of 
the revolution, while the rest were considered as youth with no morals.23  
 
The French and the British governments followed the events in Hungary with 
great care, while their populations expressed their solidarity with the 
Hungarian people. The following two chapters discuss the French and the 
British responses to this refugee crisis, and how Hungarian refugees were 
received in both countries. 
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3. Hungarian refugees in France 
 
Out of the 200,000 refugees who left Hungary, France granted asylum to 
approximately 13,000 between November 1956 and December 1957.1 The 
Hungarian revolution of 1956 was officially welcomed by countries opposing 
the Soviet regime, including France. The French government ruled out military 
intervention to support the Hungarian population in the first days of the 
revolution. But it did seek to benefit from the situation, including granting 
asylum to refugees. There were international and national political and 
economic considerations linked to the support given to the refugees.  
 
The Hungarian revolution provided an opportunity for the French government 
to attempt to destabilise the Soviet Union. The French government indicated its 
hostility to the Soviet intervention in Hungary not only by admitting refugees 
to France but also by other humanitarian actions. In the first days of the 
uprising, the French government decided to provide relief to the Hungarians 
fighting against the Soviet authorities.  
 
Within France, in order to weaken the party, the PCF was represented as being 
associated with the repression of the revolution. As a result, left and right-wing 
parties tried to blame the PCF for the repression of the revolution, in what was 
actually a political manoeuvre to gain voters and encourage defections from the 
PCF. As far as it was concerned, the PCF endorsed the Soviet invasion in 
Hungary. These political considerations influenced the treatment of the 
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refugees who were considered as freedom fighters by the SFIO and the Right, 
but described as fascists by the PCF and its newspaper, L'Humanité. Therefore, 
different political elements used the Hungarians for their own ends. 
 
The main point of this chapter is that Hungarian refugees were considered to be 
assets by the French government. The introduction to the thesis has shown that 
the 1945 Ordinance linked labour and demographic needs, and still considered 
national origins in practice. Hungarian refugees were seen as a potential labour 
force, and France wanted them to resettle permanently. The asylum policy 
regarding the Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia is a case in point. Civil 
servants went to Yugoslavia to recruit the most suitable refugees for 
employment and permanent resettlement in France. The French government 
considered refugees from Hungary like labour migrants rather than forced 
migrants, in the way it dealt with them. Refugee policy was designed according 
to general immigration policy, the 1945 Ordinance, in order to have refugees 
meeting the needs of sectors short of labour. 
 
However, the reception of the Hungarian refugees had not been prepared 
beforehand by the French government, which led, on occasions, to 
misunderstandings between the authorities and the refugees. This chapter 
shows that refugees had expectations from the government that were not 
always fulfilled. Their accommodation in refugee camps led to discontent 
among large groups of refugees, who felt prisoner in their new surroundings. 
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As an example, the history of the camp des Cinq Tranchées, near Nancy in 
eastern France, will be studied to explore the workings of immigration and 
refugee policy in this Cold War context. That camp, accommodating what were 
regarded as unemployable and unassimilable refugees, was the last to close just 
days before the visit of Nikita Khrushchev to France in 1960, and illustrates the 
limitations of French policy towards Hungarian refugees. 
 
 
 
-The French government's reaction  
 
The French government's response to these events was consistent with a logic 
that put French interests first. On 26 October 1956, Christian Pineau declared 
to the press that France did not seek to exploit Hungary's situation for military 
and political benefit.2  Yet, the same day, Jean Paul-Boncour, the French 
ambassador in Hungary, shared his concern with Pineau in which he observed 
that Hungarian insurgents, although full of enthusiasm, were already visibly 
suffering from deprivation.3 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs wondered how 
many days the revolution could last in those conditions. 
 
Having made the same observation, the British Foreign Office asked the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to send supplies to Hungary via the Austrian 
frontier. The idea behind the Foreign Office's suggestion was that the Soviet 
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authorities would refuse the help sent, and that they would appear to be 
neglecting the Hungarian people. On the other hand, if the help was accepted, 
the supplies sent would serve to help the population in their fight. In any case 
the Foreign Office believed that either discontent would continue to grow, or at 
least it would be maintained if help was accepted.4 
 
The French government accepted the request and went further than suggested. 
On 1 November 1956, François Seydoux, French ambassador in Vienna, 
proposed to Christian Pineau to make the relief coming from France visible to 
the Hungarians by adding a clearly displayed symbol of France on each parcel, 
like its flag.5 He called for Jean Paul-Boncour to inform the Hungarian 
population 'with all the means at his disposal' of the French relief effort. The 
French government was hoping that the Hungarians, who were receiving the 
supplies through the Austrian Red Cross, would realise the extent of French 
support and consider it as an encouragement to continue the revolution.  
 
Rather than openly supporting the revolution, the French government, under 
cover of humanitarian assistance, tried to take advantage of the situation in 
Hungary to destabilise the Soviet authorities and weaken their influence. The 
choice of the Red Cross to distribute the supplies was motivated by two 
reasons. Firstly, it was a reliable and experienced relief organisation. Secondly, 
since it was a non-governmental organisation, it could not be suspected of 
working for French or British interests. Despite humanitarian organisations 
trying to remain apolitical and independent, governments treated 
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humanitarianism as an instrument of their foreign policies during the Cold 
War.6 The case of humanitarian action for Hungarian refugees was no 
exception.7 
 
The collusion between the French and British governments on the support to be 
given to Hungary followed the logic of an alliance. France asked for the 
Hungarian situation to be placed on the agenda of the UN Security Council on 
26 October 1956, and the matter was discussed two days later.8 On 31 October, 
the bombing of Suez started. In order to appease the criticisms France and 
Britain were facing following that intervention, both governments tried to have 
the Hungarian question placed on the agenda of the UN Extraordinary 
Assembly on 1 November, initially summoned to discuss the Suez question. 
The United States representative believed that the French and British 
representatives wanted to discuss the matter to direct attention away from the 
Suez crisis.9 As the situation in Hungary seemed to have calmed down 
following the departure of the Soviet troops in the meantime, discussions only 
resumed on 3 November. The theory that France and Britain utilised the 
Hungarian situation for their own benefit has since been supported by 
historians.10 However, French and British attempts to distract attention from 
the Suez question at the UN met with little success. 
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After the revolution was repressed on 4 November, the French public policy 
was to criticise the Kádár government, thus satisfying the expectations of the 
French population, apart from the Communists. Internationally, the French 
foreign policy towards Hungary and the Soviet Union was the diplomatic 
boycott of both countries in line with the other NATO countries, and to discuss 
the situation at the UN General Assembly. Sending supplies to the Hungarian 
population and, later, granting asylum to Hungarian refugees was also 
following that diplomatic line of action.11 
 
The French government's first reactions were thus to use the situation in 
Hungary to engage in propaganda under the cover of humanitarianism. France 
and Britain joining together can be linked to the fact that both countries were 
involved in Suez, and that the Hungarian revolution could serve as a 
distraction, as the Suez action was internationally criticised. France's 
humanitarian action in Hungary was motivated by the Cold War. It was a way 
to weaken the Soviet Union's international position, and its influence in 
Hungary. 
 
After the repression of the revolution by the Soviet troops, the French 
government nonetheless continued its humanitarian action, and the Assemblée 
Nationale voted in favour of 'une journée nationale en faveur de la population 
hongroise' on 18 November.12 The aim was to mobilise public opinion on the 
Hungarian crisis. After that date, the parliament was mainly concerned about 
the Hungarian refugees in Austria and in France. The French population's 
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reaction was however different as, all over the country, there were 
demonstrations of support which turned into scenes of riots in Paris. 
  
 
 
-Popular reactions to the Hungarian revolution  
 
The Hungarian revolution had a strong impact on the French population. The 
following section shows how the public strongly responded to the events in 
Hungary, and how the revolution was used by the SFIO and the Right in an 
attempt to discredit the PCF. This attitude was to influence the reception of the 
Hungarian refugees when they later arrived in France.  
 
Due to its role in the Resistance, members of the PCF occupied high-ranking 
positions in the French provisional government in 1944.13 In 1945-1946, the 
PCF was the political party which had the highest number of members and 
voters. Post-war French politics are characterised by a great instability with 26 
different governments between 1944 and 1958. In order to stabilise the 
government, coalitions were necessary: the PCF was part of the first coalition 
with the SFIO and the Mouvement Républicain Populaire, called Tripartism 
from 1946 until 1947.14 Communists were eventually ousted from the 
parliament in May 1947, due to the tensions linked to the Cold War, and the 
pressure from the PCF put on its ministers in the government. From September 
1947, following France's acceptance of the Marshall Plan and the Soviet 
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position against 'American imperialism', the PCF entered a phase of opposition 
against the government, notably on colonial issues.15 From this period though, 
and until 1956, other political parties firmly opposed the PCF. De Gaulle 
referred to communists as separatists and considered the Soviet Union a threat. 
The PCF was indeed considered a foreign party by the other French political 
parties, and was described as Stalinist and receiving its orders straight from 
Moscow. An anticommunist organisation, Paix et Liberté, was founded in 1951 
by Jean-Paul David, Radical deputy, and received the support of René Pléven, 
then Prime Minister. The organisation broadcasted a weekly radio programme, 
printed hundreds of thousands of posters, and distributed millions of tracts 
during the course of its existence.16  Its action was anticommunist propaganda 
framed by the Cold War context, and was secretly funded by the American 
government.17 
 
In 1956, the PCF was still one of the major political parties in France. The 
Hungarian crisis happened during the government of the socialist Guy Mollet, 
elected in February 1956. The results of the February election show how 
important the PCF still was at the time: with 25 per cent of the votes, it had 146 
seats in parliament, and was eager to re-enter the governing coalition after nine 
years of absence.18 But in 1951, the Right had also lost its parliamentary 
majority and the Hungarian crisis provided it with an opportunity to try to 
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discredit and weaken the position of the PCF. This was attempted through 
demonstrations and press articles. 
 
The French press extensively covered the Hungarian revolution, with a 
different approach depending on the political affiliation, as Communist 
newspapers like L'Humanité considered the revolution as a counter-
revolutionary fascist event, while the rest of the press was largely supportive of 
the insurgents. Among those newspapers, Franc-Tireur, founded in 1941 and 
associated with the Gaullist resistance, reported that, on 24 October, the 
Hungarian students and workers were fighting the Soviet tanks singing the 
French national anthem and shouting 'Russians out!'.19 La Marseillaise, during 
the Second World War in occupied France, was a song of defiance against the 
occupiers. During the Liberation of France, La Marseillaise gained in 
credibility and became one of the strongest French national symbols.20 The 
image of the Hungarians singing this French revolutionary song was very 
appealing to the French public. In the Cold War context of Europe divided into 
two blocs, the French national symbol associated Hungarians and French 
against the Soviet regime. Franc-Tireur appealed to strong national symbols 
and the common past of its readership, enabling the readers to feel a direct 
connection with the Hungarian revolution.  
 
It has been argued that the French population reacted passively to the 
Hungarian revolution, being on the whole too focused on their newly found 
social rights, such as the adoption of a third week of paid holidays in February 
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1956.21 However, in Paris and all over France, the public felt very concerned 
about what was happening in Hungary. First, in terms of relief, 98 tons of 
clothing, food, and first aid supplies, including 15 tons of medication were sent 
to Hungary via Vienna thanks to the International Red Cross.22 The population 
helped greatly in this operation as they donated much of the canned food and 
clothing that was then dispatched by the Red Cross. Newspapers regularly 
advertised help for the Hungarians, whether in Hungary or as refugees in 
Austria. By the end of December 1956, 800 tons of supplies, mostly donations 
by the public, had been sent to Vienna from France, showing that the French 
population cared a lot about the situation in Hungary.23  
 
A good way to realise how the Hungarian revolution and its refugees were 
perceived in France and what triggered such generosity is to look at the 
demonstrations of support. The first demonstrations in Paris to show sympathy 
for the Hungarians started on 29 October, six days after the beginning of the 
revolution, on the appeal of Force Ouvrière (FO), a trade union. Two hundred 
people demonstrated on Boulevard Saint-Germain, after police blocked the 
access to the street leading to the Soviet embassy where the event was 
originally supposed to take place.24 
 
However, in France and all over Europe, it was the beginning of the repression 
of the revolution on 4 November which triggered the largest public 
demonstrations against the Soviet intervention. Demonstrations took place to 
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protest in front of the Soviet embassies in Berlin, Rome, Stockholm, 
Luxembourg, The Hague, Helsinki, and Oslo.25 On 5 November, about 1,000 
students demonstrated in Paris against the Soviet intervention displaying 
Hungarian and French flags, as a symbol of a people supporting another one in 
revolution.26 It was also on that day that the demonstrations started to change in 
nature and target, as a meeting against Communism took place where Daniel 
Halévy, of the Académie Française, and the right-wing MPs, Pierre André, 
Philippe d'Argenlieu, Pierre Boutang, Raymond Dronne, as well as 
representatives of Hungarian refugees criticised Communism and the weakness 
and passivity of the UN in dealing with the Hungarian question. The presence 
of right-wing MPs shows that the meeting was a political one, rather than a 
neutral demonstration of support to the Hungarian people. The meeting called 
for a demonstration to express 'leur solidarité avec les Hongrois et l’expression 
des véritables sentiments de la Nation.' At the end of the meeting, two groups 
of several hundred students went to the PCF headquarters in order to confront 
Communists, turning the support of an international event into a domestic 
matter.27 The 'true sentiments of the nation' referred to another way to 
instrumentalize the Hungarian revolution in order to discredit and isolate the 
PCF, rather than simply to demonstrate genuine support for the Hungarian 
cause. According to Gusztáv Kecskés, the Confédération Générale du Travail - 
Force Ouvrière (CGT-FO) and the SFIO tried to please their voters and get 
some of the Communist voters by severely criticizing the PCF. However, 
Kecskés claimed that in the long run the PCF was not affected and kept its 
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electorate almost intact a few weeks after the revolution.28 Discrediting the 
PCF was a way for the left- and right-wing parties to prepare the coming 
general election due to take place on 13 and 27 January 1957.29 The strategy 
proved successful in the short-term as the results were that the right-wing won, 
the Socialists did well, while the PCF receded.30  
 
The most important day of demonstrations for the Hungarian people was on 7 
November, the day the first refugees arrived, and ended in violence and death. 
Short strikes were observed all over France following an appeal by FO. At 
Simca's factories in Nanterre and Poissy, 95 per cent of the workers stopped 
work for 10 minutes, while half of Paris transport (RATP) workers stopped 
work for 5 minutes. In Renault and Brandt's factories, 60 per cent and 98 per 
cent of the workers went on strike, while 80 per cent did at the Sécurité 
Sociale. Short strikes also occurred in many French towns, showing an 
organised reaction of both students and the French working class regarding 
events in Hungary. In Caen, the PCF building was set on fire by the students 
demonstrating.31 FO representatives in Paris claimed in front of a crowd of 
5,000 that the PCF was not in a position to defend the rights of the working 
class any more.32 FO was clearly trying to get advantage of the situation by 
associating the PCF with the Soviet authorities in their handling of the 
Hungarian revolution. 
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The main demonstration happened in Paris and resulted in more than a hundred 
people injured and three dead. It started as a peaceful demonstration of a crowd 
of approximately 25,000 on the Champs-Elysées at the end of the afternoon.33 
The demonstration included 300 actual and former members of parliament and 
of the government, such as Guy Mollet, Prime Minister, François Mitterand, 
Minister of Justice, Tanguy Prigent, Minister of War Veterans and Victims, 
Paul Reynaud, Georges Bidault, Antoine Pinay, René Pléven, Robert Schuman, 
and Joseph Laniel, all former foreign ministers or prime ministers.34 There 
again, the composition of the members of parliament shows that the 
demonstration was politicised and used by the non-Communist Left and the 
Right, as the Hungarian revolution became an excuse to discredit the PCF. 
After a ceremony at the Unknown Soldier tomb, where flowers had been laid 
along with French and Hungarian flags and the Marseillaise sung, a crowd of 
6,000 young people marched towards the PCF headquarters. Five hundred 
police officers were protecting the building but the demonstrators managed to 
break through the police block and enter the building by force to commit acts 
of vandalism and start several fires.35 Following the intervention of the fire 
brigade, the demonstrators headed to the headquarters of L'Humanité, leaving 
injured people behind as well as detritus and furniture.36 Franc-Tireur 
described the event in front of the building as a 'bataille rangée' led by 
'd'authentiques commandos'. Le Figaro reported that the demonstrators had to 
fight against Communists with helmets who were targeting isolated 
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demonstrators to beat them up.37 L'Humanité, on the other side, claimed that 
the attacks on its building were led by paratroopers, as an echo to the Algerian 
War.38 The fights went on from 19.30 to midnight after Jean-Louis Vigier, MP 
for Paris, managed to calm down the remaining 200 demonstrators.39 However, 
the demonstrations had a tragic tone as 107 people ended wounded and three 
people died, two Communist militants and one FO militant, marking the end of 
the demonstrations in Paris. Support for the Hungarians turned into a witch-
hunt against Communists who still supported the Soviet action in Hungary.40 
 
Such a reaction, in the press and on the streets, reflects the French politics of 
the time. In 1956, and generally during the Fourth Republic, foreign and 
internal policies were inseparable.41 The Parisian demonstrations show that 
rather than an international matter, the Hungarian question served as an excuse 
for the Right and the non-Communist Left to confront the PCF as they 
physically assaulted its headquarters and some of its members. What started as 
demonstrations of support for the Hungarian people ended up in a domestic 
conflict between political parties. The Hungarian revolution also became a 
symbol of the fight against Communism in France. As a consequence, 
Hungarian refugees came to represent this fight, as they were largely presented 
in the non-Communist French press as freedom fighters or victims of 
Communism, and became political stakes.42 In that sense, the refugees became 
a political asset, as they were living proofs of the alleged oppressive nature of 
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communism. The demonstration on 7 November was the most emblematic 
because of the violence perpetrated at this occasion. This series of 
demonstrations happened in a relatively short time and were motivated by 
anticommunism. The Hungarian situation served as a pretext to bring discredit 
to the PCF in what was an internal political move rather than a genuine 
demonstration of support to the Hungarians. 
 
The PCF, which supported the Soviet handling of the Hungarian revolution, 
became disavowed by a number of its members, including a large number of 
intellectuals, which was a major blow as it had just returned to Parliament in 
February after nine years of absence.43 In 1956, it lost half of its members, with 
the total membership descending to 400,000.44 Among the intellectuals who 
condemned the PCF for its support of the Soviet invasion was Jean-Paul Sartre, 
who explained in length in the press why he condemned the invasion and 
stopped supporting the PCF.45 In order to prove the point that the Soviet policy 
was the right one, L'Humanité engaged in a campaign supporting the claims 
that the revolution had been led by fascists, and that the refugees were 
antisemitic. Considering the Stalinist line of the PCF, L'Humanité denouncing 
antisemitism could have appeared as a surprising strategy as, in 1952, the 
Slansky trial in Prague symbolised the violence of anti-Jewish purges among 
the leadership of the Communist Parties within the Soviet Union.46 Yet, in 
1956, this was done in the name of anti-fascism.  
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However, remaining silent on antisemitism in Soviet Russia, the PCF and 
L'Humanité relied on Hungary's then recent history of antisemitism. From the 
Peace Treaty of Trianon in 1920 until the deportations and mass murder during 
the Second World War, Hungarian history was heavily charged with 
antisemitism.47 It gave the PCF an opportunity to present the Soviet Union as a 
safeguard against antisemitism in Hungary. Despite well-known official 
antisemitism in Soviet countries, Hungary presented itself as an exception. In 
comparison with the deportation and mass murder of 500,000 Hungarian Jews, 
survivors enjoyed relative security in post-war Hungary and were able to 
occupy political positions with high responsibilities.48 However, the Hungarian 
Jewish middle class was targeted by anti-religious and anti-bourgeois measures 
since 1948 for being an 'exploiting class', and some were sent into internal 
exile.49 The Communist regime was against Zionism, but the importance of 
Jews in the party hierarchy minimised the Jewish issue.50 Communist Hungary 
was relatively spared antisemitism in comparison with other Communist 
countries. 
 
According to François Fejtö and Bernard Wasserstein, 10 per cent of the 
200,000 Hungarian refugees were Jewish.51 Israel was the privileged 
destination and 9,000 Hungarian Jews chose to emigrate there during and after 
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the revolution, followed by North America and Europe. In 1962, the French 
ambassador in Hungary estimated that out of 120,000 Jews in the country in 
1948, only 70,000 were left following legal and illegal waves of immigration, 
which largely took place between November 1956 and December 1957.52 
 
Despite their small numbers, the Hungarian Jewish refugees received French 
media attention, mostly in the pages of L'Humanité and Le Figaro, which 
turned them into a political issue. L'Humanité represented Hungarian Jews as 
victims of a fascist counter-revolution which took place in Hungary, as the 
newspaper and the PCF labelled the revolution. On the other hand, Le Figaro 
dismissed those accusations and minimised antisemitism in Hungary while 
denying antisemitism in refugee camps. Two weeks after the violent 
demonstrations against the PCF and L'Humanité headquarters, Maurice Thorez, 
the party leader, claimed when speaking to the Central Committee that the 
people who attacked the Communist buildings on 7 November were the friends 
of the Hungarian counter-revolution: fascist and antisemitic emigrants from 
eastern Europe.53 Thorez's declaration not only referred to the events on 7 
November in linking the revolution and antisemitism, but the PCF also 
associated the refugees with these events and the people behind it. The PCF 
thus tried to demonstrate that the Hungarian revolution was a fascist event by 
associating antisemitism with the revolution and with the refugees. 
 
L'Humanité and Communist deputies particularly insisted on Hungary as a 
Nazi ally during the war and claimed that the insurgents were supporters of 
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Admiral Horthy, regent of Hungary until 1944.54 On several occasions 
L'Humanité reported acts of antisemitism during the revolution, which were 
not reported in any other newspapers, except for Voix Ouvrière, another 
Communist newspaper.55 Other newspapers like Le Monde and Le Figaro did 
not report those events, as they supported the Hungarian revolution. To admit 
that antisemitic acts took place would have threatened the popular support the 
Hungarians received. 
 
L'Humanité reported that Hungarian Jews in the refugee camp in Châtellerault, 
in the Vienne département, had been victims of such bad treatment from the 
other Hungarian refugees that they had sought help from the president of the 
local Jewish community: 
 
Douze cents réfugiés hongrois sont arrivés à Châtellerault… Parmi ces 
réfugiés se trouvent un certain nombre de Juifs, qui se plaignent des 
mauvais traitements qu'ils subissent… Ils sont allés voir le président de la 
communauté juive de Châtellerault et l'ont supplié d'intervenir pour les 
faire retirer de la caserne, en raison des sévices dont ils sont l'objet de la 
part des autres réfugiés.56 
 
The article remains vague about the nature of the treatment supposedly 
inflicted and did not mention the exact number of the refugees involved. It 
reports and denounces antisemitism among refugees in a specific camp. 
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However, the aim of the article was to convince readers that the revolution was 
a fascist act led by fascist counter-revolutionaries.  
 
On the day the article was published, the Ministry of the Interior inquired on 
the events reported in L'Humanité. A short report was produced denying its 
claims. However, a contradiction exists in the report as it states that 'Les deux 
familles dont il s'agit… ont quitté la Vienne depuis plusieurs jours et se 
trouvent à Paris 12 rue Cadet',57 which refers to the people affected by 
antisemitic acts. The address in Paris was next door to the Synagogue Adas 
Yereim, at number 10 rue Cadet, which suggests that they may have been 
looked after by the Jewish community. The other point is that the Ministry of 
the Interior inquired on the day, showing that it was concerned that something 
did happen. The French government was thus aware of antisemitism in the 
Hungarian refugee camps, but denied publicly that anything had happened. Le 
Figaro reported three days later that L'Humanité lied and that nothing 
happened in Châtellerault.58 The newspaper mentioned that the Rabbi of Tours, 
Pierre Blum, declared that he had visited the camps three times in December 
and that the Jews there did not complain about being ill-treated.  
 
References to antisemitism among the Hungarian refugees and during the 
revolution were not limited to mentions in the press. In January 1957, leaflets 
on the revolution in Hungary were distributed in the Paris metro by members 
of the PCF. According to György Marosán, Minister of State in charge of 
propaganda since the end of the revolution and quoted in the leaflets, in the last 
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days of the revolution, fascists took advantage of rumours that the West would 
support it:59 
 
On a vu se manifester les traits caractéristiques du fascisme: le 
nationalisme, le chauvinisme et l'antisémitisme. Pourtant une remarque 
instructive peut être faite au sujet de l'antisémitisme. Il y a eu des faits 
d'antisémitisme, mais il est vrai qu'il n'a pas pris ouvertement une grande 
extension. Pourquoi?... Les manifestations antisémites ont été 
déconseillées d'en haut. Dans un état-major contre-révolutionnaire, un 
chef a expliqué: pas d'antisémitisme pour le moment; des faits 
d'antisémitisme gêneraient l'aide de l'Ouest… Que l'antisémitisme ne se 
soit manifesté que partiellement ne contredit pas ce caractère fasciste de 
la contre-révolution. Cela signifie simplement que l'antisémitisme a été 
tenu momentanément en réserve.60 
 
Those accusations tried to use the few antisemitic acts that happened during the 
revolution to the Communists' advantage. The PCF and the Communists in 
general tried to bring forward the question of antisemitism, hoping that it 
would discredit the Hungarian revolution, and justify the repression of the 
revolution. 
 
Not only was there an attempt from the PCF through L'Humanité and in 
Parliament to discredit the Hungarian revolution and its supporters among the 
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French by calling it fascist, but raising the question of antisemitism among the 
Hungarian refugees and in the revolution was also a way to link the Second 
World War events with the Hungarian revolution. To that end, Communists 
used the International Federation of Resistance Fighters (IFR). The IFR, 
founded in 1951, sought the creation of international committees in several 
Second World War concentration camps. Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Dachau, 
Mauthausen, Ravensbrück and Sachsenhausen were all affiliated to the IFR.61 
Following the events of 1956, they linked commemoration with ideology, and 
insisted on the major role of Communist resistance fighters during the Second 
World War. The very large proportion of deported Communists in 
concentration camps served then a new purpose: to present Communists in a 
favourable light to compensate for the sharp criticisms after the repression of 
the Hungarian revolution.  
 
Therefore the question of antisemitism of the Hungarian refugees comes within 
this strategy: putting forward antisemitic elements among the refugees to show 
the revolution's fascist character in order to discredit it and justify the support 
of the PCF towards the Soviet repression of the revolution. It was the result of 
the general political utilisation of the Hungarian revolution and the refugee 
crisis. However, as the PCF faced stern criticism for its support of the Soviet 
invasion of Hungary, it had no impact on the population's support for the 
Hungarians, and on the government's policy to grant asylum to the refugees.  
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The treatment of the question of antisemitism shows that the French 
government took tensions among refugees seriously, as it wanted to avoid 
returns to Hungary and bad publicity. On 28 October 1956, the first Hungarian 
refugees started to arrive in Austria. Twelve Austrian Red Cross posts were set 
up near the Hungarian border, while transports were mobilised in the area to 
facilitate their evacuation.62 The Cold War played a role in the necessity of 
sorting out the refugee crisis in Austria. Indeed, the French embassy there was 
concerned that if refugees were not resettled quickly in another country that 
would lead to a rise in discontentment among refugees: 
 
Si la situation se prolonge, un nombre important et toujours croissant de 
Hongrois déçus… retourneront de l'autre côté de la frontière: autant 
d'agents efficaces de la contre-propagande communiste. Au sein même du 
bloc soviétique, ils seront… une preuve vivante des amères désillusions 
qui attendent ceux qui se seront laissés prendre aux 'mensonges' de la 
propagande occidentale.63  
 
François Seydoux clearly establishes here the link between France's, and other 
countries' humanitarian relief and propaganda objectives. The French 
government believed that it would have been both a moral and a propaganda 
failure if refugees started to return to Hungary, as they would go back with the 
feeling that life was not any better under a democratic regime.64 There were 
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also allegations made that some of the refugees were, in fact, Kádár's agents. 
There were claims that such agents were acting as a fifth column among the 
refugees, and were either threatening refugees' families if they did not return to 
Hungary, or even kidnapping refugees and taking them back to Hungary.65 The 
French government remained largely unworried regarding such statements. 
Beliefs of a fifth column were marginal, and returns to Hungary were attributed 
rather to being deceived with false hopes. Yet, it was deemed crucial for the 
French government that once refugees were accepted for resettlement in 
France, they did not go back to Hungary, as it would be considered a 
propaganda failure.66 
 
To avoid refugees returning to Hungary, it was essential for the French 
government to resettle refugees out of Austria as quickly as possible. To that 
end, the evacuation of the refugees to France was organised at the beginning of 
November. Christian Pineau announced on 7 November at the Assemblée 
Nationale that the government decided to grant asylum to 10,000 Hungarian 
refugees, the same day that L'Humanité headquarters were under attack.67 The 
first 60 refugees were planned to fly to France that very evening, while another 
40 were expected the next day. Diplomats in Austria were well aware of what 
was going on in Egypt, and the international disapproval it engendered.68 The 
results were quick as, on 1 December, Seydoux remarked that French action in 
Austria, along with that by the British, German, and Swiss, had been 
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internationally praised, so that French policy abroad was not as subject to 
criticism as it was when the refugee crisis started.69 Granting asylum to 
Hungarian refugees was a way for the France to regain some credit on the 
international scene after Suez, and with respect to the French government's 
handling of the Algerian War. Humanitarian considerations were clearly not 
the main motive behind the asylum policy for the Hungarians. 
 
The refugees from Hungary represented a national and international political 
issue. The government of Guy Mollet had planned to use the reception of the 
Hungarian refugees as a way of campaigning against the PCF and to strengthen 
the SFIO, as well as using the refugees in the media for that purpose.70 It was 
also a way to distract the attention of the UN and the United States from the 
Suez crisis, and had political advantages for France's international politics.71 
To that end, the French government did not hesitate to remind the UN General 
Secretary of the position as France as one of the leading countries in helping 
the Hungarian population by granting asylum or by sending supplies and 
financially contributing to their relief.72 It has been suggested that the refugee 
situation was a matter taken very seriously by NATO, to which France was a 
member. For NATO members, not only was there a moral responsibility for 
them to help Hungarian refugees, but more importantly it would have been a 
moral defeat if refugees returned in great numbers to Hungary. From the 
beginning of the Hungarian crisis in later October, NATO followed the 
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evolution of the situation very closely. As military intervention was ruled out, 
because of the nuclear power of the Soviet Union and the risk of another world 
war, NATO was nevertheless hoping that satellite countries would emancipate 
themselves little by little from the Soviet influence.73 NATO's directives were 
to intensify the humanitarian relief to the Hungarian population and to make 
sure that the Kádár government was not benefiting from that help.74 Granting 
asylum to Hungarian refugees was following that policy, hence it was an 
important political matter that the French government managed to resettle in 
France or help to migrate somewhere else the refugees under its charge to 
avoid returns to Hungary as much as possible.  
 
As far as it was concerned, the government saw in the Hungarian refugees a 
way morally and politically to weaken the Soviet Union and the PCF, but 
essentially it also saw potential candidates for economic and demographic 
immigration, under French immigration policies and practices.  
 
 
 
-Refugees as labour immigrants  
 
As we have seen, Cold War politics played a major role in the perception of 
Hungarian refugees in France. Here, I will demonstrate the additional factors of 
their use as a labour force. It is first necessary to understand the post-war 
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labour context into which these Hungarians were brought. As a Western power, 
France's response to the Hungarian refugee crisis in Austria has been 
interpreted by Peter Gatrell as a commitment to assist people facing 
persecution.75 Tony Kushner and Katharine Knox argue that the French 
support, just as was British support, was motivated by feelings of guilt 
following the repression of the Hungarian revolution.76 This section shows that, 
rather than motivated by feeling of guilt or a commitment to assist people 
facing persecution, the French government saw in the Hungarians potentially 
employable workers in sectors in need of labour, and a population that could 
serve France's demographic interests, while still serving French propaganda 
interests. Looking at how the French government set up an immigration plan 
since the arrival of the first refugees in Austria shows that the Hungarians were 
considered as labour immigrants rather than refugees.  
 
If France accepted 10,000 Hungarians refugees, and then unlimited numbers by 
the end of November 1956, to permanently resettle, it also did so as they could 
contribute to the growth of the country because of their origins, gender, and 
professional skills. The conditions for staying in France for immigrants were 
defined by the Ordinance of 2 November 1945. In theory, the Ordinance did 
not make any distinctions or establish a hierarchy between immigrants.77 Yet, it 
stressed the importance of assimilation, just as the 1945 Code de la Nationalité 
did.78 From this year, the assessment of immigration that was needed was 
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carried out by the Office National d'Immigration (ONI). Created by the 
Ordinance of 2 November 1945, the ONI's purpose was to provide the French 
economy with foreign labour in sectors in need of labour, and to enhance 
demography, following the populationist trend from before the Second World 
War.79 The Ministry of Population established lists of immigration needs by 
sectors and desired nationalities for immigrants for the ONI. These lists were 
designed to keep an 'ethnic balance' in France, and largely privileged European 
and non-Muslim immigration.80  
 
The Ministry of the Interior also had a leading role in immigration policies.81 It 
separated the acquisition of work and residence permits, the first depending on 
the Ministry of Labour and the second on the Ministry of the Interior. There 
were three different kinds of residence permit: the card of temporary residence 
valid for less than a year, the card of ordinary residence valid for three years, 
and the card of privileged residence valid ten years and automatically 
renewable.82 The card of temporary residence could be renewed several times, 
leaving immigrants in a temporary and precarious situation. To get a better 
card, immigrants depended on their work situation, and whether their type of 
work was needed or not in the French economic situation.83 In 1956, the 
economic context was expansion in many sectors. Due to the Algerian War, the 
number of Algerian workers in France decreased, while the ONI could not 
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satisfy employers' demands.84 In April, the Ministry of the Interior issued a 
circular advocating mass regularisations for immigrants in France. Despite 
being refugees, the Hungarians benefited from this favourable economic 
context. 
 
The French government and administration carried out the regularisation of the 
Hungarians' status unusually fast. Refugees in France, if their status was legally 
recognized as such, were normally dependent on the OFPRA, created by the 
law of 25 July 1952, and under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
However, contrary to the principles of the November 1945 Ordinance, but 
according to practice, the reception of refugees in France depended on their 
nationality and was adapted depending on the national economic situation.85 
This was due to a practice of privileging some nationalities, considered 
assimilable, upon others, considered unassimilable.86 The use of circulars 
supplanted in some cases the 1945 Ordinance, giving the immigration 
administration more freedom.87 Hungarian refugees thus benefited from better 
conditions than those recommended by the 1945 Ordinance on the separation 
of the 'carte de séjour' and the 'carte de résident', and also in comparison to 
other refugees such as the Yugoslavian refugees arriving in France through 
Italy in early 1957.88 Although the 1945 Ordinance applied to both Hungarian 
and Yugoslavian refugees, the interpretation of the Ordinance for the 
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Hungarian refugees favoured their resettlement by granting them ordinary 
'cartes de séjour' after one year in France as refugees. In contrast, the Ministry 
of the Interior denied 'cartes de séjour' to Yugoslavian refugees in transit 
through Italy on the grounds that they were labour migrants trying to pass for 
refugees and that the employment situation did not favour their resettlement in 
France, but also because they were inassimilable.89 Despite the absence of 
reference to national preference in the 1945 Ordinance, practice made these 
policies still effective in 1956. 
 
This selective practice was also a proof that Mauco's ethnic and national 
preferences were applied even if the text of the Ordinance made no mention of  
such preferences. The Hungarian refugees, as Central Europeans, were not 
undesirable. Their demographic composition and occupations also fitted 
immigration prospects: mainly young single men who could be employed for 
manual work. They were also a symbol of a fight against Communism, which, 
as stated Mauco during the war, was influenced by Jews.90 
 
Moreover, thanks to Auguste Lindt, Hungarian refugees benefited from the 
protection of the Geneva Convention of 1951, contrary to the limitation of its 
application to events prior to 1 January 1951, and were almost immediately 
recognised as refugees, when the OFPRA decided that their situation was a 
consequence of the Yalta Conference. According to Stéphane Dufoix, 
individual files were not even checked and Hungarians were recognised as 
refugees based on their provenance, showing on the one hand the national 
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origin preference, and, on the other hand, the importance of the Cold War 
context.91 The OFPRA had registered 13,111 Hungarian refugees on 31 
December 1956, of whom 1,189 were new cases, and 18,865 on 31 December 
1957, representing 5,754 new cases.92  
 
The number of refugees in Austria rose very quickly after the Soviet military 
intervention in Hungary, from 15,000 on 6 November to 30,000 on 17 
November, and reaching 45,000 on 22 November.93 In response, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs created a special body to coordinate the reception of the 
refugees in France. The Comité National d'Accueil des Réfugiés Hongrois 
(CNARH) included representatives from the ministries having an interest in the 
Hungarian refugee situation, namely Interior, Foreign Affairs, Social Affairs, 
Public Health and Population, and Labour and Social Security. Representatives 
from private and non-governmental associations joined from the Croix Rouge 
Française, Secours Catholique, Cimade, CGT-FO, Confédération Française des 
Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC), Conseil National du Patronat Français (CNPF), 
and Service Social d'Aide aux Emigrants (SSAE).94 The role of this committee 
was to organise the reception of the Hungarian refugees at a national level. The 
CNARH also served as a model for committees at the level of départements 
where refugees were accommodated. The prefects in each département were to 
serve as heads of the committees, each committee including representatives 
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from the same organisations as of the national one.95 The French government, 
through the prefects, kept strict control of the CNARH. 
 
The composition of the committee, which included representatives from two 
major non-Communist trade unions as well as the CNPF, suggests employment 
was central in the reception of the Hungarians. The CNPF regrouped local, 
departmental and regional unions of employers, trade unions, and 
representatives of the trade, industry, and services sectors. The aim of the 
CNARH was thus to place refugees into employment as quickly as possible. 
Trade union representatives were, however, concerned by the arrival of a great 
number of refugees. They tried to reach a compromise and asked that the total 
number of refugees did not go beyond 10,000, as difficulties for employing 
them in some areas had already surfaced.96 There was thus protectionist 
behaviour from the unions as they feared that a sudden influx of Hungarian 
workers might have led to problems of employment. 
 
The CNARH showed in its composition that the reception of the Hungarian 
refugees was specific, as the committee included governmental bodies and 
associations. The composition of the CNARH meant that all ministries 
interested in the resettlement of the Hungarians were involved in the process. 
The presence of trade unions and refugee associations suggests that all means 
possible were made available for the quick resettlement and support of the 
refugees, as well as to put them in employment as soon as possible. 
Organisations represented at the CNARH also give a clue on the composition 
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of the refugees, since the Cimade, and the Secours Catholique, were Protestant 
and Catholic organisations respectively, while Jewish organisations were 
absent. This absence was mainly due to the limited number of Jews among the 
refugees. Despite its help, the Cojasor, a Jewish organisation created in France 
after the war for the care of Holocaust survivors and displaced persons, was not 
included in the CNARH.97 
 
Low figures of Jewish refugees are confirmed by the archives. Several Jewish 
organisations and local Jewish communities helped the Hungarian Jewish 
refugees to resettle in France or to re-emigrate. The Jewish Agency was one of 
those. Its role was to facilitate the re-emigration of those who wanted to go to 
Israel.98 At domestic level, Jewish refugees were visited in the camps by 
representatives of local Jewish communities.99 This visibility in camps led the 
Cojasor to become well known among the Jewish refugees. It helped the 
majority of the Hungarian Jews in France.100 It provided relief for 627 
individuals, including 322 families between 1956 and 1958.101 This small 
number can be explained by the fact that most of the Jewish refugees resettled 
in Israel, rather than emigrating to France.102 Despite all the measures taken to 
place the refugees in employment as quickly as possible, while protecting the 
reputation of the refugees and letting the Cojasor provide relief for Jewish 
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refugees, the French government's treatment of the Hungarian refugees as 
labour migrants was quickly jeopardised by the Cold War. 
 
 
 
-A land unprepared for asylum 
 
With France accepting a large number of refugees for resettlement, the 
government and organisations involved in their reception had to quickly set up 
plans and accommodation for the refugees. The focus of the government on the 
employability of the refugees, made the refugees feel on some occasions 
forsaken and misunderstood, as their prime interest was in freedom. 
 
The refugees from Hungary arrived in France mostly by train, transiting 
through Strasbourg. There, they would stop for a short while and be given a 
speech and some food, before taking the train to Paris. Once in the capital, they 
would be identified, and their needs and prospects for the future would be 
evaluated.103 Until early 1957, the main reception centre in Paris was a sports 
centre, in the eleventh arrondissement. The centre opened on 19 November and 
accommodated 152 single men. Couples, with or without children, and women 
and children were accommodated in eight hotels in the tenth and eleventh 
arrondissements.104 All these refugees were under the supervision of the 
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Préfecture de Police de la Seine.105 The Red Cross assessed their labour skills 
and helped them while in Paris, their stay not exceeding four or five days. Paris 
was considered a temporary location for assessing the needs of the refugees 
before directing them to refugee camps in the rest of the country. There was no 
possibility to accommodate Hungarian refugees in the city due to the major 
housing crisis in the country at the time. In April 1957, Le Monde estimated 
that 500,000 families were living in hotels or bedsits and that 450,000 lived in 
precarious accommodation conditions.106 
 
When the Austrian government publicly asked for help, the French Prime 
Minister announced that the previous limit of 10,000 refugees was lifted and 
that there would be no limitation on numbers.107 Following this decision, the 
government then decided to accept three trains of refugees without selection or 
even asking them if they wanted to re-emigrate from France, on top of the 500 
voluntary refugees per week the country was already accepting.108 As a result 
the reception of the refugees was rushed and the Ministry of Defence, which 
was providing accommodation for the refugees in military camps, could only 
provide what was available at the time, regardless of employment opportunities 
in the area: 
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Table 3.1: Ministry of Defence's plan for the accommodation of 
Hungarian refugees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: CAC, 19810201, art. 2, Note for Juvigny, 10 December 1956) 
 
All the camps mentioned in the table belonged to the Ministry of Defence and 
were military barracks or camps. Some of the camps were in isolated areas far 
from urban centres with potential employment opportunities. For example, in 
Dates Centres Capacity 
26 November Nancy (Meurthe-et-Moselle) 1,000 
27 November Gap (Hautes-Alpes) 
Mont-Dauphin (Hautes-Alpes) 
1,000 (in total 
for both camps) 
28 November Châtellerault (Vienne) 1,000 
29 November Valdahon (Doubs) 2,000 
30 November Sissonne (Aisne) 1,000 
1 December Montluçon (Allier) 2,000 
3 December Rouen (Seine-Maritime) 
Rochefort (Charente-Maritime) 
Angoulême (Charente) 
800 
500 
300 
4 December Colmar (Haut-Rhin) 
Mulhouse (Haut-Rhin) 
Strasbourg (Bas-Rhin) 
300 
300 
1,000 
5 December Rochefort (Savoie) 
La Roche-sur-Yon (Vendée) 
400 
300 
 
 
Total capacity available  
 
11,900 
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the Hautes-Alpes, the Mont-Dauphin camp was isolated from any major urban 
centre and was described as a cold place in the mountains.109 It was an old 
military fort with high ramparts, two kilometres away from the nearest village. 
The military, in charge of all the camps, were instructed to do everything 
possible to provide the refugees with material and moral support, and 
especially to prevent any kind of propaganda from reaching them.110 
    
The government accepted many refugees very quickly and no proper structure 
for accommodation was available except for these military camps. This 
consequently affected the reception of the refugees. The accommodation of 
refugees raised a lot of concern among the CNARH, as it went directly against 
its aim of placing the refugees into employment as quickly as possible.  
 
The consequences of this rushed plan to accommodate the refugees were felt as 
soon as refugees started to arrive. Mont-Dauphin, in the Hautes-Alpes, was one 
of the first places to welcome refugees from Hungary, and one of the shortest-
lived refugee camps. On 29 November, the refugee camp in Mont-Dauphin, 
along with the one in Gap, also in the Hautes-Alpes, received 974 Hungarian 
refugees coming from Strasbourg by train.111 Both convoys arrived at the Gap 
railway station and were welcomed by the Prefect, the Mayor of Gap, the 
regional president of the Red Cross, and the military officers attached to the 
camp.  
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About half the group, mainly families with children, were sent to Gap, while 
the rest, single men, were sent to Mont-Dauphin.112 The aim of the Ministry of 
the Interior was to move families, isolated women and children out of the 
military refugee camps as quickly as possible, whereas single men could stay 
in the refugee camps until they were placed into employment.113 Families 
benefited from better accommodation and they were quickly moved to hotels 
or small houses. They were generally not pressured into employment in the 
way single men were, even if the Ministry of the Interior also considered it as 
an important step for resettlement to go to a permanent accommodation. 
 
The first days in Mont-Dauphin went smoothly and, according to the Direction 
Centrale des Renseignements Généraux (RG), the intelligence service of the 
French police, the Hungarians felt grateful for the efforts made by the 
authorities and the Red Cross.114 According to the camp military authorities, 
the refugees arrived at the camp in a state of euphoria, explained by the fact 
that they were enjoying freedom again. Despite the reported high spirits, in 
both Gap and Mont-Dauphin camps, the authorities made sure that all the 
employment services were at work to find jobs for the Hungarians before they 
arrived in order to avoid 'le découragement et le laisser-aller'.115 The Ministry 
of the Interior believed that employment was the key to a successful 
resettlement. It was all the more necessary since the conditions of 
accommodation for the refugees were not ideal.  
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However, the initial report of the RG was one-sided and lacked subtlety and 
understanding of the refugees as, very quickly, the moment of euphoria 
mentioned was gone. Employment became an issue for the refugees. They 
feared that if they took employment they would lose their status as refugees 
and would not be able to re-emigrate overseas. It left the authorities in a 
delicate position as their aim was to make sure the refugees took up a job so 
that they left the camps as quickly as possible and started to settle in France. 
Yet out of the 545 job offers, only 18 refugees took up work.116 
 
Other organisations in charge of the Hungarians offered another insight on the 
refugees' conditions. The largest non-governmental organisation involved in 
the reception of the Hungarian refugees was the Service Social d'Aide aux 
Emigrants. The SSAE, whose origins go back to 1920, had a solid experience 
in dealing with refugees.117 It successively dealt with refugees from Spain, 
Russia, and Armenia for resettlement in France.118 In the case of the refugees 
from Hungary, the SSAE's support was mainly financial. From November 
1956 to January 1958, the SSAE distributed 24 million francs to the refugee 
camps as pocket money, and a further 40 million as an advance on salary for 
fifteen days to help those who found work.119 It also distributed funds and 
trousseaux to students and adults.120 Moreover, the SSAE had been chosen by 
the UNHCR to observe and survey the unaccompanied Hungarian children in 
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France. The role of the SSAE was to evaluate as a whole the problem of 
individual cases and find solutions. In February 1958, the SSAE had dealt with 
1,511 children under 18, and was still responsible for 562 of them.121 
 
Relying on its expertise in refugee questions, the SSAE tried to assess the 
reaction of the Hungarian refugees to their reception and treatment in France. It 
thus gave a detailed analysis of the refugees' state of mind: 
 
Ce sont des exilés que nous recevons. L'exilé est celui qui est sorti de son 
ambiance naturelle. Ce réfugié n'est nullement en état d'apprécier les 
avantages de sa situation nouvelle, car les pertes subies, les souffrances 
encourues par son exode, le traumatisme trop récent, ne lui permettent 
pas d'accomplir avec calme et lucidité l'effort d'adaptation nécessaire à 
une vie nouvelle dans un climat étranger.122 
 
The SSAE referred to the Hungarian refugees as exiles, but the French 
government did not use that term. The term exile was politically charged, and it 
implies a wish for return once the situation home has improved. However, the 
SSAE failed to realise that only a portion of the refugees from Hungary were 
exiles, as many of them took the opportunity of the revolution to cross the 
border to Austria, and were closer to economic migrants than to exiles.123  
 
Based on this analysis, the SSAE expected two kinds of refugee behaviour. The 
first one was described as refugees being able to start a new life quickly thanks 
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to the support provided. The other one, considered to represent the majority of 
the refugees, was a critical attitude regarding the help provided: 
 
Il est néanmoins certain que beaucoup d'entre eux trouveront cette aide 
insuffisante car leur nouvelle vie exigera forcement et pour un temps 
indéfini, l'acceptation de la rupture totale avec le passé. Dans le domaine 
des problèmes matériels, le cas pourra être temporairement résolu; mais 
quoi que nous fassions, même si nous allons jusqu'au bout de nos forces, 
il nous sera impossible de satisfaire les besoins réels de ces déracinés. 
Notre effort ne saurait effacer le passé ni éliminer ses résonances.124 
  
The SSAE expected various reactions from the refugees rather than a uniform 
one. The SSAE's analysis of the situation was a different approach from that of 
the French government. The SSAE was not so concerned with the political 
aspect of the refugees, and to define them as exiles was an attempt to 
understand the psychology of that population of refugees, and to try to support 
them accordingly. There were thus two aspects among the committee for the 
relief of Hungarian refugees in France: on one side there was the government, 
which interpreted the situation politically and pragmatically, and on the other 
side, private organisations like the SSAE, which were more concerned about 
who the refugees were and how to help them. Yet, despite all these 
organisations contributing to the government's efforts to the relief of Hungarian 
refugees in France, their resettlement did not always go smoothly because they 
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were considered as labour immigrants, while the Hungarians considered 
themselves as refugees. 
 
Emigration also became an issue. As soon as they arrived many refugees 
expressed their desire to re-emigrate to the United States, Canada or Australia. 
Out of the 530 Hungarian refugees accommodated in Mont-Dauphin, 20 per 
cent of them wanted to resettle in the United States, 14 per cent in Australia, 7 
per cent in the Federal Republic of Germany, and 6 per cent in Canada, 
representing almost half of the refugees in the camp.125 France was aware that 
the United States limited their initial offer to take refugees from Hungary to 
5,000 individuals, and it was only after pressure from the American public, on 
the grounds that the country was not doing enough to help the Hungarians, that 
the US government decided to raise the bar to 21,000. France on the other hand 
did not have any limits and had to deal with growing numbers of refugees, 
some of whom wished to re-emigrate overseas.126 On top of that, rumours 
started spreading in the camp that American navy boats docked in Marseille 
would take refugees from Hungary with them during the Christmas period to 
the United States. Radio Free Europe (RFE) propaganda and the rumours that 
followed had negative effects on the Hungarian refugees. RFE was launched in 
1951 on the initiative of the National Committee for Free Europe, pressing for 
an aggressive campaign of liberation of the Russian satellites, and was listened 
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to by millions of Hungarians especially during the days of the revolution.127 
RFE was secretly funded and sponsored by the CIA, being then instrumental in 
the Hungarian revolution, and was used as a way of shaping reactions of the 
populations under Soviet influence.128 
 
RFE led them to believe that they would be accepted for emigration to the 
United States without any problems when actually this was far from the case. 
RFE was already criticised by the refugees who felt abandoned by the USA 
and Europe as they understood that they would receive military support for the 
revolution.129 However, the US government defended itself and claimed it had 
not recommended RFE to encourage revolutionary actions nor had it promised 
military intervention, and claimed that the revolution was the result of ten years 
of Soviet repression.130 After the so-called euphoria of the first few days in the 
camp, the refugees started to fear for their future as they realised that their 
prospects for emigration overseas were complicated: 
 
Désemparés, les réfugiés… ressentent un certain sentiment de crainte, de 
perte de confiance, en un mot, de peur, malgré toutes les interventions 
officielles pour leur expliquer les mesures projetées en leur faveur pour 
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les reclasser rapidement. Inquiets sur leur avenir, ils envisagent même 
d'envoyer une délégation à Paris, auprès des ambassades étrangères.131 
 
The RG witnessed the situation in the camps deteriorating as well as the lack of 
faith of the refugees in the French government. Hungarian refugees believed 
that the French government was not doing enough to make sure they could re-
emigrate in another country. The atmosphere quickly deteriorated as the 
refugees felt more and more helpless and believed that they had no freedom of 
choice as to whether they could re-emigrate or stay in France. It was at that 
point that refugees in Mont-Dauphin said they felt like prisoners in a 
concentration or forced labour camp.132 It shows that the French government 
was failing in giving the refugees the freedom they had hoped to find in 
France. The government was under pressure to find solutions regarding the 
claims of the refugees, as they wanted to prevent them from returning to 
Hungary with the feeling that France had let them down.  
 
The situation started to escape the French government's control on 6 December 
when 50 refugees decided to leave the camp. They were stopped at Embrun, a 
about 20 kilometres from Mont-Dauphin, and sent back to the camp.133 The 
following day, all the refugees left the camp, except 50 people. In order to 
avoid more incidents, the Ministry of the Interior decided to relocate them to 
Montluçon, Allier, a more populated area. The Ministry explained that the 
refugees were longing for freedom after 'dix ans de régime soviétique' and 
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'après les promesses inconsidérées qui leur avaient été faites en Autriche'.134 
Those were references to RFE which had a negative impact on the refugees in 
Hungary and in Austria.  
 
The Soviet authorities and the Kádár government accused RFE of having 
initiated the Hungarian revolution and promised military intervention from the 
West. When the first 10,000 refugees arrived in Austria, they were reported as 
being bitter since the intervention from the West never came: '[Un jeune 
socialiste de Hongrie] s'exprima avec une grande amertume sur Radio-Europe-
Libre qui, dit-il, pendant des années a exhorté les Hongrois à chasser les 
communistes et les Russes. Mais, au moment décisif, 'l'Ouest nous a lachés', 
ajoutait-il.'135 That case was not unusual as observers in the Austrian refugee 
camps started to interview the refugees from Hungary. When interviewed, 
refugees manifested a grudge against RFE as they claimed it had pushed them 
to revolt and it had promised them support if they did.136 Years of propaganda 
by RFE led the Hungarians to understand the radio programmes as a promise 
of military intervention to support the revolution. However, since no such 
support was provided, refugees were disappointed and had the feeling that 
Western Europe and the USA had given up on them.137 
 
Archives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirm that the refugees 
genuinely thought that help from the USA, France or Britain would come, and 
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most likely in a military way. A survey carried out by an Austrian Institute on 
450 refugees in the first month following their arrival in Austria, revealed that 
out of the 96 per cent of those who listened to Western radio programmes, 79 
per cent of them listened to RFE, showing its importance during the 
revolution.138 An investigation by the West German government on the 
responsibility of the Munich-based RFE, following hundreds of testimonies of 
despondent refugees who claimed they were promised Western intervention, 
led the West German chancellor to admit that 'remarks were made which were 
liable to cause misinterpretations.'139 
 
However, these were not the only reasons and they only partially explained the 
behaviour of the refugees in Mont-Dauphin. If propaganda while in Hungary 
and Austria played a part, being accommodated in an isolated military camp 
definitely made the refugees feel like prisoners and triggered their desire to 
leave the camp as soon as possible. Comparing Mont-Dauphin with the 
Valdahon camp, near Besançon, suggests this was the case. 
 
Only a couple of days after the events in Mont-Dauphin, 300 refugees in the 
Valdahon camp, also a military barracks, left the camp on 9 December in an 
attempt to cross the Swiss border to re-emigrate to the United States or 
Canada.140 Stopped at the border, they were returned to the camp the following 
day. These two similar cases were raised at the National Assembly.141 The 
Minister of Defence, Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, claimed that what happened 
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in Mont-Dauphin and Valdahon was linked to Soviet propaganda, which made 
refugees believe that they did not earn as much money as the French for the 
same job. He also stated that, due to rumours, refugees believed that France 
was just a transit country and that they would have been able to re-emigrate 
quickly. Finally, he said that the years of Soviet authority psychologically 
affected some of the refugees. He made, however, no mention of the refugees 
being accommodated in military camps as a possible reason for their 
reaction.142 
 
On the contrary, Jean Montalat, SFIO deputy, argued that accommodating of 
the refugees in military camps was an unacceptable mistake: 
 
Nous avons craint et nous craignons malheureusement encore que les 
conditions matérielles de l'accueil des réfugiés hongrois ne soient à la 
mesure des engagements pris à leur égard. Nous pensons qu'il eût été 
préférable d'éviter, à ces malheureux qui avaient fui la guerre et les 
menaces pesant sur eux et qui sont arrivés en France dans l'état 
psychologique que vous venez de décrire, un séjour dans les camps 
militaires… Le choix des camps militaires et, en particulier, celui du 
Valdahon, comme centres d'accueil des réfugiés hongrois est une faute 
inadmissible. Il ne faudrait pas qu'elle se renouvelle à l'avenir.143 
 
The French government was not able to set up a proper plan to accommodate 
refugees and used existing military camps for that purpose, to the detriment of 
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the refugees. A discrepancy existed between the promises made to the refugees 
to help them and the way in which they were received. The French 
government's mistake was to accommodate in military structures a population 
trying to liberate itself from a regime which repressed their revolution with 
military force. Montalat's wish to not see that mistake repeated in the future 
was, however, not granted as, except for smaller accommodation around Paris 
run by the Cimade, refugees from Hungary were still accommodated in 
military camps. Yet, Montalat believed that in granting asylum to the 
Hungarian refugees, the reputation of France as a country of asylum was at 
stake.144  
 
Faced with unexpected difficulties in Mont-Dauphin and Valdahon, the 
CNARH decided to rethink its policy and to close the camps in isolated areas. 
Out of the initial list proposed by the Ministry of Defence, six camps were 
closed largely because of poor prospect of employment in the region. The 
Ministry of Defence, which was still in charge of accommodating the refugees, 
on Guy Mollet's demand, proposed a revised plan in early 1957: 
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Map 3.1: Accommodation Centres for Hungarian refugees  
on 1 February 1957 
 
Legend:  
Strasbourg: Functioning camp opened between 27 November and 5 December 1956. 
Metz: Camp opened after 5 December 1956. 
Gap: Closed camp on 1 February 1957. 
 
(Source: CAC, 19810201, art 2, Note for Juvigny, 10 December 1956; 
Accommodation centres for Hungarian refugees, 14 February 1957.) 
 
The camps around Paris were run by the Cimade and were not under the 
supervision of the Ministry of the Interior. They were very different from the 
other camps as they were smaller and were not military barracks. 
Following the new plan, the Ministry of Defence's discontent grew very 
quickly as neither Guy Mollet nor Jean Gilbert-Jules, the Minister of the 
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Interior, proposed alternative plans for the refugees in military camps run by 
the army. Another consequence of Mollet's decision to welcome Hungarian 
refugees without limit was that, at a time of housing shortages, the resettlement 
of many of the refugees proved to be difficult.145 In early January 1957, the 
Ministry of Defence had accommodated a total of 7,000 Hungarians, of whom 
4,000 were still in camps. Other military camps, like in Domfront, Orne, and in 
Cambrai, Nord, were also later used to accommodate refugees. The Ministry of 
Defence criticised the Ministry of the Interior and Guy Mollet for having 
accepted more refugees than the government could possibly handle. It also 
blamed them for having to support the refugees, when it should have been the 
role of other ministries. 
 
The situation led to increasing tensions between the two ministries. Although 
after spring 1957, refugees arrived at a much slower rate, the Ministry of 
Defence pressured the Ministry of the Interior into relieving the army from its 
responsibilities. It periodically proposed new plans to the Ministry of the 
Interior in order to evacuate its camps and pass on full responsibility to the 
Ministry of the Interior and other administrative bodies. Its plan of 30 
September 1957 proposed to evacuate Cambrai and one Nancy camp on 1 
October, Montbéliard on 1 November, Metz and the other Nancy camp on 1 
January 1958, and Domfront on 1 March.146 Cambrai, Montbéliard and one of 
the Nancy camps were closed in due time, with the remaining camps still 
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representing a total of 600 refugees.147 The housing crisis was such that the 
Ministry of the Interior had great difficulties in finding accommodation even 
for those in employment, and was unwilling to move those with jobs to another 
camp as it would delay their resettlement. On the other hand, refugees who 
were unwilling to work were sent to Domfront.148 Thus, refugees from 
Hungary, except for those at the care of the Cimade, had not been 
accommodated anywhere else but in military camps until they found permanent 
accommodation elsewhere. 
 
The Ministry of Labour established a list in early December 1956 of the 
départements with employment opportunities for the Hungarian refugees.149 A 
total of 6,818 positions were available for the Hungarians to take. That number 
included 5,913 for men and 905 for women, with the vast majority of the jobs 
available in metallurgy (1,884), construction (1,730), agriculture (926), and 
mining (424). Comparing this plan with the places of accommodation in camps 
can help to understand the effects of the resettlement policy: 
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Map 3.2: Employment opportunities and refugee camps by départements 
(excluding Paris region), December 1956-February 1957 
 
 
Legend: 
 Départements with camps and with employment for Hungarian refugees 
 Départements without camps but with employment  
 Départements with camps but without employment  
 Département with camps and with employment but closed down because of trouble 
 Départements with unused camps and without employment  
 
(Source: CAC, 20050590, art. 120, Employment opportunities for Hungarian 
refugees, 4 December 1956; 19810201, art. 2, Note for Juvigny, 10 December 
1956; 19810201, art. 2, Existing accommodation centres for Hungarian 
refugees, 14 February 1957) 
 
 127
The map clearly shows that the Ministry of the Interior did not respect the 
suggestions of the Ministry of Labour. If the refugees happened to be in a 
département with employment opportunities, it was mostly because there was a 
military camp there that could be used as a refugee camp. Roughly half the 
refugees found themselves in camps with no large employment opportunities, 
while 21 départements with prospects of employment could not receive any 
refugees in great numbers due to lack of accommodation. 
 
The Moselle, Meurthe-et-Moselle and Haute-Marne départements, which 
offered a large number of jobs in the steel industry and coal mines, were the 
most promising départements. Refugees who worked in those two sectors there 
could be accommodated by their employers, and thus solved the question of 
them leaving the camps. 
 
Those difficulties happened because the Ministry of the Interior tackled the 
resettlement of the refugees from the perspective of employment, without 
enough means of proper accommodation. This perspective ignored refugees' 
own expectations of their stay in France, such as re-emigration opportunities. 
The events in Mont-Dauphin, for example, were not linked to employment, as 
545 jobs had been offered to the refugees.150 The refugees simply refused to 
take those jobs because they feared they would lose their status as refugees and 
not be able to re-emigrate overseas if they did. In the first months, emigration 
was an important issue for the Hungarian refugees in France.  
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After those initial problems and when the refugees who were determined to 
leave France did so, the resettlement of those who decided to stay in France 
went quickly. Some camps benefited from renovation work. The military 
barracks in Cambrai, for example, were turned into a refugee camp for the 
occasion. The Ministry of Defence refurbished the camp to make it more 
comfortable for the refugees.151 The SSAE played a part as it recommended 
that the conditions should be improved.152 Walls were painted with light 
colours, rooms for couples were arranged, and sanitary installations were in 
good condition. On the whole, camps were improved to make refugees less 
prone to complain as far as the French government was concerned. For the 
SSAE, on the other hand, it was a matter of treating refugees with decency.  
 
The majority of the Hungarian refugees had been resettled by the end of 1957. 
This encouraged the French government in accepting Hungarian refugees from 
Yugoslavia. In its plans to resettle Hungarians from Yugoslavia, the 
government made it clear that only those who could be employed in sectors 
lacking a full workforce in France would be accepted. 
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-Granting asylum or recruiting workers? Hungarian refugees 
in Yugoslavia 
 
From the mid-1950s onwards, France benefited from great economic growth, 
the so-called Trente Glorieuses, and was in need of workers, which the 
government sought to meet with labour immigration.153 In granting asylum to 
Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia, Cold War considerations were put aside, 
and the French government set up a plan to recruit a labour force. I will now 
show, through the example of the Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia chosen for 
resettlement in France, how the French government turned the refugee crisis 
into labour migration. 
 
The problem of the Hungarian refugees who sought refuge in Yugoslavia was 
of a different nature in comparison to the Austrian situation. They were fewer 
in numbers, representing roughly 20,000 of the total 200,000 refugees who left 
Hungary. However, countries which granted asylum to Hungarian refugees in 
Austria were far more reluctant to do the same for Hungarian refugees in 
Yugoslavia because they sought refuge in a Communist country.154 France, 
however, proved to be one of the most generous countries and granted asylum 
to 2,453 Hungarian refugees from Yugoslavia, while the United States, still 
accepting refugees on its quota system, only accepted 2,326 of them for 
resettlement. During his visit in Yugoslavia in December 1957, the UNHCR 
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High Commissioner, Auguste Lindt, congratulated the French government for 
its help regarding the Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia.155  
 
Despite Lindt's statements, it was not generosity that motivated the French 
government in granting asylum to refugees in Yugoslavia. Just as the 
Hungarian refugees in Austria were accepted because it was profitable for 
France's economy and industry, the refugees in Yugoslavia were carefully 
selected to make sure they would fit immigration criteria. A first mission was 
sent on 2 June 1957 to recruit 1,300 refugees, after 200 had been selected by 
the French embassy there already.156 The mission, which included 
representatives of the Ministries of Labour and of Foreign Affairs, selected 
1,100 for immigration to France. Among the refugees screened, 90 per cent 
were employable in France, most of them being workers or skilled workers in 
metallurgy and agriculture. The mission was pleased that 82 per cent of the 
workers were men, among whom 72 per cent were single, as they were looking 
to recruit young single men, who were believed to be easier to employ because 
they had no family and were more mobile. The recruitment of the Hungarian 
refugees in Yugoslavia privileged individuals who could be put in employment 
immediately and resettled quickly. The mission was thus far from serving a 
humanitarian purpose as it recruited a majority of men at the expense of family 
groups or female refugees: 
 
Un problème reste donc posé et que le travail effectué par la mission ne 
fait que confirmer, à savoir qu'il serait urgent que fut fixé un deuxième 
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contingent, ne serait-ce que pour donner suite aux promesses qui par 
ailleurs ont été faites à ces réfugiés. Cette deuxième action pourrait peut-
être se situer sur un plan plus 'social' puisque aussi la première, par la 
force des choses et des circonstances, a pris essentiellement un caractère 
économique.157 
 
The mission was used, above all, to recruit workers and not to grant asylum to 
refugees. The fact that there was a selection process shows that the government 
wanted to recruit refugees who could be employed and not simply grant asylum 
to any refugee. The report suggested that the French government send another 
mission as soon as possible in order to get the best people for labour migration 
to France, before other countries arranged for their emigration elsewhere. From 
the tone of the report, it appears that the social aspect of the refugee policy was 
overshadowed by economic motives. 
 
The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Labour then arranged with 
various employers in France to recruit some of the refugees directly from 
refugee camps abroad. To that end it used the ONI which aimed to recruit 
workers under 35 years of age.158 The ONI is an example of the rationalisation 
of immigration in France, as it served a double purpose, and attempted to 
control immigration. The introduction of the ONI in the recruitment of 
Hungarian refugees provides further proof that the French government 
considered the refugees as labour. 
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The ONI sent a physician, a selection officer, and a policeman in order to 
recruit 200 young single unskilled men for agricultural work, industry and 
construction.159 Only 28 refugees were recruited on that occasion as Canada 
had already sent a mission with the same goals. The UNHCR was aware of the 
selection of refugees for work, and agreed on condition that only single men 
were recruited so that families were not split up. Thus France was not the only 
country recruiting refugees as workers in Yugoslavia. As the refugees from 
Hungary were not 'news' anymore and the UNHCR wanted the remaining 
refugees to be resettled, the French government benefited from good conditions 
to select refugees for employment without being worried that this scheme 
would be criticised. 
 
Despite being able to put refugees in employment quickly, other problems 
surfaced in some of the camps and were not related to the availability of 
employment for refugees. In several camps, a minority of refugees started to 
raise concerns among the CNARH members as they refused to take up 
proposed employment and remained idle in camps, in some cases influencing 
other refugees to do the same.160 
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-Refugee policy - success or failure? The Camp des Cinq 
Tranchées 
 
Despite, the quick resettlement of the refugees from Hungary in general, the 
French government had to deal with a minority of difficult cases, who were not 
willing to move out of the camps, or were too poor to go into permanent 
accommodation. The camp des Cinq Tranchées, near Nancy, represented to a 
large extent a failure in the French policy for the Hungarian refugees. Although 
the camp was relatively small, it represented a problem hard to solve. The 
camp was intrinsically linked to government decisions to accept an unlimited 
number of refugees for asylum: principally to show the world and especially 
countries in the Soviet sphere of influence, that the West, to use the expression 
of that time, cared about the people and that freedom could be achieved there, 
but above all to recruit mobile and immediately available workers.  
 
The camp des Cinq Tranchées consisted of unused military barracks and was 
run by the Ministry of the Interior, to re-accommodate the 150 refugees left in 
the Molitor military camp in Nancy in early 1958. The general state of the 
camp was very poor as electricity and running water were cut off in April 
1959.161 Henri Trémeaud, French representative at the UNHCR, blamed France 
for having misled the UNHCR by calling the camps 'accommodation centres' 
and created the situation at the Cinq Tranchées: 
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En France, on a toujours refusé d'appeler les choses de ce nom et le 
résultat est que les crédits pour fermer les camps sont épuisés et qu'aucun 
d'entre eux n'a pu être attribué à la France puisqu'en principe elle n'avait 
pas de 'camps'… On a créé un camp pire que les autres dans les baraques 
des Cinq Tranchées.162 
 
The French government did not arbitrarily choose to call the military camps 
'accommodation centres', but chose to give them a positive connotation rather 
than the negative one of 'camp', which could in 1956 still evoke concentration 
camps or refugee camps from the Second World War. It wanted to give an 
impression of comfort, especially to the Soviet authorities, who were trying to 
repatriate the Hungarian refugees by promising immunity regarding the 
October revolution. In reality, those 'accommodation centres' were simply 
military camps under army surveillance. The consequences were that the 
French government could not ask for the financial help from the UNHCR to 
close the refugee camps and resettle their occupants, as had been the case in 
Austria. Attempts to use the refugees for their political and economic 
advantage led to a financial backlash for France. 
 
The Cinq Tranchées camp became a bigger problem after Radio Luxembourg 
broadcast a report on the disastrous conditions in the camp in November 
1959.163 The refugees in Cinq Tranchées were hard to resettle because only 27 
of the 150 inhabitants were working, and were paid too little to rent private 
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accommodation.164 Many others were known to be petty criminals.165 Although 
the Radio Luxembourg report provoked ministerial discussions on the camp, 
no satisfactory solution was found. The camp remained open and supported by 
the SSAE.166 
 
However, the camp was prematurely closed on 1 March 1960, when the visit of 
Nikita Khrushchev was announced in France from 23 March to 3 April.167 
Stéphane Dufoix argues that this visit symbolised the improvement of relations 
between France and Hungary after Charles de Gaulle became president. The 
French government put hundreds of political activists among the Hungarian 
refugees under house arrest in Corsica, in an effort to prevent potential public 
demonstrations protesting against the visit and the Soviet Union.168 That was 
one consequence of the visit on the Hungarian refugees. As far as the 
remaining refugees at the camp des Cinq Tranchées were concerned, who were 
not classified as political activists but rather difficult cases for resettlement, 
they were dispersed to other départements. To facilitate their resettlement, the 
Ministry of the Interior agreed with the Ministry of Labour to grant them 
permanent work permit for any profession. The end of the Hungarian refugees 
resettlement occurred in an effort to conceal the camp des Cinq Tranchées from 
the Soviet head of government, showing that the refugee problem remained 
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linked to the Cold War context, when the economic resettlement of the 
refugees was not achieved. 
 
 
 
-Attitudes towards naturalisation 
 
In January 1957, 7,346 Hungarian refugees were accommodated in camps 
spread in 17 départements, of whom only 460 re-emigrated.169 In December 
1957, only 669 refugees were left in camps. At that date, a total of 12,858 
refugees had come to France, of whom 8,224 were resettled in France, 3,269 
re-emigrated elsewhere and 696 went back to Hungary.170 Thus, the French 
government succeeded in limiting the return of Hungarian refugees to their 
country of origin as part of its propaganda action, while attempting to have 
them fill unoccupied jobs and permanently resettle. 
 
However, naturalisation, which was considered to be, if not the final, then a 
major step in the process of assimilation, as France wanted Hungarians to 
contribute to the country's demographic growth, did not necessarily happen 
after the five years period of residence to apply for French citizenship.171 
Attitudes towards naturalisation were mixed among the Hungarian refugees. 
For some, it was a means by which a proper passport could replace temporary 
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and inconvenient refugee documents. It also gave refugees a feeling of 
stability. Akos Ditroy, who left Hungary because of his involvement in the 
revolution, initially wanted to go back, but changed his mind after he got 
married in France in 1961. However, he returned on his own to Hungary for the 
first time in 1965 to take stock of the situation in the country almost ten years 
after the revolution. Akos Ditroy waited a long time before applying for French 
nationality, which made him feel safe enough to travel with his family: 'Je suis 
devenu citoyen français en 1980. Ca m'a permis d'aller [en Hongrie] avec la 
famille. Avant, ma femme y allait avec les enfants mais sans moi'.172 His 
concern about the Hungarian situation, and because he was hoping for a regime 
change in Hungary, made him delay his decision to get naturalised.  
 
The Algerian War was also one of the reasons why Hungarian refugees in 
France sometimes waited to apply for French nationality:  
 
J'ai d'abord eu un titre de voyage, valable pour tous les pays au monde 
sauf la Hongrie… En 1967, j'ai eu ma naturalisation. J'aurais pu l'avoir 
dès 1962, mais à l'époque il y avait la guerre d'Algérie. Les copains qui 
ont demandé la naturalisation à cette période, le lendemain, c'était la 
convocation pour 28 mois d'Algérie.173 
 
Pierre Latzko also considered returning to Hungary after the end of the Soviet 
Union, but he quickly realised that life there was difficult for him after 35 years 
in France: 'Je suis parti en préretraite en 1991, ce qui coïncidait avec la chute 
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du mur. Je me suis dit: 'tiens, je vais rentrer chez moi'. C'est ce que j'ai fait, 
c'est ce que j'ai tenté de faire. Mais, ça n'a pas marché, car la vie de tous les 
jours pour moi là-bas, ce n'est plus possible.' His statement shows that in the 
early 1990s, despite having French nationality for nearly 25 years, he still 
considered Hungary as home. 
 
 
 
-Conclusion 
 
The French government was quick to react to the Hungarian revolution. It had 
first used the situation in Hungary to carry out, with Britain, a humanitarian 
response that was also to serve as propaganda to weaken the Soviet Union. 
This relief also enabled France to regain some credit at the UN Assembly, 
following the military intervention in Egypt. Accepting unlimited number of 
refugees was part of this propaganda. It was considered a moral victory over 
the Soviet Union that Hungarian refugees successfully resettled in France. 
 
This propaganda goal found its expression in the public demonstrations in 
Paris, which were anticommunist and the occasion to weaken the PCF, during a 
Fourth Republic made of alliances between parties and difficulties to form 
parliamentary majorities, characterised by ministerial instability.174 In this 
context, the Hungarian revolution and the Hungarian refugees became political 
objects.  
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However, the fact that the refugees were composed of single young men was 
determinant in their resettlement in France. Aside from the political 
considerations linked the Cold War, Hungarian refugees were considered to be 
labour immigrants, within the terms of the 1945 Ordinance, as they could be 
employed in agricultural and industrial sectors, which lacked sufficient a 
workforce. The refugees were also thought to be able to boost France's 
demography, as their national origin was a welcome addition to the French 
population in contrast with the Algerians, who made up the main wave of post-
war immigrants. The French government and administration thus eased their 
immigration policy by massively and automatically regularising all Hungarian 
refugees who wished to resettle in France. 
 
Yet, this chapter has also shown that their resettlement in France had its limits. 
France was not prepared to accommodate a large number of refugees, which 
led to unrest in some of the camps. Moreover, because of the complex linkage 
between immigration policies and the Cold War, the French government did 
not know what to do with refugees who could not be placed in employment and 
permanent accommodation. The fact that the last Hungarian refugee camp was 
hastily closed before Khrushchev's visit to France, in a period of thaw with the 
Soviet Union, shows that this particular group of refugees was a political 
embarrassment as a living proof of the limitations of the French resettlement 
policy.  
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4. Britain and the Refugees from Hungary 
 
Before the Hungarian refugee crisis started, the British government saw 
political advantage in supporting the revolution in Hungary. It worked with the 
French government to make sure the insurgents knew their revolution was 
supported in the West. Despite public popular support for the Hungarian 
revolutionaries, the Soviet invasion of Hungary did not trigger demonstrations 
in Britain similar to the ones in France. This can be explained by the national 
political context in Britain. The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) was 
not a major party and did not experience attacks on the scale that the PCF 
suffered. Yet, it adopted a similar position regarding the Soviet invasion of 
Hungary.1 The revolution, nevertheless, raised a lot of sympathy from the 
British public. 
 
However, granting asylum to the Hungarian refugees was a means of 
propaganda against the Soviet Union and a way to support and encourage 
rebellion in countries under Soviet influence. It was also a way to distract 
attention from the Suez crisis, criticised in Britain and at the United Nations. 
Moreover, the previous chapter showed that the French government had 
demographic and economic interests in admitting a great number of refugees 
for permanent resettlement. Britain also experienced labour shortages in late 
1956, especially in the industrial and agricultural sectors where the government 
thought that Hungarian refugees could contribute, as the bulk of the refugees 
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were young single men who previously worked in these areas.2 The use of 
Hungarian refugees as an available workforce is also shown through the 
scheme set up by the National Coal Board (NCB). The NCB received 
authorisation from the Home Office to recruit as many Hungarian refugees to 
work in British mines as necessary, as the NCB's estimations at the time 
showed that the mining sector was in great need of miners.3 
 
Refugees from Hungary arrived in Britain at a time when the Cabinet was 
looking into the possibility of limiting immigration from the West Indies, 
India, and Pakistan. Hungarian refugees were a more welcome population: it 
was believed that their large number would not cause social unrest because 
they were white.  
 
However, as in France, granting asylum to potentially unlimited numbers of 
refugees in such a short time in a country usually reluctant to grant asylum 
posed some practical issues. The British government did not have enough 
accommodation available. Thus, very different kinds of accommodation were 
used, from former military camps and barracks to houses and disused medical 
buildings, sometimes in remote places far from employment opportunities. 
This obviously affected the reception of the refugees. 
 
Whereas the French government and parliament supported the resettlement of 
Hungarian refugees in France, with the exception of the Communists, the same 
cannot be said of the British government. Tony Kushner argues that the Home 
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Office was reluctant to admit Hungarian refugees and only did so under 
Foreign Office and popular pressure.4 The Home Office indeed was opposed, 
at first, to the resettlement of Hungarian refugees in Britain. This opposition 
was motivated, to an extent, by anti-immigrant feelings but also by 
anticommunism. The Home Office and the London Metropolitan Police, 
governed by the Home Office, remained very suspicious of the Hungarian 
refugees, as they feared a communist fifth column amongst them. 
 
Finally, the previous chapter suggested that the French government did not 
distinguish between the Hungarian refugees and that the small number of Jews 
among the refugees limited French Jewish responses. Yet, in Britain, the 
Jewish community was concerned with potential antisemitism among refugees, 
and wanted to support Jewish refugees, as they, too, were suspicious of the 
Hungarian refugees. 
 
 
 
-Responses to the Hungarian crisis 
 
Popular reactions to the Hungarian revolution were very limited in comparison 
with the demonstrations in France, which were directed against the PCF. This 
can be explained by the fact that the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) 
was smaller than its French counterpart. In 1945, the CPGB's membership 
reached 45,000. It enjoyed a renewed importance in the trade unions after the 
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election of Bert Papworth to the General Council of the Trades Union Congress 
(TUC).5 By 1950, the CPGB's influence had already greatly diminished due the 
increased tensions between the Western bloc and the Soviet Union and the 
anticommunism of the TUC leaders.6 Moreover, the British working-class was 
traditionally supporters of the Labour party. In 1956, in contrast with the PCF, 
the party had no MP. 
 
The Hungarian revolution and its repression had major repercussions on the 
CPGB and its official newspaper, the Daily Worker. Harry Pollitt, the leader of 
the CPGB, supported the Soviet repression of the Hungarian revolution, which 
led to the departure of many of its members. Following the events in Hungary, 
it lost 7,000 of its 33,000 members after November 1956.7 Not only did the 
Daily Worker lose some of its subscribers, on the back of its support for the 
Soviet regime, but it also lost a third of its journalists, including its special 
reporter in Budapest, Peter Fryer, who witnessed the military repression.8 
Fryer's articles had been edited and spiked by the editor of the Daily Worker to 
make them conform to the Soviet interpretation of the Hungarian revolution.9 
Even some local branches of the CPGB publicly condemned the Soviet 
military intervention in Hungary.10 To tackle this loss of credibility and to 
justify their position, the CPGB followed a line similar to the PCF by claiming 
that the Hungarian uprising was a fascist counter-revolution. This policy was in 
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line with the confidence maintained in the Soviet Union earlier in March 
1956.11 
 
Only a few demonstrations of support for the Hungarian people took place in 
Britain and, like in France, these were directed against the CPGB.12 Among the 
few hundred demonstrating many were Hungarians or students. Yet, unlike the 
demonstrations in Paris, those in London were much more orderly, and only a 
few milk bottles were thrown at the Communist party building in London. 
Many of the protests in Britain took the form of delegations of Hungarians 
already in exile to meet the Prime Minister, or letters of protest to the Soviet 
embassy from British academics.13 
 
As far as the British press was concerned, it showed sympathy to the 
Hungarian revolution and condemned its repression by the Soviet army.14 
Those limited reactions can be explained by the fact that public opinion and the 
government were much more concerned with the Suez military intervention 
than by the Hungarian revolution. If the situation in Hungary made the 
headlines of all the major newspapers in Britain, attention progressively 
returned to Suez.15 On the other hand, the Daily Worker favoured the Soviet 
repression of the revolution. Like L'Humanité in France, the Daily Worker 
considered the revolution to be led by fascists and an attempt to a return to the 
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Horthy regime.16 It thus welcomed the end of the revolution and the forming of 
'new Hungarian anti-fascist government' and the end of the 'white terror' by 
which it characterised the violence of the revolution on the demonstrators' 
side.17 Yet, in line with the lesser influence of the CPGB in comparison with 
the PCF, the Daily Worker did not engage in a lengthy debate with other 
newspapers on the nature of the Hungarian revolution and the refugees.  
 
 
 
-The British government's reaction 
 
As far as the British government was concerned, it reacted very carefully to the 
news of the Hungarian revolution. Just like the French government, it publicly 
claimed in the House of Commons that it would not intervene in the Soviet 
Union's affairs: 'Her Majesty's Government have in no way the intention of 
exploiting events in Eastern Europe to undermine the security of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics', said Lord Privy Seal, R.A. Butler.18 Despite this 
statement, the Foreign Office worked on a way to use the Hungarian situation 
for the government's own benefit. Although the British embassy in Budapest 
tried to make sure that the Hungarian population understood that no military 
action was envisaged, it advised that any promise made by Britain should be 
kept. Such promises were usually to send food and medical supplies.19 The 
British government, rather than taking military action, engaged in propaganda 
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action by providing support to the insurgents and, later, refugees. The same 
course of action was taken by the French government, as discussed in the 
previous chapter.20 
 
Using the Hungarian situation for propaganda purposes was to continue the 
ideological warfare started in 1948, with the creation of the Information 
Research Department (IRD) by the Foreign Office. The IRD was a secret 
propaganda department and an instrument in 'Britain's covert ideological 
offensive against the Soviet Union during the Cold War'.21 Before the 
Hungarian revolution, it had engaged in the planning and organisation of anti-
Communist publicity.22 The IRD had established in 1955 that Hungarians were 
missing Imre Nagy as the government's leader, which gave the Foreign Office 
another incentive to support the Hungarian revolution.23 Yet, archives do not 
suggest an active role of the IRD during the Hungarian revolution or in the 
reception of Hungarian refugees in Britain. 
 
The other motive, in submitting the plan to the French government, was to 
distract national and international attention from Suez. When the revolution 
broke out, the decision to attack Egypt to regain the control of the Suez Canal 
had already been taken at Sèvres on 24 October. The Hungarian revolution did 
not affect the planned attack on Egypt on 29 October, but was a way to 
minimise its negative political consequences on the international scene, and 
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domestically for Britain.24 Anthony Eden, whose cabinet disagreed over Suez, 
hoped that the news from Hungary would turn in his favour.25 He was indeed 
criticised by the press, and newspapers usually supporting Eden's policy were 
divided on the Suez intervention. If the French press was on the whole 
supportive of the Suez military intervention, it was not the case in Britain.26 
This was also reflected in parliament as, for example, there were only 270 
against 218 votes in favour of an ultimatum asking the Egyptian army to 
withdraw far behind the Suez Canal. In comparison, when the same ultimatum 
was voted on in the French national assembly there were 368 in favour with 
182 votes against.27 At the same time, between 2,000 and 3,000 students 
demonstrated against the Suez intervention in early November in Edinburgh 
and London.28 
 
The Hungarian revolution represented an opportunity for Anthony Eden and 
for the British government, just like the French government, to divert attention 
from Suez while using propaganda against the Soviet authorities. However, 
after the repression of the Hungarian revolution, the press, except the Daily 
Worker, first blamed Eden and the government for the outcome in Hungary.29 
The British press was convinced that the Suez military intervention had given 
Khrushchev similarly the opportunity to intervene in Hungary. Despite those 
criticisms, the Soviet intervention in Hungary eventually enabled the British 
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government to partly divert attention away from its actions, both at the UN and 
in the press. British government spokesmen exaggerated the difference 
between Suez and Hungary by referring to legitimate military action in Egypt 
and an act of aggression in Hungary.30 
 
At the UN Assembly, Sir Pierson Dixon, the British delegate, made a link 
between Suez and Hungary and declared that both situations shared in common 
'one clear simple and disturbing pattern': they were the result of Soviet 
imperialism.31 He claimed that the Soviet Union had expanded its sphere of 
influence and this had caused the Egyptian situation to get out of control, and 
that the Hungarian revolution turned into a major crisis. Dixon used vocabulary 
consecrated by the Cold War and much used in the press to explain to the UN 
Assembly that the 'Free World' was fighting against the 'Russian Empire', and 
that the 'Soviet psychological warfare machine' had tried to bully and 
intimidate the British people without success.  
 
Granting asylum to Hungarian refugees in Britain was part of the same 
ideological war. Soon after the repression of the Hungarian revolution, the 
number of Hungarians fleeing the country to Austria started to rise 
dramatically. In the logic of 'Free World' against 'Soviet imperialism', Sir 
Pierson Dixon declared to the UN Assembly that the British government was 
examining arrangements to receive 2,500 refugees from Hungary, following 
the Austrian government's demand for international help a few days before.32 
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The reception of the first Hungarian refugees was then partly motivated by 
propaganda reasons which mirrored the French government's policy. 
 
Moreover, Britain, like France, was a NATO member, for which it was very 
important to sort out the refugee crisis in Austria. The decision to waive the 
limitation on the number of refugees to be permitted to enter the UK was 
following the general policy of NATO. During the Cold War, it was important 
that propaganda depicted Britain and the West as maintaining high moral 
values, so providing relief to Hungarian refugees in Austria was also a way to 
support the Hungarian revolution.33 Such action stemmed from the beginning 
of the Cold War, from NATO’s determination to counter Communist 
propaganda.34 The responses involved assessing the threat posed by legal 
Communist parties in NATO countries, and representing Communism as a 
failing political and economic system. Discrediting Communism and 
Communist political parties was a key objective in NATO's propaganda plans. 
As a consequence, NATO became very involved in providing relief for 
Hungarian refugees. The relief provided by NATO country members was 
significant as they had provided asylum to 100,977 refugees from Hungary out 
of a total 124,822 refugees moved from Austria in March 1957.35 However, as 
far as Britain was concerned, and as the chapter on France and Hungarian 
refugees suggested, Hungarian refugees were not indiscriminately accepted for 
resettlement despite public claims to the contrary. Although the Cold War 
context played a role in granting asylum to refugees, the main condition of 
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resettlement for refugees was that they were suitable candidates for 
immigration as defined by British policy. 
 
 
 
-British policy on Hungarian refugees 
 
When Lord John Hope, the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
announced at the House of Commons on 7 November that Britain was ready to 
accept 2,500 Hungarian refugees, he also claimed that the refugee crisis in 
Austria would be solved quickly if all countries followed its example.36 The 
announcement was on the whole welcomed by the press.37 Peter Gatrell argues 
that the quick response from Western powers to the Hungarian refugee crisis 
enabled them to avoid acknowledging the late response to refugees from Nazi 
Germany, and was a commitment to assist people facing persecution.38 
However, in the cases of the French and British governments, there were very 
few comparisons made between Jewish refugees in the 1930s and Hungarian 
refugees at the time. Tony Kushner and Katharine Knox argue that the main 
motivations to grant asylum to the Hungarian refugees came from 'feelings of 
guilt' and a will to please the popular demand to help the Hungarians.39 There 
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were indeed public demands for the support of Hungarian refugees.40 This was 
the case as well in parliament. For example, Peter Kirk, Conservative MP for 
Gravesend, believed the 2,500 bar was too low: 'First, I cannot feel that for us 
to take 2,500 is enough. I do not think that we should have put any ceiling on 
the number, in the first place. We should have sought, in this emergency and 
this stormy situation, to keep the gates free and wide open for any Hungarian 
who cares to come.'41  
 
Behind the humanitarian declaration of Lord John Hope, there was the prospect 
of using the Hungarian refugees as labour immigrants. Following the 
declaration of Lord John Hope, the Home Office asked the embassy in Vienna 
to provide all information possible on how to identify and recruit refugees who 
could be employed in Britain in sectors lacking workers.42 The Home Office 
then set up a team which went to Austria to select refugees for resettlement in 
Britain among the 32,000 in Austrian camps.43 The government was indeed 
willing to grant asylum but only according to employers' needs.  
 
The reason why the British government lifted the 2,500 bar and accepted so 
many Hungarian refugees can be explained by immigration policies and 
practices. Since the end of the Second World War, the government had 
privileged European immigration to Britain, and this despite claims of Britain 
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not being an immigration country, as those claims were to discourage any 
spontaneous and unwanted immigration. 
 
In 1948, coinciding with the passing of the British Nationality Act, Britain 
experienced increased immigration from the Commonwealth. West Indian, 
Pakistani and Indian immigrants started to arrive in Britain with the prospect of 
securing jobs and housing. The Home Office very quickly became worried 
about what it referred to as 'coloured immigration' which would lead to 
'undesirable elements' coming, and present a large problem for the government 
to tackle. Although, the black community was estimated to only number 30,000 
individuals in 1950, it was feared that large populations could exacerbate racial 
tensions, and many of the immigrants were considered unemployable. When a 
Working Party on the Employment in the United Kingdom of Surplus Colonial 
Labour mentioned the possibility of employing black immigrants in sectors 
such as mining and agriculture, the Ministry of Labour dismissed the idea by 
arguing that West Indians were 'not of the type required in the UK'.44 There 
was thus a lot of racial prejudice when it came to the employment of West 
Indians in Britain, and the Ministry of Labour claimed that they could not be 
absorbed in British industry should they come in great numbers. In contrast, 
345,000 eastern and southern Europeans immigrated to Britain through the 
European Voluntary Workers (EVW) scheme between 1947 and 1949, 
showing a clear preference for European immigration.45 Moreover, this scheme 
was also political and immigrants coming through the EVW scheme were 
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considered as refugees from communism.46 EVW immigrants were welcomed 
in Britain for ideological reasons and because of the country's economic needs. 
 
Yet, in 1954, reflecting on the possibility of adopting policy to control this 
postcolonial immigration, the Cabinet did not recommend any action other than 
deportation of 'undesirables', as it feared that general restrictions would damage 
the relations with the Commonwealth. However, 'some ministers evidently felt 
that this would not be enough, that black immigration would increase the 
population to 'unmanageable proportions' in ten to fifteen years' time.'47 The 
arrival of the Hungarian refugees was a welcome alternative to this 
immigration due to their European origins. 
 
In 1956, the immigration rules were defined by the Aliens Order of 1953, 
which established a link between labour needs and entry and work permits 
issued by the Ministry of Labour.48 The permits were valid for one year, then 
extended up to four years. There was also an arbitrary element in the 1953 
Aliens Order as any alien could be refused entry at the discretion of an 
immigration officer.49 On top of Cold War considerations, their European 
origin and their professional skills made them strong candidates for 
immigration to Britain. In the case of the Hungarian refugees then, the Aliens 
Order was used to facilitate their entry. 
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Since it considered refugees as labour immigrants, the British government set 
up a plan to select Hungarians in Austrian camps who were considered to be 
suitable people for resettlement in Britain, despite claiming it would accept any 
refugees. On 25 November, following a new appeal made by the Austrian 
government, the British waived the 2,500 limit, and said that no more 
individual interviews would take place in the refugee camp to speed up the 
evacuation process.50 The first immigration team returned to Britain the 
following day and put on hold its immigration mission until the beginning of 
1957. The British government left the task to arrange the refugees' travel 
arrangements to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration 
(ICEM) officers in association with the Austrian government with the 
assistance of the British embassy.  
 
The ICEM, a body of which Britain was not a member, was the main 
organisation dealing with the transportation of Hungarian refugees from 
Austria to other countries of asylum.51 It was an independent organisation 
founded in 1952, after a conference on the refugee problem in Europe, on the 
initiative of the United States and Belgium.52 The British government refused 
to be part of ICEM officially because of the yearly cost of £70,000 for 
administrative expenses. In reality, it was because it would be pressured to 
contribute to other refugee relief operations, but above all because it did not 
consider Britain as a country of immigration and therefore would not benefit 
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from ICEM action. In 1956-57, ICEM largely relied on financial aid provided 
by the US as it had limited funds from elsewhere.53  
 
However, in January 1957, ICEM withdrew from the mission after having sent 
13,000 Hungarians to Britain for a cost of over $300,000.54 Due to a lack of 
funds, ICEM was forced to stop transportation of refugees to the United 
Kingdom. Yet, the British government was reluctant to pay the organisation for 
transportation services as it was not a member. The Foreign Office wanted to 
make a point to ICEM that it was not the British government's habit to pay to 
have refugees sent over for resettlement. The Foreign Office only very 
reluctantly agreed to pay £10,000 if ICEM asked for a financial contribution.55  
 
The Home Office claimed that its refugee policy was not discriminatory, and a 
month after the decision to grant asylum to refugees was taken, it stated that 
'there was no attempt to select particular classes of refugees, and with the 
exception of any found to be undesirable, the refugees sent [to Britain] were a 
representative cross-section of those who had crossed into Austria.'56 But 
selection existed as the word 'undesirable' suggests.  
 
The report of the immigration team sent from January to March 1957 to 
Traiskirchen camp, in Austria, to recruit 500 refugees among the 3,500 at the 
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camp, reveals the details of the selection process.57 The camp was a former 
training school for 200 Soviet officer cadets who had lived there from the end 
of the war to November 1955. When they left, they looted the place and 
smashed every pane of glass.58 The overall condition of the camp was thus very 
poor. 
 
The mission was composed of eight immigration officers, two Aliens 
Registration officers, four Foreign Office staff, four ICEM typists, a 
photographer, and the Chief Inspector of the Home Office Immigration Branch. 
The selection process was detailed and involved the examination and 
photographing of each refugee.59 This lengthy process demonstrates the 
complete control over who would be accepted for resettlement in Britain. 
Despite the absence of anyone from the Ministry of Labour, refugees were still 
accepted under its conditions. Among the people accepted by the mission 60 
per cent were unmarried men and women, the rest were family groups joining 
relatives in Britain, usually husbands. According to the mission, they were 
working-class people, mainly miners, and factory and agricultural workers. The 
employment factor was predominant in the selection of refugees.  
 
In total, the mission refused 35 applications: 18 appeared not to be intending 
permanent residence, seven were 'gypsies of an undesirable type', five were of 
other nationalities, three were mentally unbalanced, one was a homosexual, 
                                                 
57
 TNA, HO 352/142, Report of the Home Office Mission in Austria at Traiskirchen, Vienna 
and Innsbruck, 27 March 1957. 
58
 TNA, HO 352/142, Report of the Home Office Mission in Austria at Traiskirchen, Vienna 
and Innsbruck, 27 March 1957. 
59
 TNA, HO 352/142, Report of the Home Office Mission in Austria at Traiskirchen, Vienna 
and Innsbruck, 27 March 1957. 
 157
and one was in possession of forged papers. The selection was thus not only 
motivated by employment reasons, but also by integration reasons as the 
refugees were selected to resettle permanently in Britain. The fact that 
'mentally unbalanced' refugees were refused suggests that refugees should not 
be a burden to the country. Race and sexual orientation were also important, as 
gypsies and homosexuals were refused. They were not considered by the 
mission to be suitable for permanent resettlement in Britain as homosexuality 
was illegal there in the 1950s.  
 
The Ministry of Labour claimed that the refugees were free to choose the job 
they wanted as long as it was approved by the Ministry of Labour, showing 
that this freedom was actually very relative, and that refugees were to take up 
jobs in specific sectors.60 The control of the Ministry of Labour over the 
employment of Hungarian refugees stresses the fact that immigrants were 
accepted on the conditions laid out by the 1953 Aliens Order. The same 
statement mentioned that the employment regulation was especially relaxed for 
the refugees so that they could take up employment as soon as possible but 
only certain categories were effectively available to them, meaning that in 
practice the freedom granted to the refugees from Hungary fell more or less 
under the provisions of the Aliens Order of 1953.61 Yet the arbitrariness of the 
1953 Aliens Order did play in favour of the Hungarian refugees as they had the 
support of the Ministry of Labour to resettle in Britain. It shows how much the 
British government was willing to turn the Hungarian refugee crisis into a 
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useful way in which to fill vacant jobs in industrial sectors, while discarding 
those who were considered unfit for permanent resettlement.  
 
The number of refugees accepted for resettlement in Britain, however, posed a 
problem. The British government failed to anticipate accommodation issues 
linked to the arrival of several thousands refugees in just a few months. The 
question of emigration was also overlooked when recruiting refugees in 
Austria, as many of them did not plan to permanently resettle in Britain. 
 
 
 
-Life in British camps 
 
As in France, Hungarians in Britain were accommodated in refugee camps, 
which were referred to as hostels. The way the hostels were run reveals that 
everything was to be done to put the refugees in employment and permanent 
accommodation as quickly as possible. The British Council for Aid to 
Refugees (BCAR) was appointed by the government to run the refugee hostels 
and benefited from a £10,000 grant to cover administrative expenses.62 The 
BCAR was in turn helped by voluntary organisations such as the British Red 
Cross, the Women's Voluntary Service, as well as religious and local 
organisations. The Lord Mayor of London's appeal launched in November 
1956 was very successful and raised £2.5 million mainly used by the BCAR.63 
 
                                                 
62
 Hansard, HC (series 5), vol. 560, col. 6w, 9 November 1956. 
63
 Hansard, HC (series 5), vol. 566, col. 758-9, 8 March 1957. 
 159
The first major contingent of refugees arrived on 17 November at Blackbushe 
airport, near London, and consisted mostly of children and women, of whom 
only 18 were available for work interviews which took place at their hostel in 
Fulham.64 Just two days later, another 350 refugees arrived, consisting mainly 
of men this time. They were all interviewed in their hostels in Chigwell and 
Islington by labour officers for placement in employment.65 This type of hostel 
was referred to as first-line hostels, where all newly arrived refugees were sent 
and interviewed. They were then sent to second-line hostels mainly in England, 
where they usually stayed until they found permanent accommodation and 
employment or re-emigrated. 
 
The Ministry of Labour established a list of good areas and of places to avoid 
for the resettlement of Hungarian refugees. According to the list areas to avoid 
were the Central Valley of Scotland, the Highlands, Cumberland, Durham, 
Westmorland, Lancashire and particularly Liverpool, Warwickshire, 
Staffordshire, North Wales and Anglesey, South Wales, and more generally, 
any seaside resort depending on the holiday trade.66 On the other hand, the 
good areas were South Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Bedfordshire and the other 
Home Counties, and London. However, the British government, being 
traditionally reluctant to grant asylum to refugees, did not have the necessary 
accommodation to provide refugees with.67 This led the British government to 
announce the temporarily suspension of arrival of refugees from 11 
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December.68 However it resumed in early 1957 when the possibility to 
welcome another 5,000 to replace those re-emigrating to Canada was studied.69  
 
In January 1957, 10,200 Hungarian refugees were accommodated in 128 hotels 
across the country.70 At its peak, a total of 150 hostels, reception centres and 
private buildings were run directly or indirectly by the BCAR.71 The following 
map shows where Hungarian refugees were sent in Britain: 
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Map 4.1: Refugees from Hungary in hostels by counties, 6 April 1957 
 
Legend: 
 Between 0 and 99 refugees from Hungary 
 Between 100 and 499 refugees from Hungary 
 Between 500 and 999 refugees from Hungary  
 More than 1,000 refugees from Hungary 
 
(Source: TNA, HO 352/143, Hostel situation on 6 April 1957) 
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By April 1957, a total of 7,672 Hungarian refugees were accommodated in 67 
hostels in Britain, although the Hungarian Jews under the care of the Central 
British Fund for Jewish Relief and Rehabilitation (CBF) were not included in 
those figures.72 The large number of hostels is explained by the fact that they 
were of very diverse nature from large former military camps to smaller 
accommodation at the YMCA or other charity and religious buildings.  
 
Many of the camps such as the hutted or Nissen huts camps at Hydon Heath, 
Surrey, or in Plawsworth, Durham, had been last used during the Second 
World War. Other accommodation included former Royal Air Force stations, 
industrial hostels, a former TB hospital in Blagdon near Bristol, an empty 
sanatorium in Sheffield, an old school in Liverpool, and a former children's 
home in Wilmslow. The biggest concentration of refugees by far was between 
Rugeley and Hednesford, Staffordshire, where 2,454 people lived in former 
military barracks.73 The Hednesford camp served as a transit camp.74 The 
variety of the accommodation shows that the British government used every 
building at its disposal to give temporary accommodation to the Hungarian 
refugees. 
 
This variety of accommodation also shows that the government did not have 
the means necessary to standardise the reception of the Hungarian refugees. As 
a consequence the quality of accommodation varied greatly from one place to 
the other. Tony Kushner argues that the standard of refugee accommodation 
was kept low so that they would understand that they were only in temporary 
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accommodation.75 It is also linked to the fact that the government had a limited 
choice in places of accommodation for the refugees. Like in France, because of 
the lack of suitable accommodation, the geographical situation of the camps 
did not pay much respect for the recommendations issued by the Ministry of 
Labour back in November 1956, which sometimes led to frustration among 
refugees.76  
 
Despite Britain enjoying a period of full employment and the fact that the vast 
majority of the Hungarian refugees could be employed in the areas where 
labour was lacking, various problems regarding their employment and 
resettlement occurred. First, there was the emigration issue. In December 1956, 
approximately 5,000 refugees in Britain had already expressed a wish to re-
emigrate, preferably to Canada which was the only country accepting refugees 
from Britain at the time.77 Indeed, out of nearly 22,000 Hungarian refugees 
who came to Britain, approximately 5,500 of them re-emigrated.78 The 
problem for the government was that it wanted to use the refugees as labour 
even if they wanted to re-emigrate. The government publicly gave assurances 
that taking employment was not prejudicial to re-emigration to Canada, and on 
the contrary the refugees were advised to do so as well as to learn English.79  
 
Since the government expected Canada to accept 5,000 Hungarian refugees 
fairly quickly, putting them in employment was an economic necessity to limit 
their maintenance costs. Unless refugees who wanted to emigrate had a sponsor 
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in Canada, they had to wait until April to re-emigrate.80 A letter was sent to all 
prospective candidates for emigration to explain to them that employment was 
also a way to make money and so to resettle more easily once in Canada. The 
letter also told them: 
 
To assist us and the Canadian authorities in making the final 
arrangements for immigration, some of you who are not in regular 
employment may be asked to move to other hostels specially set aside for 
emigrants… Those of you in regular employment will be called to the 
nearest hostel set aside for emigration when the Canadian authorities 
come to that hostel for medical examination and interview.81 
 
To some of the refugees, being unemployed seemed to offer a better chance to 
be accepted in Canada as they were moved to special hostels, waiting to 
emigrate. Hence some of them turned down job offers claiming that pay was 
too low and that ultimately they would emigrate to Canada anyway.82  
 
Although no group of refugees deserted the camps as in France, some refugees 
refused to take up or look for employment or accommodation outside hostels.83 
Others refused to be transferred from one hostel to another or to pay for their 
maintenance when in employment. Also, as in France, the British authorities 
had to deal with individuals or groups of individuals refusing to comply with 
the rules established in the hostels by the Home Office and the BCAR. The 
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hostels were seen as temporary accommodation and the aim of the Home 
Office was to sort out the refugee situation as quickly as possible by placing 
the Hungarian refugees into permanent accommodation and employment so 
that they could become financially independent. Any delay on their 
resettlement was also a delay for securing much-wanted additional labour, one 
of the main reasons for the Hungarian refugees' presence in the country. 
 
The Home Office took those matters very seriously, as refugees had been 
accepted with a view that the British economy would benefit from their 
presence. A special meeting was held in February 1957 with representatives of 
the Home Office, the BCAR, the National Assistance Board (NAB), the 
National Coal Board (NCB), and the Ministry of Labour to tackle the issue.84 
The outcome of the meeting was that the refugees were to be dealt with firmly 
but not arbitrarily. The first step was to withhold pocket money. If this had no 
effect after two weeks, recalcitrant refugees were to be moved to a less 
attractive hostel or to a hostel where the warden was known to handle difficult 
situations with success. When refugees refused to pay for their maintenance, 
they were to be denied meals at the hostels while the most extreme cases 
required exclusion from hostels and re-entry was barred. However, if the 
meeting advised in some rare cases 'to make an example of a recalcitrant 
refugee', it was hoped that the threat would be enough to persuade the refugees 
to comply to the rules. The Home Office, and the other governmental bodies 
involved in the refugee hostels management as well as the BCAR followed a 
rather strict line in order to enforce their employment policy for the refugees.  
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A set of rules and circulars regarding the Hungarian refugees was put together 
in a handbook called the H-Code. The H-Code was distributed to all wardens 
and officers in the hostels and contained guidelines for discipline. On top of all 
the measures adopted during the February 1957 meeting, the H-Code also 
recommended that if the refugee was married, that 'it may be salutary to tackle 
him in the presence of his wife.'85 This was an assumption on the part of the 
Home Office that refugees likely to cause trouble were male. Not only was 
pressure from the warden strong, as disciplined refugees were deprived of their 
meal rights, but, to an extent, the pressure was humiliating as the disciplinary 
action was be taken in the presence of the refugee's wife if he had one. On the 
basis of a careful reading of the H-Code and Hostel administrative meetings 
reports, it seems that very little consideration was given to the experiences, and 
possible traumas, of the Hungarians as refugees.86 Hungarians were considered 
as labour immigrants and treated as such. 
 
Despite these problems, the refugees were settled relatively quickly, thanks to 
the work of voluntary organisations like the Women's Voluntary Service which 
sought suitable accommodation outside the camps for the refugees and helped 
resettle more than 5,000 of them.87 In spite of the chaotic organisation 
regarding accommodation in different kinds of camps all over the country, 
from 10,200 Hungarians in hostels in January 1957, there were only 1,560 left 
in November that year. The BCAR stayed in charge of the hostels until that 
time. The Home Office decided to replace it by the National Assistance Board 
earlier in May 1957 as funding was running out. That way the remaining 
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refugees still waiting for resettlement became an exclusive charge on the 
government.88 It was also in May 1957, that the decision was taken to stop 
large scheme Hungarian refugee migration to Britain in anticipation of the 
exhaustion of Lord Mayor's fund.89 These decisions to stop immigration when 
funding ran out reveals the nature of granting asylum: Hungarian refugees were 
labour that was to be brought to Britain at a lesser cost, and employed as 
quickly as possible to be profitable for Britain's economy. The Hungarian 
refugees emigrating to Britain after that time were even more carefully 
selected, as the cost of their emigration and maintenance in Britain were not 
paid for by the Lord Mayor's fund anymore but by the government, and they 
were to fill in specific employment opportunities. 
 
 
 
-The National Coal Board and useful refugees 
 
In addition to the normal procedure for the reception of Hungarian refugees in 
Britain, the NCB set up its own plan to recruit refugees for employment in the 
mining industry. The vast majority of Hungarian refugees being young single 
men, the NCB believed that it was a good way to fill up vacancies and to slow 
down the decline in numbers of miners.90 To that extent, the Home Office set 
up the hostels policy along with the Ministry of Labour for one precise goal:  
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The substantial proportion of [Hungarian refugees] who are in the 18-38 
age range makes the problem [of employment] simpler. There is a good 
deal to be gained by taking advantage of the present situation to fill the 
continuing gap in the manpower to get the coal which the country 
requires. It is obvious therefore that every effort should be made to recruit 
and to retain those who are brought here for employment in the mines.91 
 
In granting asylum to the Hungarian refugees, the Home Office saw an 
opportunity to enhance British coal production, and as generous as it might 
have seemed at the time to grant asylum to thousands of refugees from 
Hungary, it privileged national interests first by accepting a number of those 
refugees considered to be good quality labour. 
    
The NCB thus regarded the Hungarian refugees as a very attractive workforce. 
The NCB wanted to benefit from the same terms as the 1947 European 
Voluntary Workers agreement, under which, 91,000 Baltic people and 
Ukrainians were recruited to work in Britain between 1947 and 1949.92 The 
matter was carefully studied by the NCB which estimated that 12,000 
vacancies needed to be filled at the pits.93 The NCB was willing to take non-
experienced miners as each refugee would get three weeks preliminary 
training, plus a twelve-week English language course.94 The NCB promised not 
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to stop employing British workers, and to continue its usual recruitment of new 
British miners along with Hungarian refugees. The recruitment of Hungarian 
refugees was also to enable the NCB to upgrade a number of British miners, as 
the whole scheme had been set up in agreement with the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM),95 as the terms of the agreement of 1947 required. By 
mid-February 1957, it was estimated that 3,900 refugees from Hungary were 
enrolled in the NCB scheme.96 The NCB then decided to advertise this as 
serving 'human interest', but it is clear that the NCB did not only recruit 
Hungarian refugees for the sake of human interest as it and Britain would 
benefit from a quickly employable workforce. Recruiting 5,000 miners plus 
their families among the refugees was following the Home Office general 
policy on Hungarian asylum policy as it was a way to work towards Britain's 
own profit. Rather than a moral duty to relieve Austria from its refugee crisis 
or simply to contribute to the relief of the plight of the Hungarian refugees, 
economic arguments prevailed. From this policy and the freedom given to the 
NCB emerges a pattern according to which the Home Office would privilege 
economically useful refugees. 
    
However, the NCB plan to recruit Hungarian refugees in Austria showed its 
limitations. During the meeting on sanctions for the difficult cases that had 
been held in February 1957, the NCB faced particular difficulties with its 
recruitment scheme: 
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The Board has in addition other problems, arising from the circumstances 
in which they recruited refugees in Austria for coalmining, in some cases 
without fully taking into account the difficulties to be expected, e.g. the 
recruit who has 'no interest in coalmining' or who is obviously unsuitable 
for that work… What the Board would like to do is to relieve themselves 
of responsibility for their careless selection by turning out of their scheme 
any unsuitable, unwilling or troublesome recruit, and throw responsibility 
on to either (i) BCAR or (ii) the National Assistance Board… The 
resettlement of their failures is the responsibility of the Board.97 
 
The NCB did not realise that the refugees recruited did not always understand 
what they were signing up for in Austria, as their main preoccupation was to 
emigrate. When the scheme started to show its limitations, the NCB tried to 
foist the unsuitable refugees back on the BCAR or Home Office. 
 
Not only did some refugees show little interest in mining jobs, but the NCB 
had to deal with the discontent of trade unions in some coalmining areas. While 
it was publicly reported in December 1956 that there was 'no opposition in the 
mining areas to the reception of refugees', the situation quickly deteriorated in 
early 1957.98 As far as employment of Hungarians was concerned, they could 
not take jobs in sectors objected by the Trades Union Congress, and they were 
not to take jobs for which British workers were available. Although the NCB 
scheme to employ Hungarians for coalmining was agreed with the National 
Executive of the NUM, Hungarians remained subject to acceptance by local 
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branches of the Union. Local agreement was hard to achieve, and many 
collieries refused Hungarians for work.99 Local branches opposed the 
employment of Hungarians on the grounds that they feared they would get 
priority accommodation, while some British miners were on waiting lists. They 
also feared that the job availabilities would not last and employing Hungarians 
would prevent British miners from finding jobs in the future. Local branches 
thus adopted a protectionist attitude towards Hungarians. Moreover, the 
relationship between the NCB and the NUM was tense. The NUM believed 
that the NCB was privileging the government's interests rather than those of the 
miners. The employment of Hungarian refugees was associated by the NUM to 
the abolition of the Bonus Disqualification resulting in a loss of salary for 
miners in some cases.100 
 
Following press reports on problems of refugees in mining areas, questions 
were raised in parliament on the state of employment of refugees in the 
coalmining industry.101 In January 1957, the Minister of Labour and National 
Service, Iain Macleod, estimated that despite 4,700 immediate vacancies, the 
NUM was facing local problems employing Hungarian refugees.102 Those 
problems were reported in the press. In March, the situation had barely 
evolved, and impatience grew in the House of Commons as Hungarian 
refugees who had enrolled in the NCB scheme failed to become 'effective units 
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of production'.103 The expression gave away the fact that NCB scheme was 
based on economic motives in which Hungarian refugees were to be used to 
increase profits, as recommended by the 1953 Aliens Order. 
    
If the rate of employment through the normal scheme of the Ministry of Labour 
is compared to the one of the NCB for the period 8 March to 14 June 1957, the 
results are eloquent: out of approximately 3,900 refugees who came to Britain 
through the NCB scheme, only 429 were employed by the NCB,104 while 8,324 
men and 1,717 women were employed under the normal employment scheme 
of the Ministry of Labour.105 The figures reflect the absolute failure of the NCB 
scheme to employ 5,000 Hungarian refugees as miners. By mid-June 1957, the 
excuse of the 12-week training of the refugees in coalmining and in English, 
used repeatedly in the press and during parliamentary debates, did not hold up 
any more. Promises that no British miners would be rejected for lack of 
vacancies where Hungarians were employed did not convince local 
branches.106 Very few collieries agreed to employ Hungarians, and only a fifth 
of the trained refugees were eventually absorbed into coalmining.107 By the end 
of 1957, 4,186 Hungarians had been trained by the NCB, but only 731 had 
been placed while 370 others were waiting to be employed.108 What seemed a 
good opportunity to fill vacancies in the mining sector at the beginning of the 
refugee crisis did not fulfil its promises, and the attempt to use the Hungarian 
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refugees as a specialised labour migration was simply proved wrong as only a 
minority went through the whole NCB scheme. The refugees experience in the 
British coal industry also counterbalances the general tendency in previous 
research that Hungarian refugees were unanimously welcomed in all strata of 
British society.  
 
 
 
-Anglo-Jewish responses  
 
As well as an attempt to turn the refugee crisis into an opportunity to gain 
valuable labour, the reception of the refugees was also affected by Cold War 
politics. As in France, the question of whether antisemitism was prevalent 
during the Hungarian revolution and in the refugee camps was raised. The 
CPGB and the Daily Worker supported the Soviet repression of the revolution 
and its interpretation that it was a fascist counter-revolution. However, that 
question was answered by claims that agents of the Kádár government posing 
as refugees were responsible for antisemitism. This section argues that the 
British government covered up antisemitism in order to defend the Hungarian 
revolution, and that Anglo-Jewish responses were framed by fear of 
antisemitism in refugee camps. 
 
The Daily Worker quoted the Jewish Chronicle and World Jewish Congress 
claims about 'anti-Semitic excesses occurred in more than 20 villages and small 
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towns during the October-November revolt'.109 The nature of the antisemitic 
excesses were not mentioned, and the newspaper did not insist on that issue in 
the way the French paper L'Humanité did. The main point that the Daily 
Worker made was that many Jews fled Hungary fearing persecution similar to 
the Second World War period and a return to fascism.110  
 
The Jewish Chronicle showed much more concern regarding the situation of 
the Jews in Hungary and in refugee camps. From the very first days of the 
Hungarian revolution, it covered the event focusing in particular on the Jewish 
population: 
 
The change from the rule of Mátyás Rákosi to that of Imre Nagy in 
Hungary should, in ordinary circumstances, have been one to bring some 
alleviation to the position of Jews there… His return to the Premiership 
now, after years of disgrace, ought to bring back the policy of toleration 
which he tried to follow several years ago. But all, of course, depends on 
the turn which the revolution, which has already caused a good deal of 
bloodshed, takes.111 
 
At that point, the newspaper had no tangible proof of antisemitism in Hungary, 
but feared its presence because of the recent past. Once in Austria, Jewish 
Hungarians claimed that they had left Hungary because of 'fears of a re-
emergence of antisemitism', and this was at the time when the revolutionary 
                                                 
109
 Daily Worker, 22 June 1957. 
110
 Miklós Molnár, Histoire de la Hongrie (Paris, 2004), pp.374-5. 
111
 Jewish Chronicle, 26 October 1956. 
 175
side seemed to be victorious.112 The Jewish refugees feared that since a number 
of Jews occupied high-ranking positions in the previous Hungarian 
government, the whole community would be stigmatised and persecuted.113  
 
The Soviet repression of the revolution prevented the allegation from being 
confirmed, but the fear of persecution among some Jewish refugees 
remained.114 The Jewish Chronicle claimed, for example, that Jews were killed 
in some regions of Hungary.115 In December, the newspaper reported that the 
primary motivation compelling Jews to leave was because 'they feared the 
Hungarians, not the Russians'.116 These fears drew heavily on the history of 
Hungary during the Second World War. Since then, it had become difficult to 
get reliable information out of Hungary, so these reports may have relied more 
on speculation than hard journalism, particularly given the Jewish Chronicle's 
antagonistic position on the Soviet Union. Such a view is confirmed by the 
archives.117  
 
The Board of Deputies' reports contrast with the articles in the Jewish 
Chronicle. In mid-November 1956, Dr Stephen Roth, European Director of the 
World Jewish Congress, interviewed Jewish and non-Jewish refugees from 
Hungary, British and Israeli diplomats, members of the Vienna Jewish 
community, and representatives of the American Joint Distribution Committee, 
the Jewish Agency and the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (Hias) to assess the 
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situation of the Hungarian Jews during and after the revolution.118 Apart from 
two minor cases, Roth concluded that there was little antisemitism: 
 
It is abundantly clear that no antisemitism was noticeable during the 
uprising. This fact was confirmed by all observers. Only two smaller 
incidents have come to light. One of these was a small demonstration 
by students two or three months back and the second on October 23 as 
part of the demonstration that started the revolution. One small group of 
students is reported to have shouted 'Down with the Jews' only to be 
immediately quelled by the others. Jewish Youth participated in the 
fighting along with the rest of the population.119  
 
Dr Roth observed that the reason why there was so little antisemitism was 
because the hatred was concentrated against the Russians, and the 
revolutionary leaders discouraged any action that would have served as an 
excuse for the Russians to intervene or 'that might have affected the sympathy 
of the West for their cause'. His report confirms that the exodus of a part of the 
Jews from Hungary to Austria was motivated by fears rather than an actual 
life-threatening situation. According to him, the absence of antisemitism during 
the revolution remained, however, very surprising due to the strong antisemitic 
tendencies of the Hungarian population.120  
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The CBF also sent observers to Austria in order to assess the needs of the 
refugees and schemes for emigration and resettlement, after a special 
Hungarian Relief Committee was formed.121 Another report from the West 
London Synagogue of British Jews confirmed Dr Roth's views by stating that 
both in Hungary and in Austrian camps, the fear of pogroms and persecution in 
general was greater than the antisemitic manifestations which happened.122 
 
Beyond fears of antisemitism, many Hungarian Jews saw in the revolution an 
opportunity to escape to new economic opportunities, a motive common 
among many other refugees. The first Jewish refugees, who came from small 
towns near the Austrian border, left out of fear that the revolution might turn 
against the Jews. However, after 4 November, Jewish refugees mainly came 
from Budapest and followed the pattern of non-Jewish refugees, that is to say, 
they were mostly young people rather than family groups.123 
 
Despite the lack of proof of antisemitism, the Board of Deputies did not want 
to take the risk of exposing refugees to antisemitism in refugee camps in 
Britain, as reports of antisemitism in refugee camps in Austria were mentioned 
in the Jewish press.124 The Board of Deputies decided to provide the CBF with 
all the help it needed.125 The CBF asked the Jews' Temporary Shelter (JTS) to 
provide accommodation for some of the refugees, while the Jewish Refugee 
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Committee took charge of welfare work, having officers at the JTS in order to 
help the refugees in their search for permanent accommodation and 
employment as well as helping with any emigration plans.126    
 
On 23 November, it was estimated that among the 750 Hungarian refugees at 
the time, only 22 were Jewish and had arrived in Britain with the first group of 
refugees, of whom five were accommodated by the JTS.127 At first, very few 
Hungarian Jews benefited from special help as they went through the camps 
run by the BCAR and were not always aware of the action of the CBF. So in 
order to register Jewish refugees, the CBF met the refugees off the transports or 
saw them in camps.128 The work of the CBF to meet Jewish refugees was 
facilitated by the BCAR, which was also concerned by antisemitism in refugee 
camps: 'A number of people were transferred from the Reception Centres and 
second line Hostels where there was a certain amount of antisemitism, to the 
Jews' Temporary Shelter.'129 The nature of the antisemitism was not disclosed, 
but was nevertheless important enough for the Jewish refugees to have to be 
moved out from the camps and it was declared a matter of urgency to remove 
Jewish refugees from camps by the CBF.130 Payments were still made from the 
BCAR to support the refugees under Jewish care. Consequently, the number of 
Jewish refugees under CBF care rose and, by 14 December, 200 Jewish 
refugees were known to the services of the CBF and the JTS, which at that date 
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accommodated approximately 60 refugees from Hungary.131 The CBF 
negotiated the renting of temporary premises in seaside boarding houses until 
April 1957.132 There were thus slight differences in the help that was given to 
Jewish and non-Jewish refugees, even if the level of financial support was the 
same.133  
    
In its annual report for the years 1956/1957, the CBF confirmed the presence of 
antisemitism, although avoiding the term, in the Hungarian refugee camps in 
Britain, as a motive for the BCAR to make the Jewish organisation the main 
supporter of the Hungarian Jews' needs: 
 
[The Jewish refugees] were brought in the first instance to Reception 
Camps, but, for good reasons, the BCAR asked the CBF to remove the 
Jewish Refugees as quickly as possible. Many were placed at the Jews' 
Temporary Shelter, but this was soon full and boarding-house 
accommodation was found at Westgate and at Brighton for large 
groups.134 
 
The 1,500 registered Hungarian Jewish refugees who arrived in Britain from 
November 1956 to November 1957 were thus the responsibility of the CBF, as 
the BCAR was unwilling or unable to tackle the issue of antisemitism in the 
Hungarian refugee camps. 
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The way Jewish refugees defined themselves varied. A report from the CBF on 
Styal Cottage Homes in Manchester mentioned that some of them were 
Orthodox, and others claimed to be Catholics, in particular those married to 
non-Jews. A CBF representative stated to the observer that there were 30 Jews 
registered: 'I visited accordingly all the 20 houses where refugees are being 
accommodated and found only 15 people who claimed to be Jews directly or 
by marriage. I found several Jewish people who whilst they admitted to be of  
Jewish birth, they claimed at present to belong to the Catholic faith'.135 They 
nevertheless were under the care of the CBF. 
 
As in France, antisemitism in refugee camps was a problem for both the British 
government and the BCAR. Yet, responses were different, even if fears of 
antisemitism were the main reason for the intervention of Jewish organisations 
in refugee camps in both countries. This section has shown that Anglo-Jewry 
used schemes previously set up for the support of Jewish refugees from Nazi 
Germany to provide relief for Hungarian Jews. There is no evidence of a 
French-Jewish response of that magnitude. Antisemitism in refugee camps 
consisted of remarks made against the Jews who were considered better treated 
than the non-Jews, and appeared to have been made as revenge against the 
Jews in Hungary who were perceived as occupying more positions of 
leadership in Hungary than was warranted.136 There was thus antisemitism in 
British refugee camps which forced the BCAR and the British government to 
adapt their response to Hungarian refugees. However, there were no violent 
cases of antisemitism and Jewish refugees were moved from camps to be under 
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CBF care as a measure of precaution. The fear of antisemitism in Hungarian 
refugee camps was nourished mostly by antisemitic remarks from other 
refugees, rather than physical manifestations. These allegations of antisemitism 
were, however, monitored by the Home Office, which had remained suspicious 
of the Hungarian refugees. 
 
 
 
-A Communist 'fifth column'? 
 
There was, at the time, in the British press another theory regarding the 
responsibility for antisemitism in refugee camps: that it was the doing of 
undercover AVH agents, the Hungarian State Security Authority, passing as 
refugees. The Cold War context of paranoia and spies, influenced the reception 
of Hungarian refugees in Britain. The fifth column theory of Soviet agents 
within the refugees' ranks was mainly supported by the Home Office and the 
Metropolitan Police. Suspecting refugees of being enemy agents was not 
something new in 1956, as German Jewish refugees in Britain during the 
Second World War had been suspected of being Nazi agents.137 
 
The British press was concerned by the possibility of Communist spies being 
among refugees in Britain. Doubts started to appear in the press in December 
1956, after the general enthusiasm for refugees started to wither. Rumours 
started to spread that AVH agents were among refugees in Britain and that they 
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aimed to cause mayhem in the camps, which would explain some refugees' 
wish to return to Hungary.138 According to the Daily Mail, those Communist 
agents posing as refugees were making lists of freedom fighters to deport if 
they ever returned to Hungary.139 George Mikes, a Hungarian-born British 
satirist, believed that antisemitism in refugee camps was their doing in order to 
give the impression to the public that Hungarian refugees were fascist.140 
Rumours were based on denunciations in refugee camps as some refugees 
claimed that some others were agents.141 
 
A certain paranoia also existed on the part of the British authorities towards the 
Hungarian refugees. Although the Home Office appeared in public to be 
concerned and seemingly caring for Hungarian, some elements in the Home 
Office remained sceptical as to the nature of the Hungarian refugees. 
Moreover, it was the Home Office that initially wanted to limit the number of 
Hungarian refugees on the basis that Britain was not an immigration country.142 
Although it is not explicit in the archives material, raising doubts on the nature 
of the Hungarian refugees was a way to bring attention about the need to 
control Hungarian immigration to the other departments and most notably the 
Foreign Office.  
 
It was also the effects of a tradition of suspecting immigrants of being spies or 
fifth columnists. The Home Office had a history of being suspicious towards 
refugees in Britain in the Twentieth Century. Immigration policies, since the 
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1905 Aliens Act, were all responses to the presence of specific groups of 
immigrants or aliens in Britain seen as undesirable or enemies. During the First 
World War, a German spy scare led to the internment of 32,000 German and 
Austrian nationals in Britain. The 1914 British Nationality and Status of Aliens 
Act was amended in 1918 to enable the government to strip former enemy 
aliens of their citizenship and to deport them. During the Second World War, 
German and Austrian Jewish refugees were interned, as it was feared there 
were Nazi spies among them.143 Although Hungarian refugees were not 
interned, the Home Office remained very suspicious towards them in the Cold 
War context. 
 
The discourse of the Home Office's representatives became ambiguous when 
mentioning refugees, as they claimed that admitting a large number of refugees 
was not without risks for the safety of Britain. When asked at the House of 
Commons whether steps had been taken to prevent Communist agents in 
disguise from entering the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State for the 
Home Office, Major Lloyd-George, said they had: 
 
When the decision was taken, on 23 November, to dispense with 
individual interviews with Hungarian refugees before admitting them to 
this country, it was realised that this involved certain risks, but these risks 
were deliberately accepted in order to give help as quickly as possible to 
the refugees and to the Austrian Government. It would not be in the 
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public interest to give details of security arrangements but I can assure 
my hon. Friend that the point he makes has not been overlooked.144 
  
Although individual interviews were not systematically carried out in Austria, 
all the refugees were identified and interviewed within the first days of their 
arrival to the United Kingdom. The security arrangements that Lloyd-George 
referred to were Operation Post Report, adapted to the occasion for the arrival 
of the Hungarian refugees in the country. Operation Post Report has its origins 
in October 1950, when the Home Office launched it in order to interview all 
foreigners who had arrived in Britain since 1939 'in circumstances in which the 
usual enquiries could not be made into their history.'145 These reports were to 
serve as 'the basis of any future internment policy', clearly showing a lack of 
trust towards Hungarian refugees.146 It was also a way for MI6 to send some 
refugees into the Soviet Union as British agents, although there is no evidence 
that this happened in 1956.147 The operation required the Metropolitan police to 
cooperate with MI5, Special Branch and local police, as the scheme was 
extended to all nationalities.148 Operation Post Report permitted the internment 
of certain categories of enemy and non-enemy aliens in times of war, suspected 
of spreading Communist propaganda, or of being in contact with the Soviet 
authorities, and, even more arbitrarily, 'aliens suspected by the Police of being 
a danger to security on any other grounds.'149 Operation Post Report was based 
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on the systematic interviewing of all aliens considered to be potential threats, 
or who would have been enemy nationals in a case of a war with Britain, that is 
to say any Soviet and satellite countries citizens. Operation Post Report was 
revived in November 1956, in order to control and even eradicate the 
Communist threat in the country supposedly posed by the arrival of foreigners 
from Eastern Europe.150 The sudden influx of refugees from Hungary was thus 
at the origin of the revival of the Operation Post Report, and between 
November 1956 and April 1957, 35,000 aliens in Britain were interviewed by 
Immigration officers or the Metropolitan Police. The Home Office, along with 
the Metropolitan Police, MI5 and Special Branch were thus keeping a check on 
the Hungarian refugees, verifying discrepancies between the information they 
provided during their interviews and their records, and were in a position to 
apply the arbitrary measures above in case of war with the Soviet Union.151  
 
However, the publicly available records in British archives suggest that there 
were very few undercover Communist agents among the refugees.152 One 
noticeable case of an agent was that of Sandor Tarsoly who was detained in 
Brixton prison in March 1958, and discovered following an Operation Post 
Report interview.153 Tarsoly was recruited by the AVH in Hungary which 
offered to let him escape with his mistress if he provided information on the 
'refugees generally in certain camps in Austria, the steps which the Americans 
were believed to be taking to recruit and train intelligence agents from among 
the refugees and Hungarian refugees of professional standing, including their 
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names, and the names and addresses of relatives in Hungary.' Tarsoly, along 
with a handful of other people, were deported to Austria. 
 
The whole Operation Post Report scheme meant that the Home Office did not 
actually consider Hungarian refugees as freedom fighters, despite referring to 
them as such in public.154 This episode is revealing of a general distrust 
towards Hungarian refugees, as the available evidence in British archives 
shows that there were little grounds for reviving an operation of the scale of 
Post Report. AVH agents in refugee camps were also thought to be at least 
partly responsible for the antisemitism reported. They were sent to discredit 
refugees in a propaganda move. As far as antisemitism was concerned in the 
press, there had been thus a transfer of responsibility from Hungarian refugees 
to secret agents. Yet, putting the blame for antisemitism on AVH agents 
ignored the fact that there were Hungarian refugees who were antisemitic 
without being agents. The Home Office was simply motivated by limiting the 
numbers of Hungarian refugees in Britain, as it had done in the past with other 
waves of refugees. 
 
Despite the suspicious attitude towards Hungarian refugees, Britain 
nevertheless granted asylum to 21,667 Hungarian refugees from 28 October 
1956 to 20 February 1958 of whom 14,710 permanently resettled in the 
country, thereby placing Britain among the countries which allowed the most 
refugees to enter at the time.155 As far as naturalisation is concerned, it is hard 
to establish any trend or pattern due to the lack of archival material available 
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on the subject. Yet, contrary to the attitudes towards naturalisation presented in 
the previous chapter, naturalisation in Britain could be a way to completely 
turn the page and forget about Hungary.156 Anna J. and her husband applied for 
naturalisation as soon as they could in 1962: 'We just wanted to belong. That 
was really our aim.' Anna J. never felt homesick and did not want to go back to 
Hungary as she associated it with bad memories. However, she eventually went 
back in 1965 to give up her Hungarian nationality.157 
 
 
 
-Conclusion 
 
Examining British and French responses to the Hungarian refugees brings out 
more similarities than differences. In both countries, the Hungarian refugees 
benefited from a lot of public support through public and private donations. It 
found also a way to fight ideologically the Soviet Union and communism. The 
humanitarian plan set up by the Foreign Office with its French counterpart 
indicates how both countries managed to conciliate humanitarian and moral 
values with propaganda. 
 
In both cases apparent government altruism was underpinned by a 
determination to secure the most economically useful people for economic 
sectors short of labour. Accepting large numbers of Hungarian refugees for 
permanent resettlement was driven by political and economic motives. 
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Hungarian refugees were accepted because they fitted French and British 
immigration policies. This group of refugees was seen as a potential workforce 
to be used in sectors in need of labour. The Hungarians were also white 
Europeans, which was considered a welcome alternative to the growing West 
Indian and Asian immigration to Britain. Yet, the claims of unlimited access 
led in both countries to concerns about communist infiltration. Indeed, Cold 
War concerns had a substantial impact on British and French policy makers. 
This was linked to the problem of antisemitism in refugee camps. The case of 
the Jewish refugees was problematic for both countries. In order to contain 
antisemitism, British Jewish organisations stepped up to support Jewish 
refugees, just like the Cojasor did in France. As a consequence, Jewish 
refugees were accommodated in smaller sized hostels, and benefited from 
better support than the other refugees thanks to their small numbers. 
 
Despite many similarities between France and Britain, this chapter has also 
uncovered differences regarding the reception of Hungarian refugees. Contrary 
to France, which was determined to grant asylum to refugees as long as they 
were deemed to be profitable for the country, the reception of Hungarian 
refugees in Britain depended on available funds. The British government 
decided to stop the Hungarian immigration in May 1957 before the Lord 
Mayor's fund ran out, even though the refugee crisis in Austria and Yugoslavia 
was not completely solved at that time.158 There were still 45,000 refugees left 
in Austria while Yugoslavia had counted 14,300 refugees out of the original 
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19,100.159 On top of that, the British government could not prevent the failure 
of the NCB scheme, which meant that approximately 3,900 refugees on top of 
those already accepted had to be resettled without being employed in the 
mining industry. 
 
Moreover, the repression of the Hungarian revolution and the refugee crisis 
which followed did not have the same impact on British national politics the 
way it had in France, and demonstrations against the CPGB were much 
smaller. That can be explained by the fact that the CPGB did not have the same 
influence in British parliament, since it had none in 1956, than the PCF had. In 
Britain, the use of the Hungarian revolution was primarily to fulfil propaganda 
and economic objectives. 
 
Finally, Hungarian refugees responded differently from their condition of 
asylum in Britain than in France. Whereas France had to deal with Hungarians 
deserting refugee camps on two occasions, refugees in Britain only expressed 
their concerns to the bodies in charge without leaving their hostels. It can be 
explained by the fact that Britain had particular re-emigration schemes, notably 
with Australia, which fitted the refugees' desire to settle outside Europe. 
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Part II 
5. The French and British presence in Egypt and the 
Jewish Community  
 
In order to study the reception of the refugees from Egypt in France and in 
Britain, it is necessary to first look at who these refugees were. Unlike the 
Hungarian refugees, the majority of the refugees from Egypt were Jewish, and 
had a special status in Egypt. Many Jews of Egypt were stateless, while others 
had French or British passports, and this determined their treatment by the 
French and British immigration authorities. This preamble looks at how some 
of the Jews of Egypt accessed French and British nationality, while others 
remained stateless or were Egyptian.  
 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, the Jewish community in Egypt 
numbered only 6,000 individuals. Thanks to various waves of immigration 
from Asia Minor, Iraq, Syria, Italy, Western Europe, and Greek and Turkish 
regions of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the nineteenth century, and from 
Palestine during the First World War, the community had risen to 63,550 by 
1927, with the vast majority living in Alexandria and Cairo.1 Most were 
Sephardi. Most of them could only speak Arabic well enough to communicate 
with merchants or servants, which still applied in 1956.2 The rest were 
Ashkenazi Jews who had arrived in the same period, and between 7,000 and 
                                                 
1
 Gudrun Krämer and Alfred Morabia, 'Face à la modernité: les Juifs d'Egypte aux XIXe et 
XXe siècles', in Jacques Hassoun, (ed.), Histoire des Juifs du Nil (Paris, 1990), p.72, p.92. 
2
 Deborah Starr, Remembering Cosmopolitan Egypt: Literature, Culture, and Empire (New 
York, 2009), p.113. 
 191
9,000 Karaites, whose presence in Egypt dates back to the eighth century.3 As a 
result, the majority of the Jews of Egypt were a rather heterogeneous recent 
addition to the then small Jewish community in the country and that explains 
why they were also more receptive to the European influences, not having deep 
roots in the country. 
 
Egypt was subject to French and British influence from the eighteenth century. 
The French presence in the country started in 1798 with the Napoleonic 
campaign and ended in 1801. Although short in time, the campaign exposed 
Egypt to European influences and the country adopted some European 
practices, notably in the sectors of the army, administration and economy 
without necessarily challenging the traditional social and political structures of 
the country.4 British and French influences were dominant in the economic life 
of the country from 1875. Britain occupied Egypt in 1882, and it became a 
protectorate in 1915 until its independence in 1922. 
 
Egypt became independent following a British unilateral declaration, although 
the British reserved four points of contention for future negotiation: the 
defence of Egypt against foreign aggression, the security of the Suez Canal, the 
protection of foreign interests and of minorities, and the status of the Sudan 
which had been occupied along with Egypt by Britain in 1882.5 Britain often 
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used the four reserved points as a way to block any policy or appointment 
considered likely to harm its interests.6 
 
However, this did not mean that French influence vanished. The first French 
schools opened in Egypt under Napoleonic occupation, but it is from 1850 that 
these schools became more popular and more numerous with the arrival of the 
French Catholic missionaries and the presence of the Alliance Israélite 
Universelle (AIU). Since its opening of a school in Cairo in 1897, the AIU 
gave a French education to the Karaite community as part of its larger mission 
since its creation in France in 1860 to prepare and encourage the emancipation 
of Oriental Jews.7 Karaites were rejected by the rabbinate in Egypt for being 
Arabophone, and the AIU aimed at reconciling them with the larger Jewish 
community through education.8 The Karaite students came from the Jewish 
lower class, which remained a neglected minority within the community.9  
 
French schools were mostly composed of students from the minority 
communities in Egypt which responded very well to French culture and 
language. They were popular with parents: in 1945-46, 33,000 students 
attended, compared to 11,000 students at British, American, Greek and Italian 
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schools.10 Between the wars, about half of all students at foreign schools 
attended French schools. As a result, French culture had a strong impact on 
Egyptian urban society, since most of those schools were concentrated in the 
Alexandria, Cairo and the Suez Canal areas.11 French schools in Egypt were 
not reserved for French nationals but open to anyone who could afford it. Many 
students with other nationalities, like Greeks or Italians, received a French 
education, ensuring that the French language would continue to be spoken by 
different communities in Egypt.12 
 
The French language had become at the turn of the century the most used 
European language among the Jewish and foreign communities, be it in legal 
matters or commercial ones.13 In Alexandria for example, the foreign 
communities communicated in French rather than in Arabic according to one 
interviewee: 'Il y avait des communautés italiennes, grecques, arméniennes, qui 
étaient minoritaires, mais qui avaient toujours cette connaissance du français. 
C'était une constante.'14 French was a transcommunal language as well as the 
language of the Egyptian elite, the diplomacy, the scientific community and the 
lawyers, in the inter-war years, and it was still the case in 1956.15 It also meant, 
as there were school fees to pay to attend, that the students in French schools 
belonged to the middle- and upper-classes of Egyptian society. 
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After the Entente Cordiale in 1904, and a loss of direct political influence on 
Egypt, the French government sought to expand even more its cultural 
influence in the country, assuming a civilising role through the diffusion of the 
French language and ideals. Those aims were reflected in French schools' 
classes. Students went to French schools like the école Jabès, a private school 
focused on French education, in Alexandria, where they were taught what one 
former pupil called 'l'amour de la France' through its national symbols. Isaac 
Saporta and Rosy Kowsman, brother and sister, discuss the place that France 
occupied at the school: 
 
Isaac Saporta: Le deuxième pays, c'était la France. On ne parlait que de la 
France dans cette école. 
Rosy Kowsman: On recevait le Consul de France une fois par an, on 
chantait la Marseillaise. La France! La France! Et on faisait des puzzles 
immenses! C'était: la France! 
Isaac Saporta: Pour nous, la Marseillaise, on l'avait au fond du cœur, et il 
y avait toujours une [he thrusts out his chest]… sensation de… ça 
continue pour moi. 
Rosy Kowsman: …qui continue quand on l'entend.16 
 
These schools benefited from an excellent reputation in terms of teaching 
quality. They were for many Jewish families a natural choice when it came to 
the education of their children as the cultural ties between the community and 
French culture had become very close. The French government and French 
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agencies thus successfully fulfilled their role of diffusion of the French culture 
and language.  
 
At its peak in the 1940s, the Jewish community was estimated to have between 
75,000 and 80,000 members,17 and approximately 4,500 children from the 
Jewish community in Egypt attended French schools in 1946, making a very 
high proportion among the community.18 There were also children from the 
Muslim Egyptian elite, diplomats, scientists, and lawyers, who were sent to 
benefit from a better education as it would prepare them for a future in the 
same elite in a country opened to European influences. The main reason, apart 
from the excellent reputation that French schools had in Egypt, was that the 
French language, especially at the beginning of the twentieth century, was an 
alternative to English, which even in Egyptian schools, was the language of the 
occupying forces, a feeling that would persist after the Second World War.19 
French did not have the negative connotation that English had due to the recent 
history of occupation in the country. 
 
In 1951, 51 per cent of the students in the Jewish community of Egypt attended 
French schools, demonstrating the success of the French government's mission 
to attract and to form a local elite serving its economic, political, cultural and 
strategic interests in Egypt.20 The Egyptian monarchy ended in 1952 following 
the Free Officers coup. Although one of its proclaimed aims was the 
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elimination of foreign influence,21 foreign schools remained largely unaffected 
in their teaching programme. Foreign schools were subject by law in 1955 to 
inspection by the Ministry of Education, and the compulsory teaching of 
Arabic and 'national' subjects in Arabic like history and geography. Yet, it 
never threatened the teaching of French or English, and some schools did not 
even apply those measures.22  
 
The British occupation also had a cultural influence in Egypt. Some schools 
were founded on the British model in Egypt, though it happened later than the 
first French schools. French culture and language enjoyed a predominant role 
in the elite spheres of Egypt and within the Jewish and foreign communities, 
and British cultural influence never equalled the French one.23 The 
Anglicisation of Egyptian schools started in 1891, when Douglas Dunlop 
became Minister of Public Instruction, and continued until 1919. In order to 
replace French as the most spoken foreign language in Egypt, he suppressed its 
teaching in primary and secondary Egyptian schools replacing it with 
English.24  
 
The most famous British school was Victoria College, inaugurated by Lord 
Cromer in Alexandria in 1909. At that time, the college had 196 students, made 
up of 90 Christians, 67 Jews, and 39 Muslims, and a variety of nationalities 
such as Egyptian, Turkish, Syrian, Armenian, Maltese, Greek, English, French, 
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Italian, Spanish, Dutch, Swiss, and Belgian.25 Branded by Lord Cromer as an 
'excellent example of the composition of the Egyptian society', it nevertheless 
shows a great discrepancy between the number of Muslim and non-Muslim 
students at the time in a predominantly Muslim country. British schools did not 
have national and religious criteria when recruiting, even if they privileged 
members of the foreign communities and the Egyptian elite. In 1921, only a 
third of the 2,400 British subjects and of the 1,700 Protestant students went to 
British schools. As a sign of the predominance of the French culture in Egypt, 
French schools had more British students than the British schools.26  
 
More British schools were founded in Egypt from 1927, as the British High 
Commissioner, Lord Lloyd, insisted on the necessity of developing the British 
culture in the Near-East, and weakening the position of the French language 
and culture in Egypt which he considered to be a crusade against the political 
and cultural influence of Britain in the country. From the 1930s, the English 
language gained more importance, notably with the emergence of the United 
States as world power and the influence of its culture through cinema and 
literature. Moreover, the world economic situation meant that the use of 
English became necessary as it facilitated international trade. This policy was 
reflected in the attendance in British schools as between the First and the 
Second World Wars, the number of students rose between 2,000 and 4,000, to 
reach 10,000 in 1945.27 If English did not completely replace French as the 
inter-communal language, the younger generation had at least a basic 
knowledge of the English language. 
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Among the refugees who came to France and to Britain following the Suez 
crisis were stateless Jews. Before the Egyptian Citizenship Laws of 1929, 
Egyptian nationality was not legally defined, and the Jews in Egypt who did 
not have a foreign passport were considered as 'local subjects' or indigenous by 
the Egyptian authorities. The status of 'local subject' was a way to differentiate 
Egyptian-born people from the Ottoman subjects who were born elsewhere 
under the capitulation system, which permitted non-Muslims to be judged by 
the law of their country of origin. The attribution of the status of 'local subject' 
depended on local administrations rather than on a national decision, except for 
three common criteria: birth, residence, and military service.28 The members of 
the Jewish community in Egypt were dhimmis, that is to say non-Muslims of 
the Book, a category which also included Christians and Zoroastrians, and 
were subject to certain restrictions and to religious tribunals established in 
1875. The attachment of some members of the Jewish community went beyond 
nationality. It was not unusual that for different members of one family to have 
different nationalities while the common denominator was the Jewish identity 
and the use of the French language. This was the case for Régine Zayan, Yves 
Fedida, and David Yohana, for example. 
 
When it became possible to obtain Egyptian nationality in 1929, many local 
subjects among the Jewish community did not apply for Egyptian citizenship. 
According to Frédéric Abecassis, this is because they were more attached to 
the communal identity than the national one, or because they had faith in the 
British protection of religious minorities. Being Egyptian was not necessary to 
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live in Egypt as long as the local subjects did not want to become civil servants 
or start a career in politics.29 
 
The end of Egypt as part of the Ottoman Empire and its status as a British 
protectorate in 1914 did not end the local subject status nor the capitulation 
system, but the need for a definition of Egyptian nationality became more and 
more pressing. However, it was only after Egypt became independent, that the 
Egyptian government set up a committee to draft a law regarding nationality. 
After many changes, a law regarding the definition, acquisition and loss of 
Egyptian nationality was introduced in 1929. It established a distinction 
between Egyptian Ottoman subjects who were automatically and compulsorily 
naturalised Egyptian, and foreigners who could become Egyptian by decree 
only if they asked to be naturalised.30 To qualify, foreigners had to be born in 
Egypt from a father himself born in Egypt, but who was originally from an 
Arab or Muslim country.31 This disposition prevented a number of Jews from 
being naturalised Egyptian, and they remained stateless. As a result only 5,000 
Jews were granted Egyptian nationality out of a potential 40,000.32 It also 
announced the will of the Egyptian government to turn the country into a 
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Muslim nation-state by excluding large numbers of people from non-Muslim 
and non-Arabic communities. 
 
A number of Jews, in order to avoid discrimination, sought the protection of 
the European presence to benefit from the capitulation system, meaning that 
they could be tried in mixed tribunals where European laws were applied in 
concordance with Egyptian laws. It concerned the following countries: France, 
Britain, Greece, Italy, Belgium, the United States, Denmark, Holland, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain and Sweden. People with consular protection then became 
foreign residents in Egypt and avoided the discriminatory status of dhimmis.33 
 
The capitulation system was eventually abolished in 1937, following the 
Convention of Montreux between Egypt and the twelve capitulatory powers, 
ending the privileges of the foreign communities.34 Mixed tribunals were 
planned to disappear twelve years after the treaty, even if from 1937 foreign 
nationals could be subject to Egypt's laws and taxation. Despite the convention, 
the foreign communities kept their economic dominance.35  
 
In 1956, Jews from Egypt with French nationality were called 'Français de 
Code Civil' by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These were different from the 
French nationals, who included mainly teaching and diplomatic staff.36 They 
were thus considered as administratively French and they had become French 
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while living in a foreign country. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs differentiated 
between the French from France and the 'Français de Code Civil'. Most of the 
Egyptian Jews who had French nationality managed to secure it by claiming 
they had relatives who had lived at one point in Algeria and thus were entitled 
to the 1870 Crémieux decree, which granted French nationality to Jews in 
Algeria. It nevertheless appeared after a general inspection in 1939 that 90 per 
cent of those registered, mostly Jews and representing more than 4,000 
individuals, had no claim to French protection, since neither they nor their 
ancestors had ever lived in Algeria.37 The facility with which the Jews obtained 
and kept their French nationality shows how important it was for the French 
government to have some French and Francophile nationals in the country as 
part of its influence, a state of affairs of which France had been keenly aware in 
the 1930s. 
 
It is estimated that in the 1920s and 1930s, between 25 and 30 per cent of the 
Jewish population had Egyptian citizenship, while 25 per cent were foreign 
nationals, the rest being stateless.38 In the 1930s, about 9 per cent of Jews in 
Egypt were 'Français de Code Civil', while those who were British nationals 
represented only 3 per cent, which out of 80,000 members represented roughly 
2,500 individuals.39 The main reason was that it was harder for the Jews of 
Egypt to obtain British nationality in comparison with French nationality.  
 
Only families originating from Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus, which were all 
part of the British empire, were eligible. Exceptions could be made if 
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applicants were considered to be an asset for British policy in Egypt, as they 
could act as intermediaries between Britain and the local power, or if they 
rendered services to the British nation, like serving in the British army during 
the Second World War.40 When a member of staff proposed to adopt a more 
liberal attitude regarding the naturalisation of Jewish families in Egypt who 
had lost their Austro-Hungarian protection during the First World War, as they 
could form 'a useful nucleus for a Colony after [the British] direct withdrawal 
from the control of Egyptian Affairs', the Foreign Office showed no interest 
whatsoever 'in names like de Kraemer, Menasce, and [Gherein]', names 
typically considered Jewish.41 Very few British naturalisations happened in 
comparison with French ones among the Jewish community during the period 
Egypt was under British rule. Though Gudrun Krämer suggests that Britain 
limited its protection as it was the dominant European power in Egypt at the 
time, the policy also parallels the general anti-alien policy in Britain.42 During 
the First World War, anti-alienism, along with antisemitism even towards 
British-born Jews, was still high.43 Naturalising the Austro-Hungarian Jews in 
Egypt, who were technically enemy aliens, would have meant letting them 
having full access to Britain, if it had been their wish to re-emigrate. 
 
While many British-naturalised Jewish families in Egypt had a knowledge of 
English, they mostly spoke French: 
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We came from a Europeanised Jewish family… Although we were 
British subjects, we were not part of the British administrative class… 
However, the language situation at home was complex yet typical of the 
times for Jewish families in Egypt. My parents spoke French but we had 
a Slovene nanny… And the Slovenian language is not a very usable one 
so my mother asked my nanny to talk to us, children, in Italian instead of 
Slovene.44 
 
Having a British passport did not necessarily mean speaking English at home, 
nor the Arabic of the country they lived in. Nationality was not a defining 
element for the Jews of Egypt before the Suez crisis. What mattered was 
Egyptian Jewish identity and social class. Middle- and upper-middle-class Jews 
had little contact with the lower-class Jews who made up 25 per cent of the 
Jewish community in 1948, and were mainly indigenous Arabic-speaking 
individuals.45 Nationality for the Jews of Egypt was a way to be protected by 
European powers and was a matter of passport rather than national identity: 
Raymond Levy said, 'People did not speak about nationality, but about 
passport: "Quel passeport as-tu?" [laughs]. People had all sort of passports. I 
had friends who had Italian passports and couldn't speak Italian!'46 The fact that 
people had a foreign passport did not mean that they had an allegiance to their 
country of nationality. Nationality was not defining identity for many Jews of 
Egypt. However, for the Egyptian government it meant that they were foreign 
nationals, which made it easier to expel them when they became enemy 
nationals during the Suez crisis. 
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As far as the questions of Israel and Zionism were concerned, only a few Jews 
were actively involved in Zionist movements, though many were sympathetic 
to the creation of the State of Israel, and only 4,000 Jews from Egypt emigrated 
to Palestine between 1917 and 1947. Most Jews of Egypt were at first hostile 
or indifferent to Zionism as a political movement.47 Zionist activity expanded 
during the 1940s, and Zionist youth movements saw an increase of their 
membership. In general, the Jews from Egypt were to be found in every 
political affiliation in Egypt from supporters of the King to Communists, and 
also sympathisers of the Wafd.48 It reflects the complexity of allegiances. Their 
Jewish identity was very important as Jews of Egypt in opposition to Jews 
from another place. 
 
At the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the Egyptian army attempted to 
invade Israel, only to be defeated. However, this changed the relationship 
between the Egyptian government and society and the Jewish community. Jews 
were suspected of being Zionists by the government, and several were arrested 
and interned. Some others were arrested on the allegation that they were 
Communists. Thus, 1,000 Jews, Muslims and Europeans known to be 
opponents to the Egyptian government were interned, plus another 300 Jews 
for their past association with Zionist activities which were legal before 1948.49 
Their properties were sequestrated during their internment, and only returned 
in 1949 after the end of the war with Israel, and the internees liberated. More 
broadly, the Jewish community became the target of anti-European and 
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antisemitic actions from July to September 1949: demonstrations, arson and 
destruction of Jewish property happened in Cairo.50 As a result 20,000 Jews 
left Egypt between May 1948 and January 1950, a large proportion of whom 
settled in Israel. From 1951 to 1953, their situation seemed to have stabilised, 
despite the revolution of 1952 and the end of the Monarchy.51 The change of 
regime in 1952 made the Jews of Egypt question their future in the country, 
even though Neguib, then head of State after the coup, pledged friendly 
relations with the Jews of Egypt.52  
 
As a minority group more subjected to European influences than Egyptian 
ones, and because of their peculiar legal status and their Jewish identity, the 
Jews from Egypt were deeply affected by the French and British occupations 
and the rise of Egyptian nationalism and pan-Arabism. Inside the Jewish 
community, their status and future in the country was questioned, as well as 
privately in family circles.53 
 
Egypt was moving towards nationalism and Arabism from the 1930s, and these 
developments gained considerable popularity in the early 1950s when the 
monarchy was overthrown.54 Once he became leader of Egypt, Nasser tried to 
minimise European influence, and especially that of the British, to make Egypt 
a leading Arab country. He stood as a charismatic leader of the Arab world 
from Algeria to Yemen, promoting a nationalist ideology which sometimes 
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leaned towards xenophobia.55 In October 1956 and following the Suez military 
intervention, those who had managed to be granted Egyptian citizenship were 
targeted by a series of removals of naturalisations. The French and British 
nationals were expelled, in an attempt to reduce the European presence. The 
Egyptian government also suspected Jews of being Zionist or Communist 
activists and sometimes interned them. In a context of Egyptianisation of the 
country and affirmed opposition to Zionism and Israel, the Jews of Egypt were 
targeted for expulsion regardless of whether they had personally avowed 
support for Zionism or not. Refugees who sought asylum in France had more 
affinity with French culture or had relatives in France.  
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6. From French Jews in Egypt to Jews from Egypt  
in France 
 
At the time of the Suez canal crisis, approximately 10,000 French nationals 
were living in Egypt. Out of those 3,000 were diplomatic and teaching staff 
and workers at the Suez Canal Company. The rest of the French nationals in 
Egypt at the time were Jews who had acquired relatively recently French 
citizenship.1 Most of them had never lived in France before, but considered 
themselves of French culture since they spoke the language, and many had a 
French education at school. 
 
While the Suez crisis was extensively reported and debated in the press and in 
parliament, the situation of the French nationals was not as much discussed in 
the press as was the situation of the Hungarians. There were also very few 
parliamentary debates mentioning the situation of foreign and Jewish 
communities during the Suez crisis. As a consequence, the refugees from 
Egypt arrived in France rather anonymously.  
 
Yet, France granted asylum to 11,000 Jewish refugees from Egypt for 
permanent resettlement or re-emigration.2 While many of the refugees were 
French nationals, the French government also had to deal with approximately 
4,000 foreign and stateless refugees from Egypt who sought refuge there due to 
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a familial and/or cultural attachment to the country. Among these, some simply 
transited through France to re-emigrate somewhere else, mostly Israel.3  
 
While Hungarians were welcomed by the government because they were 
considered suitable candidates for immigration, refugees from Egypt were seen 
as less desirable. They were assimilated with Algerian immigrants by the 
French administration, which, in the Algerian War context, made them feel 
unwelcome. For French Jewish refugees, even their nationality was questioned 
and was seen as a special status as they were referred to as 'Français de Code 
Civil'. According to immigration policies, this group of refugees was restricted 
entry to France as much as possible. The French government thus tried to limit 
as much as possible the immigration of refugees from Egypt, but were faced 
with political and moral dilemmas because of France's responsibility in the 
Suez crisis, the Algerian context, and as well as the treatment of the Jewish 
population during the Vichy years. 
 
This chapter shows that the arrival of the Jewish refugees from Egypt, French 
nationals and stateless, was considered by the French government to be a 
Jewish problem and handled as such. It argues that despite a common 
knowledge of the French language, and in some cases French education and 
nationality, their French culture was not sufficient for them to be considered as 
French by the French authorities. Delegating the reception of refugees to 
organisations such as the Cojasor emphasises the fact that the government had 
little interest in this wave of refugees, in contrast with the Hungarian refugees. 
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Studying those organisations is necessary as their work enabled a great 
majority of the refugees to have support until permanent accommodation was 
offered to them. The fact that the care for the refugees from Egypt was 
delegated for the most part to a Jewish association and its work was central to 
the permanent resettlement of the refugees emphasises the Jewish character of 
the handling of this refugee situation. The chapter analyses how immigration 
and resettlement policies affected differently refugees from Egypt in 
comparison with the Hungarian refugees. Finally, this chapter also studies the 
effect of the resettlement in France on the identity of the Jews from Egypt. It 
focuses particularly on how their French identity and culture was affected by 
the treatment they received from the French authorities, and how their 
resettlement played a major part in emphasising their Egyptian common past 
rather than their French culture in the immediate years after their arrival in 
France.  
 
 
 
-The expulsion of French nationals and stateless Jews 
 
The event that led to the expulsion of the French and British nationals and the 
6,000 stateless Jews was the French, British and Israeli military intervention in 
Egypt in October 1956. This military intervention was the response to the 
nationalisation of the Suez canal by Nasser on 26 July 1956. Some of the Jews 
from Egypt believed then that the nationalisation would worsen the Jewish 
community's position in the country. André H.'s father and grandfather warned 
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him that the time had come to leave the country on hearing the announcement 
on the radio: 'Mon père et mon grand-père ont écouté la radio et ils ont dit: 
"C'est fini!" Donc il faut partir!'4 Although André H. and his family were not 
able to leave for France until 1959, since being stateless they were not subject 
to direct expulsion, his family's worries reflect the general concern among Jews 
in Egypt.  
 
In Alexandria, 77 French nationals emigrated soon after the nationalisation of 
the canal. Most of them were Jewish. The rest of the Jews of Egypt forming the 
French colony were worried but preferred to see how the situation would 
evolve.5 At this time they were not subject to any restriction and could transfer 
their assets relatively easily. On the other hand, 1,888 non-Jewish French 
nationals out of the 2,108 registered at the Port-Said consulate working for the 
Suez Canal Company and originally from France decided to leave following 
the nationalisation.6 The attachment to Egypt was strong for the French Jews 
born there. The French, British, and some Egyptian and stateless members of 
the community who stayed after the nationalisation of the canal, had to leave a 
few months later in much stricter conditions. 
 
The nationalisation of the canal raised concerns about the French population in 
Egypt at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In early August, the French embassy 
in Cairo tried to assess the intentions of the French colony in case of a major 
crisis in Egypt, and to have precise figures on the number of people who would 
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then became potential candidates for evacuation. Table 6.1 shows that the 
French embassy used again the distinction between nationals and 'Français de 
Code Civil': 
 
Table 6.1: Composition of the French colony in Egypt on 15 August 1956 
on the eventuality of evacuation to France. 
 
      Categories  
 
 
 
Zones  
French citizens 
 
North Africans Total 
 
Nationals 
'Français 
de Code 
Civil' 
Algerians 
(incl. 
Jews) 
Moroccans 
(incl. Jews) 
Cairo 2,885 1,400 2,120 
(several 
100s) 
500 6,905 
Alexandria 2,574 1,542 1,794 
(1,500) 
780  
(600) 
6690 
Canal Zone 0 405 0 0 405 
Total 8,806 3,914 
(about 
2,000) 
1,280 
(600) 
14,000 
(approx. 
2,600) 
(Source: MAE, Levant 1944-1965, Egypte 1953-1959, 514, French population 
in Egypt, 15 August 1956.) 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs anticipated the evacuation of the French 
colony at an early date and had figures regarding who would have to be 
evacuated to France in case of a military operation against Egypt. However, 
apart from advising its nationals to move to France, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs did not set up a proper evacuation plan. It did not anticipate the 
expulsion plans of Nasser, even in the nationalistic political context in Egypt at 
the time, and his intention to reduce the European influence in the country.7 
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This failure to anticipate had an impact on the reception of the Jews who 
sought refuge in France, aggravated by the fact that non-French Jews were not 
considered as potential immigrants. 
 
Table 6.1 also reveals the presence of a number of Algerians and Moroccans in 
Egypt in 1956. Though they were not considered as elements to be evacuated, 
the French embassy nevertheless surveyed their intentions, as Moroccans and 
Algerians had the status of 'protégés'. The table reveals as well that the 
embassy made a distinction between Jews and non-Jews in those two national 
categories. The Algerians in Cairo were mainly Muslims, and their presence in 
the city can be explained by the fact that various nationalist figures from the 
Maghreb met there to encourage anti-colonial movement since the end of the 
Second World War.8 Moreover, Nasser openly supported the Front National de 
Libération (FLN), even if their relations were sometimes tense.9 The French 
government believed the Egyptian president was actively involved in the 
Algerian War, and reclaiming the Suez canal was just an extension of the same 
conflict, as well as protecting financial assets links to the Suez canal.10 As a 
result, the Muslim Algerians in Egypt were suspected of links with the FLN.11 
Though Morocco had been independent since March 1956, Moroccans in 
Egypt were also suspected of being nationalists. 
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French staff at the French schools were the first to be expelled, the schools 
being a symbol of French presence in Egypt. The military intervention was for 
Nasser the opportunity to minimise their influence in the country by shutting 
down their schools and institutions. Yves R., student at the time at the Lyçée 
Français in Alexandria, remembers how quickly it happened: 'Les écoles 
ferment. Les professeurs sont expulsés. Instantanément. D'abord les institutions 
françaises. Fermées! Virées! Ensuite, avec un peu plus de temps, tous les 
ressortissants français.'12 Nasser was able to carry out his politics of 
Egyptianisation and pan-Arabism by quickly shutting down the French 
institutions, as well as British and Jewish schools. During the military 
intervention which started in October, schools were closed because of the war. 
However, despite what Yves R. remembered, it was only on 20 November, that 
the Lyçée Français in Cairo and its annexe in Meadi were requisitioned and 
occupied by the Egyptian army. Similarly, all the schools of the Mission 
Laïque Française and Alliance Française were closed, representing a total of 
10,000 students unable to attend school.13 More generally, the Centre Culturel 
Français in Cairo closed down on 9 November along with the French embassy 
and the Institut des Hautes Etudes Françaises du Caire while the French 
hospitals were occupied by the Egyptian army, thus reducing French cultural 
influence on Egyptian territory.14  
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When the Egyptian government forced 280 French teaching staff (400 with 
relatives included) to stay at home, and interned about ten of them, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs made their evacuation a priority.15 While the 
remaining 6,500 French nationals in Egypt were not put under house arrest, the 
Ministry was concerned that the French Jews' freedom of movement was 
restricted.16 It left the other French nationals behind as no evacuation plan had 
been prepared despite the estimation of numbers likely to be affected made 
during the summer. The 'Français de Code Civil' could only turn to the Swiss 
embassy which represented French interests in Egypt after the French embassy 
closed in November. As diplomatic relations between France and Egypt 
stopped on 1 November 1956, the Swiss delegation was in charge of French 
interests in the country and could deliver a safe conduct with a visa valid for 
one month to stateless refugees who had relatives in France.17 
 
In most cases, police officers came to the workplace or home of the people 
who were being expelled and asked them to leave the country within two to 
seven days. Assets belonging to French nationals were frozen, and were 
forcibly given to the Egyptian government as expellees had to agree to leave 
everything behind. Expellees were only allowed to take with them a suitcase of 
maximum 20 kilos and twenty Egyptian pounds worth just under twenty 
British pounds. A laissez-passer was then delivered with 'aller définitif sans 
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retour' written on it. This form of expulsion was called voluntary expulsion and 
was common from November 1956.18  
 
However, leaving Egypt was not always easy at that time, and Régine Zayan 
had to stay longer despite an expulsion order: 
 
Ils m'ont remis un petit papier disant que j'étais expulsée, que je devais 
quitter le territoire égyptien pour un départ sans retour. Deux semaines 
plus tard ou un peu plus, ils sont revenus parce que je n'étais pas partie. 
En fait, les avions étaient complets partout. La foule était énorme dans les 
consulats, les agences de voyage, les compagnies d'aviation. Pouvoir 
partir immédiatement c'était très difficile. Et le papier indiquait sous huit 
jours. Cette fois ils sont venus me chercher… L'officier a demandé 
pourquoi nous n'étions pas partis. Ils nous ont simplement fait peur en 
disant que si nous ne quittions pas les lieux rapidement, nous serions 
emprisonnés. Hors, nous savions qu'il y avait énormément de gens en 
prison. Ils nous ont relâchés et c'est tout.19 
 
Régine Zayan was luckier than many. By early December, at least 900 Jews 
had been arrested.20 As she explains, it was not always easy to leave quickly as 
so many others were being expelled or trying to leave as they could not 
imagine that they had a future there any more. 
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The Jewish community was also targeted by a series of restrictions since the 
Egyptian government associated Jews with Zionism and Israel. The first 
restriction was that Jewish schools were shut down and requisitioned, while 
some of their staff was interned like the French director of the Ecole de la 
Communauté Israélite du Caire.21 However, the Egyptian government went 
further than just closing down schools. On 22 November, Nasser amended the 
Egyptian nationality law of 13 September 1950, aiming at achieving 'national 
homogeneity', by a decree-law according to which 'only individuals resident on 
Egyptian territory before 1 January 1900, who maintained their residence until 
the date of promulgation of the present decree and who are not under the 
jurisdiction of a foreign state, are Egyptians.'22 In other words, all Jews who 
had been granted Egyptian nationality after 1 January 1900 became stateless. 
Those who had been naturalised between that date and 1932, and on the 
condition that they were not known to have taken part to Zionist activities or 
associations, could remain in Egypt. The following day, Nasser declared all 
Jews enemies of the State, and as such, they were subject to expulsion from 
Egypt, along with French and British citizens.23   
 
Other stateless Jews or local subjects, like David Yohana, decided to leave 
Egypt later despite not being expressly asked to leave the country. However, in 
the spring of 1957, it was much harder to leave for France, even as a refugee. 
In an attempt to limit the number of refugees, the French authorities refused to 
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deliver visas to the stateless Jews with insufficient financial means to live in 
France. It was only with the sponsorship of friends who had come to France as 
refugees a few months before that he obtained a transit visa for Israel valid for 
15 days that enabled him to go to France on 13 August 1957.24 
 
In general, it was the Jewish community that was the most affected by the 
consequences of the military intervention led by France, Britain and Israel. The 
aim of Nasser's government was to purge Egypt of foreign influence and of its 
Jewish community and to replace foreigners or non-Muslims in key positions 
in society and the administration by Egyptian Muslims. Some foreigners or 
Jews were requisitioned by the Egyptian government to train Egyptians for 
positions they had previously occupied, delaying their expulsion by a few 
months or even years.25 The action of the Egyptian authorities can be summed 
up in four points: arrest and internment, sequestration of possessions and 
businesses, expulsion, and, finally, promulgation of a new status stripping the 
Jews of their Egyptian nationality. Thousands of Jews, stateless or Egyptian, 
French or British were interned or put under house arrest, while between 
November 1956 and March 1957, more than 500 Jewish businesses were 
seized and had their accounts frozen, and 800 more businesses were put on a 
black list with their accounts frozen as well. All the sequestrated enterprises 
were ordered to fire their Jewish employees, which was done promptly.26 
Subject to expulsion or not, the Jews from Egypt had little choice other than to 
leave the country and seek refuge elsewhere. Due to the French influences of 
their educational and cultural background, France was a natural choice for 
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immigration for many members of the Jewish community of Egypt. In early 
1961, following a continuous anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli propaganda campaign 
since the Suez crisis, only 7,000 Jews remained in Egypt, of which 2,000 were 
Karaites, mostly unskilled labourers and small artisans.27 
 
 
 
-The reception of refugees from Egypt in France 
 
Before the refugees started to arrive in France, the French press had 
characterised the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in July 1956 as a repetition 
of the Munich agreement or Germany's annexation of Austria in 1938. Many 
articles presented Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the inability of 
the UN to solve the issue as a new Anschluss. Except in the case of the 
Communist papers, there was a pro-war tone in the French press. Combat 
claimed that allowing Nasser to nationalise the canal was the Anschluss all 
over again.28 Le Monde also believed that 'l'histoire recommence' and drew the 
same parallels with Nasser and Hitler, the nationalisation of the canal and the 
Anschluss.29 Paris-Presse castigated the American attitude at the UN Security 
Council and felt the spirit of Munich over the whole affair.30 The press overall 
called the government to act on the Suez question. 
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The government had considered military intervention to reclaim the canal, but 
that was not the only reason to intervene. It saw in the Egyptian situation a 
prolongation of the Algerian War. Links between Nasser and the FLN were 
established, and overthrowing the Egyptian leader was considered a necessity 
in order to win the Algerian War. Robert Lacoste, resident minister and 
governor general of Algeria, recommended action against Nasser, as he feared 
that if the Egyptian leader appeared victorious in nationalising the Suez canal, 
the Algerian War could not be won.31 This view was shared in the French 
government. Nasser's links with Moscow were also emphasised, and many 
considered that he was serving, knowingly or not, Soviet interests. Moreover, 
Egypt concluded a deal in 1955 with Czechoslovakia to receive military 
material, much to the dismay of Israel.32 Then, reclaiming the Suez canal was 
not only a way to fight the Algerian War, it was also a way to diminish 
communist influence in Egypt by ousting its leader. The PCF did not support 
the military intervention in Egypt. Yet, the party was in a difficult position 
having to justify the Soviet invasion of Hungary at the same time. Their 
criticisms of the Suez intervention were thus greatly weakened. 
 
Despite the fact that France had to leave Egypt following pressure from the 
Soviet Union and the United States, the operation was not considered a failure. 
Christian Pineau indeed claimed that Egypt was the main loser: Nasser's army 
was defeated and demoralised, most of the Soviet military material was lost 
and had to be paid for by Egypt, the canal was unusable and Egyptian 
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economic improvements were halted.33 It was in such a political context that 
the question of the expulsion from Egypt of French, British and stateless 
nationals was posed. 
 
While the repatriation of the diplomatic and teaching staffs posed little 
problem, since it was considered a priority, the reception of the other French 
nationals and the stateless and denaturalised Jews proved more difficult. 
Hungarian refugees were considered good candidates for resettlement in 
France, due to the fact that they were mostly young European men who could 
be potentially employed. They were fitting the economic and demographic 
needs as established by French immigration policies and practices. The 
demographic composition of the Jewish refugees from Egypt differed greatly, 
as they were large family units from a predominantly middle-class 
background.34 
 
The introduction to the thesis has shown the importance of Georges Mauco's 
ideas on labour, ethnicity and nationality in French immigration practices. 
Despite the absence of mentions of ethnic preferences in French law after the 
war, national and ethnic preferences remained strong within the French 
administration.35 Mauco considered that among 'foreign races', people from the 
Levant, a category also referring to Jews, were unassimilable and undesirable 
because they were too distant from the 'French race'.36 He wanted to limit as 
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much as possible the introduction to France of Mediterranean and Oriental 
people for immigration and naturalisation and favoured instead European 
immigration. In terms of occupation, priority was given to farmers, miners, and 
builders, while commercial, professional, and banking occupations were to be 
given limited access to immigration.37 Immigration from Egypt was therefore 
to be avoided according to French immigration policy. 
 
Egyptian immigration had already been specifically labelled as undesirable in 
1947.38 Immigration policy was constantly in conflict among concerned 
ministries and the ONI between labour needs and demographic needs. The 
focus was on favouring the entry of assimilable workers in France, which was a 
way to reconcile both labour and demographic objectives. In case of conflicting 
interests, population needs were often put forward, which led to policy of 
general restriction of immigration from Arab countries, including Egypt despite 
any significant immigration from this country. The amalgation of Arab 
immigration and the refugees from Egypt persisted until naturalisation, notably 
when dealing with the administrative services.39 
 
Moreover, refugees from Egypt arrived at a time when Algerian immigration 
was considered undesirable.40 The position of the French administration was 
that Algerian immigrants and any immigration from the Mediterranean region 
were to be avoided. Algerian immigration was considered not to serve France's 
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demographic interests. To that aim, in March 1956, any person wishing to 
travel from France to Algeria or from Algeria to France had to produce their 
national identity card, which marked the end of the free passage between 
France and Algeria. This practice was indirect discrimination towards the 
Algerians, who travelled the most between the two countries.41 All necessary 
information for providing national identity cards was thoroughly checked by 
the French administration, which delayed many Algerians in their travel plans, 
or prevented them if they could not present the required information. 
 
In addition to that, the Algerian War context greatly affected the condition of 
Algerians in France. They were treated with suspicion, both by the government 
and administration, and in the press. On 9 March 1956, the police violently 
repressed a demonstration organised in Paris by the Algerian National 
Movement against the special powers wanted by Guy Mollet. Yet, this 
repression took place with total indifference on the part of public opinion.42 
The link between Algerian workers and terrorists was commonly made. When 
confronting the French administration, the refugees from Egypt were 
nevertheless amalgamated with Algerian immigrants.43 The fact that they were 
referred to as 'Français de Code Civil' was an emphasis of the fact that they 
were not of French culture nor birth, and was an echo to the status of Algerians 
as 'Français musulmans d'Algérie'. Such status, rather than protecting those it 
referred to, became the object of discrimination. 
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As a consequence, the French government tried in the first place to prevent any 
form of expulsion of the Jewish community in Egypt. In order to limit the 
arrival of refugees from Egypt in France, and also because the Ministry of the 
Interior considered that it did not have the resources to accommodate the whole 
French population from Egypt and some stateless Jews, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs tried to investigate ways of making the expulsions illegal on the 
international scene. According to the Ministry, the expulsions violated Article 
9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of which Egypt was a 
signatory.44 The Jurisconsulte for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs managed to 
show that Egypt was thus violating several international agreements by 
expelling its Jewish population. France had a strong case to present to the 
United Nations, by showing that the Egyptian measures were an attempt at 
genocide, internationally defined since the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by the UN General Assembly in 
December 1948 and signed by France and Egypt the same month.45 The 
Jurisconsulte believed that the new regulations concerning the Jewish 
community in Egypt could be interpreted as a plan to exterminate or to make 
an entire group or race disappear.46 These recommendations, however, were 
not applied, and little was done by the French government to bring up the case 
of its nationals and the Jewish population in Egypt in the UN Assembly. The 
main reason was that the French government was hoping to discuss the future 
of the Suez Canal with the Egyptian government in an attempt to renegotiate 
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the terms of the nationalisation. Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
considered that bringing up the matter of the ill-treatments and the expulsions 
to the UN Assembly could prevent the negotiations from happening due to the 
French army's actions in Algeria: 
 
Nous désirons certainement que des négociations soient entamées le plus 
rapidement possible avec l'Egypte sur le futur statut du Canal de Suez. Je 
me demande si un débat à l'Assemblée dans lequel nous accuserions 
l'Egypte d'avoir fait subir à nos nationaux des traitements inadmissibles et 
où seraient évoquées les prétendues 'atrocités' commises par nos troupes 
ne risquerait pas de retarder les négociations ou même de compromettre 
l'ouverture de celles-ci.47 
 
The atrocities the Jurisconsulte mentioned referred to the French army handling 
of the situation in Algeria. By the end of 1956, some of the soldiers in the 
French army had revealed in letters to newspapers and politicians the use of 
illegal violent force and torture in Algeria. From October the matter was 
regularly discussed at the Assemblée Nationale.48 The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs feared that such talks could lead to embarrassment if the Egyptian 
treatment of the French and Jewish communities was paralleled to the Algerian 
situation. Furthermore, it could also have been perceived as an isolated move 
by the French government in the handling of the Suez crisis, which, up until 
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that time, had been jointly conducted with the British government.49 This 
explains in part why the case of the expellees from Egypt did not receive as 
much attention on the international scene as the Hungarian refugees. Rather 
than a means to put pressure on Egypt, their mention at the UN General 
Assembly would have been a liability for France, as the French government 
feared that its handling of the Algerian War would also be publicly criticised. 
The French intention was also to distract international opinion from the Suez 
crisis by focusing on the Soviet repression of the Hungarian revolution.50 
 
Moreover, the fact that most of the expellees were Jewish limited France's 
scope of action. Press comparison of Egypt to Nazi Germany after the 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal put pressure on the French government to 
relax its immigration policy. That pressure on the French government increased 
when it became public that Nasser targeted the Jews with discriminatory laws 
after the bombing of Suez. Le Figaro and Franc-Tireur claimed the 70,000 
Jews in Egypt were all subject to expulsion.51 Le Monde reported that the 
Egyptian government was adopting laws and decrees denaturalising the Jews 
and nationalising their businesses and assets.52  
 
There was a further complication to the admission of refugees from Egypt. It 
was a political necessity to be generous towards the Jewish refugees from 
Egypt, so that the French collaborationist past could remained buried. Since the 
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end of the Second World War, there had been a refusal, from the French 
government and the Jewish community, to emphasise the wartime deportations 
and murder of Jews.53 Moreover Jewish deportees were considered like any 
other deportees. This was a period when the French government concealed its 
treatment of the collaboration and Jewish questions during the Vichy years.54 
Despite decrees and commissions created from 1945 to study imprisonment 
and deportation during the Vichy years, the focus was more on the deportation 
of French workers rather than the Jewish condition.55 The emphasis was on the 
unity of the French people, who could not be divided into categories: all 
deportees, Jews and non-Jews, were French and died 'pour la France'. The 
French Jewish community itself remained fairly silent, and kept the memory of 
the Jewish genocide dormant after the war. The Jewish community rather chose 
integration and commemorated its deportations as part of the French unity.56 
Commemorations of Jewish deportees existed, but they were carried out within 
the Jewish community, and integrated the memory of non-Jews in the 
ceremony or memorials.57  
 
The threats of expulsion by the Egyptian government put France in a difficult 
situation. Due to its involvement in the Suez crisis, France had a responsibility 
for the expulsion of the Jews from Egypt. Being generous with the Jews from 
Egypt was important in order to avoid criticism and to keep this myth of a 
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French unity alive and the past buried, especially since the 'mémorial du 
Martyr Juif Inconnu' was inaugurated in Paris on 30 October 1956.58 René 
Coty and Guy Mollet, although invited, could not attend the ceremony due to 
the Suez events, while Israel was officially represented.59  
 
Since the French government could not stop the expulsions, it tried to limit the 
access to France of refugees without being accused of restrictive measures 
against Jewish refugees. Therefore, refugees from Egypt were only accepted on 
the condition that they were (a) French, Moroccan or Tunisian nationals, (b) 
stateless, (c) Egyptian Jews with French parents or children or French spouse, 
(d) stateless persons with Moroccan or Tunisian parents or children or French 
spouse, and (e) foreigners exposed to serious risks following services given to 
the Nation.60 French nationals were top priorities for evacuation. However, the 
case of the Egyptian Jews reveals that only those who had French relatives 
could be evacuated to France. There were limits to the French cultural policy in 
Egypt since the French government was not ready to accept those among the 
Egyptian Jews who did not have any French relatives. For the French 
government, their French culture and education were not enough to claim a 
right to refuge in France. However, since the Egyptian Jews lost their 
nationality when they left the country, the difference between categories (b) 
and (c) was irrelevant in practice. The mission of giving a French education to 
the Jews of Egypt backfired, as the French government found itself in a 
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position where it became very hard to refuse the entry of stateless Jews to 
French territory. 
 
For many of the stateless Jews of Egypt, the kinship required for asylum in 
France was understood as being familiar with French culture, through language 
and education, rather than to have family members with French nationality. For 
those who spoke French and had been to French schools, France was the first 
choice before Israel, where life was thought to be hard, among some of the 
refugees interviewed.61 French local authorities also interpreted the circular in 
a very liberal sense. For example, the Bouches-du-Rhône prefecture issued no 
refusal to stay on French territory to stateless Jews without relatives in France, 
as the administration there considered the situation of the refugees who were 
expelled from Egypt.62 However, since stateless refugees did not have French 
citizenship, they had to deal with the administration more often. In practice, 
they had to prove that they would not become a financial burden on the State, 
which most of them inevitably became, as they had to leave Egypt with 
virtually no money or assets. Liberal interpretation and relaxing of the 
immigration policy enabled a part of the stateless refugees from Egypt to seek 
refuge in France.  
 
It is important to distinguish between stateless Egyptians and Moroccans and 
Tunisians. Along with the French nationals, they were first in order of priority, 
and they did not have to get a work permit like other foreigners.63 The reason 
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was that many Moroccans and Tunisians had a French passport and were 
subject to expulsion as French nationals. They were thus accepted without 
restriction in France. 
 
 
 
-Arrival in France 
 
It is estimated that from November 1956 to March 1957, 80 per cent of the 
refugees from Egypt arriving in France were Jewish.64 Most refugees from 
Egypt left the country by boat, while the rest mainly flew to Paris. Almost 
3,000 Jews from Egypt arrived on thirteen ships which landed in Marseille 
between 30 November 1956 and 22 January 1957.65 By January, the reception 
of the refugees from Egypt was already organised. Refugees who did not have 
any relatives able to take care of them, were met by the Red Cross at their 
arrival. After a quick registration they were sent to sports centres or cheap 
hotels in the area that served as temporary accommodation, or redirected to 
Paris. Régine Zayan remembers her arrival in Paris in January 1957 and how 
quickly she and her mother were taken care of: 
 
L'arrivée à Paris a été assez impressionnante pour nous. Nous sommes 
arrivées à Orly… Il y a avait une cellule de la Croix Rouge qui était 
présente et qui nous accueillait. On nous a donné un billet de 50 francs 
anciens, pour prendre un taxi… Le taxi nous a déposé à l'hôtel. Certains 
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hôtels étaient réquisitionnés pour les Français d'Egypte. Il y avait toute 
une partie de cet hôtel réservée aux réfugiés.66  
 
Because of the lack of accommodation available in hotels, their location varied. 
Renée Hakoun, a French national who arrived with her husband in Marseille a 
few weeks before Régine Zayan, was sent briefly to Arles, and then moved to 
Paris to a hotel full of French nationals from Egypt in the Quartier Latin.67 
 
In the Bouches-du-Rhône, the problem was different, Marseille was already 
receiving many French nationals leaving North Africa.68 The French 
government had no additional structures to accommodate the refugees from 
Egypt, as the existing ones were already full with refugees from Spain, because 
of the Franco regime, and Jews from Morocco.69 In order to cope with a large 
influx of refugees, the Ministry of the Interior worked with the SSAE and the 
Red Cross to open budget hotels. Yves Fedida, remembers his arrival in 
Marseille: 
 
On a pris le bateau et on est arrivé à Marseille… A cette époque il y avait 
la Croix Rouge qui accueillait les réfugiés à Marseille et le gouvernement 
français avait installé des camps pour accueillir les gens. Ce qu'on ne 
voulait surtout pas c'est qu'ils viennent en région parisienne au départ car 
il y avait une crise du logement épouvantable en France. 
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Il y avait toutes sortes de camps… Il y avait un camp à Toulon qui était 
un camp de la marine, il y avait des hôtels à Carry-le-Rouet, et nous 
avons été dans des hôtels à Arles. En fait ils réquisitionnaient des une 
étoile, des deux étoiles, etc., et qui, en hiver, étaient complètement vides. 
Ils les ouvraient, ils nous mettaient là-bas et nous étions deux familles 
dans une chambre double avec enfants.70 
 
The words used by Yves Fedida show that even if the refugees from Egypt 
were not in actual camps, hotels were considered as such. Calling them camps 
was also a way of acknowledging their condition of being refugees. The 
refugees from Egypt in France did not experience the camp situation as did the 
Hungarian and Egyptian refugees in Britain, and the Hungarian refugees in 
France, but some of them nevertheless felt as refugees, and found life in hotels 
comparable to life in camps.  
 
The housing crisis, mentioned by Yves Fedida, was a major problem as French 
cities were desperately lacking accommodation. It affected the experience of 
the refugees from Egypt, as they had to cope with isolation in small towns' 
hotels. The French government found itself in a situation where requisitioning 
hotels became a viable solution as the influx of Hungarians meant than military 
bases serving as camps were full.  
 
The SSAE needed to requisition 110 hotels in the Bouches-du-Rhône and Var 
départements due to the influx of stateless refugees in the Marseille area, as 
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most of the open hotels there were already full.71 Marseille, to the same extent 
as Paris because of the accommodation crisis, had limited space and the 
refugees ended up being accommodated in isolated areas in the south of 
France.72   
 
When the refugees arrived in large numbers in December 1956, the SSAE 
found itself completely overwhelmed and was not able to register them all. The 
number of stateless refugees who arrived along with the French refugees was 
not be the only factor in the sometimes chaotic handling of the arrival of the 
expellees from Egypt in France. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs failed to 
anticipate the effect of the French culture on the Jewish community in Egypt, 
and among the 6,000 stateless refugees who left Egypt between November 
1956 and the end of 1957, almost a quarter chose to seek refuge in France.73 As 
a consequence, both French and stateless refugees who had no family to stay 
with in France during the first few months found themselves isolated in small 
villages of the Var or the Bouches-du-Rhône, thus slowing down their 
resettlement in France. As shown in the following table the main concentration 
of non-French refugees from Egypt were to be found in the Allier, Bouches-du-
Rhône, Lozère, Var, Isère, and the Seine départements, where the refugees 
stayed in hotels closed during the winter but requisitioned by the Ministry of 
the Interior and reopened to accommodate the refugees and repatriates: 
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Table 6.2: Numbers of non-French refugees arriving from Egypt by départements in 
France, January 1957  
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T
otal
 
Allier 21 35 39  4 1         100 
Aisne    1           1 
Alpes- 
Mari-
times 
  3 3 4 8      7   25 
Bouches- 
du-Rhône 
56 52 130 4 5 2 15      1 1 266* 
Gironde     3 1         4 
Hérault    1           1 
Ille-et- 
Vilaine 
   2           2 
Lozère 15 32 19  1 1 2        70 
Orne   1            1 
Hautes- 
Pyrénées 
    1          1 
Bas-Rhin   1            1 
Seine 176 178 251 3  1  5 1      615 
Seine-et- 
Oise 
  1  5          6 
Seine-et- 
Marne 
           4   4 
Var 56 151 116 18 8 15 2   1 1 2   370 
Vaucluse    3           3 
Isère 14 21 27   1         63 
Total 338 469 588 35 31 30 19 5 1 1 1 13 1 1 1,533 
*Bouches-Du-Rhône: 266 - This number does not include children under 
16 years of age. Moreover, 184 foreigners from Egypt were in transit for 
Israel in the Camp du Grand Arénas as of 18 January 1957.  
 
(Source: CAC, 19900353, art. 17, Number of repatriates from Egypt,  
end of January 1957) 
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The most represented categories were the stateless refugees (588), the 
Tunisians (469), and the Moroccans (338), for a total number of 1,533 foreign 
refugees at the end of January 1957, which was far from a massive wave of 
uncontrolled and uncontrollable immigration to France.  
 
Thirty British nationals were also in France, showing that attachment to French 
culture was more important than to nationality in some cases, especially if they 
had French relatives in the country. It was also because French was the only 
language they could speak despite their British nationality. These figures show 
that despite initial measures to restrict the number of non-French refugees from 
Egypt, the Ministry of the Interior eventually adopted a rather liberal policy in 
admitting them. 
 
The Tunisian and Moroccan refugees from Egypt were mostly Jews and did not 
want to return to Tunisia and Morocco due to the rise of antisemitism since the 
creation of Israel and the independence of both countries.74 It reveals a certain 
sympathy for the Jewish condition by the French government, as they were 
granted permission to stay in the country, after the Moroccan and Tunisian 
authorities unofficially informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it 
detached itself from the question of its Jewish nationals expelled from Egypt, if 
they did not show any intention of returning to Morocco or Tunisia.75 The 
OFPRA was thus able to put these refugees under the protection of the 
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UNHCR, after a period of three months.76 In March 1958, 584 Tunisian and 
453 Moroccan expellees from Egypt were considered as refugees.77 
 
Table 6.2 also points out the main geographical reception areas of the refugees 
in the first months of their arrival in France. The Allier département had quite a 
small population and was not the most attractive destination in terms of 
employment opportunities, with Vichy as a main destination for the refugees in 
the area. Although of French nationality, as French and non-French refugees 
and repatriates from Egypt were mixed in hotels, Robert Suarès was among the 
refugees sent to Vichy after transiting through Paris. He remembers what life 
was like there in the first months: 
 
On a été pris en charge par la Croix Rouge qui nous a conduit dans des 
hôtels à Paris Montparnasse. Et là, nous nous sommes retrouvés à 
plusieurs européens d’Egypte où nous sommes restés un certain temps et 
ils nous ont demandé "vers quelle destination voulez-vous allez ?" Alors 
moi je me suis dit, je suis en France je reste en France… Ils nous ont 
renvoyé sur Vichy… Ils ont rouvert des hôtels en plein mois de 
décembre, donc fin décembre à Vichy les chaudières de l'hôtel ont éclaté. 
C’était l’hiver le plus froid depuis cinquante ans ! C’était très moyen.78 
 
The hotels were not adapted to receive such a large number of people during 
the winter period, but the refugees were nevertheless compliant and did not 
pose problems during their stays in the requisitioned hotels.  
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The SSAE was asked by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide financial 
support to the refugees from Egypt registered with the OFPRA. The financial 
support was calculated on the basis of the unemployment benefits in the Paris 
region, along with extra money coming from a donation by the American Joint 
Distribution Committee. Refugees from Egypt looked after by the SSAE 
received 22,300 Francs per month if single, 32,800 Frs per month for a couple 
without children, or 40,300 Frs per month for a couple with children.79 
Although based on unemployment rates, some of the refugees interviewed 
considered the allocation too small, especially those who were too old to find 
suitable employment, and they had to buy cheap food to cook in hotels, even if 
that was forbidden, or go to soup kitchens.80 
 
Once in France, the stateless refugees had to register with the police in order to 
obtain a carte de séjour (residence permit) valid for a month, this length of 
time being used to check that the applicant had relatives in France. Once this 
had been verified, a carte de séjour receipt was delivered so that refugees could 
ask the OFPRA to be legally recognised as statutory refugees or stateless 
persons, which enabled them to obtain a work permit at the Direction 
Départementale du Travail et de la Main d'Œuvre.81 Without the recognition of 
refugee status at OFPRA under the Geneva Convention, refugees could be 
expelled.82 The refugees from Egypt were normally not eligible, as 1956 was 
not covered by the Convention, but nevertheless benefited from the status of 
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refugees under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees as they were stateless. They were referred to as 'réfugiés provenant 
d'Egypte sous mandat du Haut Commissaire'.83 Although they were called 
differently, they had the same rights as refugees under the definition of the 
1951 Convention in France.84 Once administrative steps had been completed, 
the stateless refugees had the same rights and obligations as any other aliens 
residing on French territory.  
 
The French nationals expelled from Egypt did not have to go through those 
procedures. Instead, they had to register at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris with 
the Comité d'Aide aux Français Rapatriés de l'Etranger when they arrived, 
where they received a carte de rapatrié. The committee was under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The primary function of the 
carte de rapatrié was to track French refugees from Egypt when they asked for 
support from public services.85 Although the other reason mentioned for this 
card was that it would facilitate the support for those refugees, it existed within 
a logic of control of a category of people difficult to classify as they were 
foreigners with a French passport. The card meant in practice that they were 
considered as foreign migrants. 
 
The fact that the refugees from Egypt were not as numerous as the refugees 
from Hungary enabled the Ministry of the Interior to use hotels rather than 
military camps to accommodate them, even if they were in unsatisfactory 
conditions. The heating broke down in some places, and refugees were not 
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allowed to cook.86 Some of the refugees managed to buy a portable stove and 
secretly cooked food in their rooms, as they could not afford to eat out every 
day. Others went to the soup kitchens that the Cojasor ran for impoverished 
Holocaust survivors.87 Life in hotels was a very convenient way for the French 
authorities to deal with the refugees. Unlike in camps, where discontent could 
have led to strikes or other spontaneous mass movements, spreading the 
refugees across different parts of France and accommodating them in hotels 
enabled the Ministry of the Interior to control them. Small groups of people in 
smaller structures proved easier to handle. 
 
As most of the refugees and repatriates were Jewish, the French Red Cross 
(CRF) believed that it was the duty of Jewish associations to be in charge of 
them.88 The CRF contacted Jewish organisations in France, and decided that 
the Cojasor was the most active and appropriate organisation to take on the 
refugees from Egypt. Although the CRF did not dismiss the French 
government's responsibility towards its nationals expelled from Egypt, the 
organisation argued that the French Jewish associations should financially 
support the French government's assistance by helping the refugees. For the 
CRF, the refugees from Egypt were an exclusively Jewish problem calling for 
a Jewish solution rather than public support. 
 
From the beginning of 1957, the role of the Cojasor became increasingly 
important, and the association was consulted on various decisions regarding the 
refugees. Although never acknowledged, the Ministry of the Interior handled 
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the reception of the refugees from Egypt, French or stateless, as a Jewish 
problem. It attempted to resettle them among already existing French Jewish 
communities, and by relying heavily on the help of the Cojasor, which was 
specialised in Jewish relief. The Ministry of the Interior, the SSAE and the 
Cojasor decided that they should be resettled in cities with employment and 
resettlement opportunities as well as with active and considerable Jewish 
communities. In cities with a large Jewish community, Jews from Egypt could 
benefit from extra local help, and their integration in French society would also 
be facilitated by contact with French Jews. The last criterion was the most 
important and it was decided in early 1957 to resettle a number of Jews from 
Egypt in the following départements: 
 
Table 6.3: Proposed dispersal of Jews from Egypt for permanent 
resettlement in February 1957 
 
 
Départements 
Number of 
Jews from 
Egypt 
Cote d'Or 40 
Haute-Garonne 50 
Gironde 50 
Loire 40 
Bas-Rhin 100 
Haut-Rhin 30 
Rhône 100 
Nord 40 
Belfort 30 
Total 480 
(Source: CAC, 20050590, art. 119, Conversation with Cantan,  
20 February 1957.) 
 
The problem of having privileged the Jewish community criterion was that it 
did not always match employment and resettlement opportunities. The Ministry 
of the Interior had, as a result, trouble convincing some of the prefectures to 
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admit the desired number of refugees as shown in table 6.3. For example, the 
Prefecture in Lyon tried to avoid receiving any refugees at all, as it was facing 
severe housing shortages.89 The situation became such at a local level that the 
SSAE, the Cojasor, the Fonds Social Juif Unifié (FSJU), and the French Red 
Cross wrote to the French government concerned by the slowness and the lack 
of permanent solution for the resettlement of the refugees from Egypt:  
 
La réintégration dans la vie métropolitaine de ces Français, dépouillés de 
tout et dont la nation ne saurait se désintéresser, est rendue extrêmement 
difficile, sinon impossible, par l'absence de logement permettant une vie 
familiale, même précaire, et alors même qu'un salaire et un travail normal 
sont assurés.90  
 
The phrasing of the letter suggests that the refugees from Egypt, despite their 
French nationality, had to be reintegrated into the nation because they were 
born outside France, which emphasises the idea of a different nationality status 
for the French nationals from Egypt. This unification of different organisations 
led to concrete solutions soon after. It was acknowledged in the letter that 
funds were given to help the refugees, but permanent resettlement was 
considered to be the only way out of a precarious life in France.  
    
The aim of the Cojasor was to know who considered resettling permanently in 
France, to facilitate the settlement and integration of the refugees and to take 
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care of their legal status.91 The role of the Cojasor was to morally and 
psychologically support the refugees, but also to support them financially to 
help them paying for hotel rooms or furnished flats, to grant scholarships or 
apprenticeships for students, until families could earn enough money. The 
refugees benefited from Cojasor's Service Spécial de Placement created when 
the first refugees arrived in France, since it considered that successful 
resettlement could only happen if they were in employment.92 
    
As most of the Egyptian refugees were Jewish, the Hias, based in the United 
States, worked with the Cojasor to determine how many refugees wanted to re-
emigrate to Israel. The core of the emigration to Israel from France happened 
in the first months after the expulsions. In May 1957, 2,232 refugees from 
Egypt, French nationals and stateless, emigrated to Israel after transiting 
through France.93 Thus more than three quarters of the refugees decided to stay 
in France rather than to re-emigrate. Refugees with clear intentions to emigrate 
to Israel benefited from a different reception scheme. They were issued transit 
visas from the Swiss embassy in Egypt, after confirming their desire to resettle 
in Israel. Once in France, they were under the care of the Israeli embassy and 
accommodated  in camps run by the Jewish Agency for Israel around 
Marseille. While facilitating the transit of those refugees, who could not leave 
Egypt directly for Israel because of the situation of war arising from the Suez 
crisis, the French government declined any financial responsibility for those 
refugees, leaving them to the care of the Israeli diplomatic authorities.94 
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For the refugees who decided to settle in France, employment was one of the 
major problems. Most refugees came from middle-class and upper-middle-
class backgrounds, and had jobs in business or the liberal professions. Many 
male refugees owned their own businesses or worked in family-run enterprises 
or banks and most of the married women did not have paid work. There was a 
great difference between the manual jobs available in France and the last 
occupations the refugees had before leaving Egypt: 'D'abord, nous avons 
essayé de trouver du travail. J'ai trouvé du travail rapidement dans une société 
qui fabriquait des colles. J'étais simple correspondancier, j'ai commencé au bas 
de l'échelle. Je ne pouvais pas avoir de prétentions.'95 The testimony of Robert 
Suarès, whose job in Egypt in an electrical and plastics company required him 
to speak five different languages, shows the importance of employment in 
order to resettle in a new place, even if it meant working at a lower level than 
in Egypt. Benefits were barely enough to live on, so that refugees from Egypt 
saw in employment a way to earn enough money. If this example reflects a 
certain adaptability and understanding of the difficult situation in which the 
refugees were, not all of them could do the same. In general, the older the 
refugees were, the harder it was for them to find a suitable job. Refugees from 
Egypt who were older than 45 years old had many difficulties in finding 
employment again. Even if they had engineering qualifications, French 
employers refused to hire them on the basis that they were not accustomed to 
the latest technologies and work conditions in France, or because they had 
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lived all their life outside of France. Five hundred refugees were in that 
position by the end of 1959.96  
 
Many Egyptians experienced problems of employment. Despite jobs left vacant 
by Algerian workers because of the Algerian war, the refugees from Egypt 
were not employable in these sectors due to their bourgeois background.97 A 
sample of unemployed refugees from Egypt in Marseille in November 1957 
shows in which sectors it was hard to find a job: technicians, shop clerks, trade 
employees, bank clerks, and executives.98 The sectors in which those refugees 
were looking for employment were not matching the job opportunities in 
France at that period, leaving the refugees in the above categories in long-term 
unemployment. Because of their age and their previous social class and 
employment background, refugees from Egypt were harder to resettle than 
Hungarian refugees.99  
 
Long-term unemployment had practical effects on the duration of support to 
refugees. While the last Hungarian refugee camp was closed down in March 
1960, which put an end to support as their resettlement was considered 
achieved, some refugees from Egypt were still being looked after by the 
Cojasor until the mid-1960s.100 Because of the unemployment situation of 
some of the refugees from Egypt, the Service d'Accueil aux Français Expulsés 
d'Egypte, under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still existed after 
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1961. Similarly, the SSAE was still in charge of refugees from Egypt who 
could not be placed into employment, especially those who were more than 40 
years old.101 The Fonds Commun, which financed the resettlement of refugees 
from Egypt, held regular meetings from its creation in 1957 to 1963 when the 
bulk of the refugees were put into permanent accommodation. It was finally 
wound up in 1965 and only three families benefited from the scheme after 30 
September that year.102 It thus took four years longer to officially resettle the 
refugees from Egypt than the more numerous Hungarians. 
 
The action of the Cojasor for Hungarian refugees was limited due to their small 
number and because of the government's close supervision of their 
resettlement. As far as the refugees from Egypt were concerned, the Cojasor 
played a central role in the resettlement of the refugees. It was reported in 
1966, that 4,300 families, representing 11,000 persons, used the organisation's 
services either for help to resettle in France or to re-emigrate.103 For the 
Cojasor, one of the main conditions needed to secure the integration of 
refugees in France was permanent accommodation. Before October 1957, 750 
Jewish families from Egypt, including 550 in the Paris area, were living in 
hotels since the closing of the Japy and Jean Jaurès reception centres.104 Life in 
the Parisian hotels could only be a temporary solution, especially because of 
the cost of living there. Some of the refugees from Egypt, and notably those 
supported by the Cojasor and the Red Cross, found a permanent solution in the 
offer that was made to them to live in social housing (HLM) around Paris in 
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Villiers-Le-Bel or Sarcelles for example. Thanks to an idea from the Cojasor 
and the partnership of the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, a public 
financial organisation under Parliamentary control, the Red Cross, the 
UNHCR, and the American Joint Distribution Committee,105 the Fonds 
Commun pour l'Établissement des Réfugiés d'Égypte was created, originally to 
help 300 families.106 The support was first granted as loans,107 but these 
quickly became donations since some of the refugees found repayment too 
difficult. SSAE and Cojasor social workers would initially decide who was to 
be granted the loans.108 Because of the housing crisis, the refugees had to apply 
for a flat in buildings yet to be built.109 The Fonds Commun enabled the 
resettlement of 600 families from 1957 to the end of 1966.110 
 
 
 
-Effects of resettlement policies on refugees 
  
So far I have argued that the French government had delegated the resettlement 
process of the refugees from Egypt to the Cojasor, after unsuccessfully trying 
to limit their arrival in France. Despite being undesirable immigrants in the 
sense of the 1945 Ordinance, refugees from Egypt were accepted with little 
restriction because of the Vichy past and the Algerian War context. Moreover, 
some officials showed occasional compassion for the refugees and liberally 
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interpreted the immigration policy. On the other hand, Chapter 3 of the thesis 
has established that refugees from Hungary were under the care of the Ministry 
of the Interior with the CNARH, and were largely welcomed by the public and 
the government. Therefore, the two waves of refugees eventually benefited 
from generous offers of asylum but for different reasons. This part now 
compares how these immigration policies affected both waves of refugees, and 
argues that, despite being considered as undesirable immigrants at first, 
refugees from Egypt benefited from better structures of resettlement than the 
Hungarians in France. 
 
If the immigration policies for the refugees from Egypt and from Hungary 
ended up being similar, the identity and composition of the refugees affected 
their resettlement in different ways. Being associated on many occasions with 
Algerian immigrants by the French administration officers, the refugees from 
Egypt were not seen in a favourable light in France. While the Ministry of 
Labour believed that Algerian immigration was a useful addition to the French 
workforce, that view was not shared by the whole government.111 With the 
Algerian War, which started in 1954, there was also a growing distrust of 
Algerian workers in France from the authorities and the public.112 The refugees 
from Egypt were compared to the Algerians, as North Africans, but without the 
economic advantages they represented. Due to their bourgeois background, 
most of the refugees were not employable in the same sectors as the Algerian 
immigrants.113 Moreover, many Egyptians, forced migrants from a higher 
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social class than the Hungarian refugees, experienced problems of 
employment, as their qualifications did match labour needs.114  
 
On the other hand, there is no archival evidence of prejudice against Hungarian 
refugees because of their origins. They represented a European alternative to 
Algerian immigration in accordance with the interpretation made of the 1945 
Ordinance. Their relative young age on average was also part of the 
demographic and professional recommendations as people under 30 and 
certainly not above 40 were supposed to enhance France's productivity and 
demography.115 The Hungarian refugees were easier to place in employment 
for the vast majority. 
 
Yet, as far as resettlement in permanent accommodation was concerned, thanks 
to the action of the Fonds Commun for resettlement grants and providing 
accommodation in the suburbs of Paris, many of the refugees from Egypt were 
accommodated together and benefited from the experience of the Cojasor in 
dealing with refugees. The fact that they were considered hard to be employed, 
and because they were family groups, led the government to a more flexible 
approach towards the refugees from Egypt. Whereas Paris was initially 
considered to be avoided as a resettlement place for both waves of refugees, 
many refugees from Egypt were accommodated in its suburbs. 
 
In contrast, the fact that the Hungarian refugees were considered as a labour 
immigration by the government, led to occasional misunderstandings. The 
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resettlement plan for the Hungarian obeyed to a logic of quick resettlement 
through employment in sectors which lacked workforce. Despite the help of the 
SSAE, there was little moral support for the Hungarian refugees the way the 
refugees from Egypt received thanks to the Cojasor. It was thought that once 
employed, France would look as having completed its humanitarian role 
towards Cold War refugees while satisfying to its economic needs. That 
explains why the camp of the Cinq Tranchées, near Nancy, represented a 
moral, political and economic problem for the French government. All of the 
French government plan for resettling Hungarians was based on their 
employability in specific sectors, and unemployed refugees were left out. 
 
The resettlement policy of Hungarian refugees was ill-adapted to refugees who 
were not single young men, in contrast with the resettlement policy of the 
refugees from Egypt, which included everyone. This problem is reflected in the 
handling of unaccompanied children among the Hungarian refugees. 
Unaccompanied children, aged between 15 and 18 for the most part, 
represented a total of 13 per cent of Hungarian refugees in France. Many were 
members of the same class or factory and spontaneously decided to leave 
Hungary attracted by life in Western Europe.116 The children were separated 
from their families who were left in Hungary or who had emigrated elsewhere, 
but were not given separate accommodation and had to share with adults in 
camps. An agreement was signed by the UNHCR and the SSAE to tackle this 
issue. The SSAE set up a team of four social workers working full time on the 
issue of unaccompanied Hungarian refugee children. The case of these children 
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was particularly problematic for the SSAE as most children were unsettled: 
they would change job very often, and were left wandering alone in France, to 
often ending up looking for work in Paris. In February 1958, the SSAE had 
dealt in total with 1,151 children including 562 cases still active. The closed 
cases were mostly composed of children who became legally adults (311), 
whereas some chose to re-emigrate (192), when only a handful were repatriated 
to Hungary (67).117 The case of the unaccompanied children shows the limits 
of the French government's resettlement policy for Hungarian refugees. This 
category of refugees, although posing a specific problem of resettlement, was 
not matching the type of Hungarian refugees immediately employable wanted 
by the government. As they were not desirable immigrants in the sense of the 
1945 Ordinance, the French government delegated their support to the SSAE, 
which indicates a lack of interest for their situation. 
 
Therefore, despite benefiting from similar immigration policies but for 
different reasons, considering Hungarian refugees as political and economic 
assets and refugees from Egypt as liabilities led the government to treat the 
refugees differently. It eventually led the refugees from Egypt to be better 
taken care of, mostly thanks to the Cojasor and the Fonds Commun, than the 
Hungarians. Yet, despite a policy which favoured resettlement in large groups 
around Paris, the refugees from Egypt felt challenged in their French identity. 
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-Limitations of French identity 
 
The Fonds Commun represented a completely different approach to the initial 
plan to resettle the Jewish refugees from Egypt in cities with a large Jewish 
community. The main places of resettlement presented in table 6.3 changed 
following the application of the plan, and the new places were situated around 
Paris and included Villiers-le-Bel, Gennevilliers, Garges-lès-Gonnesses, and 
Sarcelles. These places were part of the French government's mass housing 
policy where HLMs were built at great speed and efficiency in the suburbs of 
Paris to tackle the housing crisis.118  
 
In Gennevilliers, for example, 125 of 129 flats divided into eight blocks had 
been granted to Jewish families from Egypt.119 In this environment, a part of 
the Jewish community from Egypt managed to re-form itself, where a life as 
similar as possible to the one in Egypt was recreated, and where provisional 
synagogues were made in flats. As a consequence, having quite a large number 
of Jews from Egypt in the same place slowed down the integration of many of 
them into French society, and led to misunderstandings between two different 
French cultures.120 People from France and the French from Egypt had 
different traditions and habits. One refugee from Egypt living in Villiers-Le-
Bel, Youda Lévy, was quoted in 1960 as saying: 
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Certainement les choses ne se passent pas comme chez nous… Nous 
sommes différents, c'est une réalité qu'on ne peut pas ignorer. Elle se 
traduit partout, dans les gestes, les petites activités quotidiennes… Ici, 
personne n'a le temps d'écouter les confidences, d'attendre que l'on 
choisisse son pain. Cela est très bizarre pour nous qui avons été 
accoutumés à ne pas compter avec le temps. C'est un autre monde, et il 
faut les comprendre comme nous voulons nous faire comprendre par 
"eux".121   
 
Despite the French culture of most of the Jews from Egypt, acquired through 
education, language, films, books or magazines, the refugees realised that 
many cultural differences separated them from the metropolitan French. This 
problem was not only to be found in Villiers-Le-Bel as those who lived 
somewhere else, or left the recreated community realised how much 
metropolitan French habits could be different from the habits of those 
Egyptians of French culture. Refugees in Villiers-Le-Bel quickly recreated the 
traditions of the Jewish community in Egypt: 
 
Les réunions autour d'un café. Les longues conversations du soir. Les 
"viens dîner chez moi/je viens dîner chez toi" qui n'existaient pas en 
France. Quand, après quitté Villiers-Le-Bel et que nous avons été 
confronté à la France profonde et que vous restez dans un immeuble 
comme ça… On peut rester cinq ans en disant bonjour/bonsoir dans 
l'ascenseur… Les Français ne vous accueillent pas dans leur appartement. 
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Les Égyptiens c'est tout de suite: Viens! Ça manquait énormément de 
chaleur humaine. C'est le jour et la nuit.122  
 
Life in Villiers-Le-Bel, and in other places with a large concentration of Jewish 
refugees from Egypt, allowed a transition phase for the refugees who lived in a 
very different environment compared to the one where they used to live in 
Egypt, in which they had to learn to live with less means. As familiar as they 
could have been with French culture, the refugees described the metropolitan 
French as strangers with whom they had little in common except for the 
language. The education they received in French schools in Egypt, and the fact 
that they could speak French did not prepare them to live in 1950s France. 
Contacts with the French population were not always easy, as André Cohen 
remembers: 'Cela n'a pas été difficile de vivre en France. Les Français ont été 
accueillants… oui et non! Je ne me suis pas fait de vrais amis à part les 
contacts de travail. Je fréquentais des collègues mais ça n'allait pas plus loin 
que les déjeuners ensemble.'123 Despite thinking of themselves as French or as 
of French culture, resettling in France demanded adaptation for the refugees. It 
is obvious that a gap existed between the Francophone Jews from Egypt and 
the French from France and, in the interviews, narratives of 'them' against 'us' 
were often used to emphasise this difference, especially in the case of the Jews 
who were not French nationals. 
 
Je suis en même temps détaché et imbriqué dans la vie française… Le 
contact avec les Français n'est pas le même qu'avec mes amis égyptiens. 
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À Alexandrie c'était une vie… pas communautaire… mais on allait 
sonner chez quelqu'un, il était là, on montait puis on discutait, puis on 
allait au cinéma ensemble. A Paris ça ne se faisait pas. Cela ne se faisait 
pas d'aller sonner chez un voisin et de lui dire qu'est-ce que tu fais ce 
soir? Les rapports en Egypte étaient plus chaleureux, évidemment!124 
 
Lucien Perez, who was stateless, has his own explanation regarding the 
problems the French from Egypt had when they arrived in France, as they were 
born and had lived all their life in Egypt: 
 
Les Français d'Egypte ils ne connaissaient rien de la France, ils étaient 
français mais ils ne connaissaient rien de la France. C'est comme un 
Algérien qui est né ici mais il ne connaît rien de l'Algérie. Nous c'était un 
peu comme ça. Moi ce qui me rattachait à la France c'est que je parlais 
français, c'est tout. Mais je ne savais rien de la France. Je ne savais même 
pas le parlé français de la rue, du marché, c'était tout à fait différent. Ce 
qu'on avait appris c'était le bon français. C'était la Tour Eiffel, la France. 
La France, le pays des cultures, c'est ça qu'on avait appris. Et c'est ça que 
je recherchais en venant en France et c'était tout à fait différent.125 
 
The main problem of the refugees from Egypt in France is very well presented 
here as many thought that speaking the language and having a French 
education was enough to be easily integrated. However, the reality was 
different as many of the refugees from Egypt had an accent when they spoke 
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French, and they were easily recognised as non-metropolitan French: 'Moi, je 
me suis senti comme un réfugié. Souvent on me demandait: "votre accent il est 
d'où ?" Moi, j'étais gêné de dire que j'étais d'Egypte… parce que c'était un peu 
mal vu, on était presque arabe après [laughs]! Avec l'afflux des Arabes, venir 
d'Egypte, on est arabe!'126 Some, who felt French in Egypt discovered that 
there was a cultural gap between the French from Egypt and the French from 
France. Lucien Perez mentioned 'les Arabes': since 1956 more and more 
Algerians were coming to France, and France was getting deeper into the 
Algerian War.127 The fact that the Algerian War also happened in metropolitan 
France, through terrorist attacks, ensured that the perception of the Algerians in 
France from 1954 onwards deteriorated, with them being described as 
'terrorists' and 'fellagha' in public discourses.128 According to Gérard Noiriel, 
the Algerians became the 'enemy within', victims of a new racism stigmatising 
the Algerians as foreigners and colonised, and which was emphasised by their 
working-class status. The refugees from Egypt also experienced to an extent 
this type of racism in their first years in France, as the public institutions 
dealing with immigrants associated them with the Algerians. 
 
On the other hand, other refugees managed to integrate well in the French 
society. Albert Setton, who was a French national born in Egypt, never felt like 
a refugee and felt French as he was entitled to the same rights and had the same 
obligations as any other French citizen: 'Je ne suis pas senti du tout réfugié. 
J'étais considéré comme français. Dès que je suis arrivé, j'ai été au centre 
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d'inscription des militaires, j'ai passé mon conseil de révision.'129 Similarly, 
Régine Zayan, who had a French passport as well, did not simply look for 
integration but for assimilation, a feature common to people of her age at the 
time according to her: 
 
Comme beaucoup de personnes de mon âge, nous ne voulions pas 
seulement nous intégrer mais nous voulions presque nous assimiler. Un 
grand nombre de mes connaissances étaient de la communauté juive 
égyptienne. Mais j'ai eu des collègues, donc déjà je commençais à avoir 
d'autres relations hors de la communauté… Je ne cachais ni du fait que 
j'étais d'Egypte ni du fait que j'étais juive, mais je mettais en évidence le 
fait que j'étais française.130 
 
Without denying her past, Régine Zayan deliberately chose to emphasise her 
French identity when with others. It was a way, if not hide, to minimise the 
differences between the French from Egypt and the French from France, and to 
avoid being considered in a different way. 
 
However, not all the French from Egypt felt the same way. In the case of 
Robert Suarès, who had a French passport, he had a hard time realising that he 
would not be able to live in Egypt anymore: 
 
Ah ça,  j'ai toujours eu une certaine nostalgie de l'Egypte! On n'a pas 
retrouvé, à aucun moment, l'atmosphère égyptienne, les plaisirs 
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égyptiens. Ça a été un chambardement. Ça a été vraiment un choc, on 
peut parler d'un choc culturel énorme! Colossal! Même à Villiers-Le-Bel! 
C'est un choc. Il a fallu vraiment dire: "ou je m'adapte ou je crève!" Il ne 
fallait plus rechercher à retrouver. Il fallait s'adapter. Ça m'a fait me sentir 
comme un réfugié, un déraciné. Pendant de nombreuses années… 
pendant de nombreuses années.131 
 
Even if Robert Suarès was French, he still felt like an Egyptian in the sense that 
he had previously lived all his life there. Born in 1934, he was already a young 
man when he had to leave for France. Having lived all his youth in Egypt, he 
felt like a refugee in France despite his French nationality. Robert Suarès' 
reflections on being a French refugee in France bridge the gap between the 
younger and older generations of refugees from Egypt, for whom it was harder 
to adapt to life in France.   
 
The Jews of Egypt believed they had a special relationship with France as 
many went to a French school in Egypt and understood the importance of the 
French language in the community. Renée Hakoun, one of the refugees 
interviewed, made clear that she felt French because of her French nationality 
and considered herself a 'rapatriée' rather than a refugee. During her time in 
Egypt, she considered she had the same habits as the French in France, as she 
went to see French films at the cinema for example. She nevertheless 
acknowledged that she spoke Arabic, and had many interactions with 
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Armenians, Greeks, English and Arabs.132 Once in France, she did not feel the 
cultural distance that some of the other refugees from Egypt felt, French and 
non-French alike, despite their French education and language. On the other 
hand, Régine Zayan's experience was completely different, as she felt that her 
status as French citizen was questioned by civil servants who considered her as 
a foreigner because she was born in Egypt despite her French nationality: 
 
Au commissariat, ils nous considéraient comme venants d'Egypte peut-
être comme des Arabes. Il faut dire que l'Arabe n'était pas très bien perçu 
et il faut dire que nous étions très mal perçus au commissariat, 
vraiment!... On nous demandait la preuve de notre nationalité française. Il 
fallait donc fournir des certificats de nationalité française. Pour fournir ce 
certificat il fallait un extrait de naissance. Nous n'étions pas nés en 
France, il fallait donc trouver un extrait de naissance. Or à l'époque, 
c'était la Suisse qui s'occupait des ressortissants français… Pour prouver 
qu'on était français ce n'était pas évident. Né a l'étranger ça voulait dire 
qu'on était étranger! J'ai très très mal ressenti ça.133  
 
At a time of a growing immigration of Algerian workers, the administration 
made little difference between Algerian labour immigrants and refugees from 
Egypt. Régine Zayan realised that being mistaken for Arabs by the 
administration was discriminatory for them. French Jews from Egypt had to 
prove that they were French. 
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The situation with the administration was even worse for stateless refugees. 
The non-French refugees from Egypt were subject to the normal rules for 
refugees and foreigners, that is to say registration with the OFPRA was 
compulsory in order to have a refugee card, and frequent registration at the 
préfecture de Police was also compulsory to have the residence permit along 
with a work permit.134 To obtain or to renew the carte de séjour was a real 
challenge for the stateless refugees. Emile Gabbay, who had been strippped of 
his Egyptian nationality, was in shock when he first discovered the ignorance 
of a patronising civil servant at the Police prefecture: 
 
Il y a un gars qui m'a reçu avec le passeport annulé, les papiers de 
l'OFPRA. Il regarde et commence à me parler en petit nègre: "oui, tu 
cherches bon petit français qui te remplit un document, qui te fait une 
lettre." Donc pendant qu'il parlait, moi j'écrivais sur un papier comme ça, 
il me dit: "oh, vous savez écrire!" Je croyais rêver!135 
 
The prefecture officers knew nothing about the refugees from Egypt, who they 
were and their background. A similar experience happened to David Yohana, 
who queuing among Algerians, was mistaken for an immigrant worker: 
 
Il fallait renouveler les papiers à la préfecture de Police, et là, je vous 
avoue, c'était des moments difficiles… Je me trouvais dans des queues 
avec des gens… des Algériens… Une fois on m'a demandé tout de suite: 
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"Vous parlez français?! Vous savez écrire?!" J'ai dit: "Oui je sais écrire. 
Oui je parle…", "Ah! Alors remplissez moi ce papier!"136 
 
Those two examples show the contempt and ignorance with which the refugees 
from Egypt were treated at first, but they also reveal how the French 
administration interacted with the Algerian immigrant workers. In these 
situations the French education that many of the refugees received was of little 
use, as civil servants considered them as foreigners. In the context of a large 
scale immigration of workers from Algeria, the French administration showed 
neither patience nor compassion for the refugees from Egypt who were 
assumed to be uneducated Algerians:137 
 
Une autre fois j'y ai été pour renouveler mes papiers. Je faisais la queue 
avec des Algériens et puis tout à coup, après avoir fait la queue, on nous 
fait attendre pendant des heures, j'entends: "Yohana! Yohana! 
YOHANA! YOHANA! Où tu étais!?" Je lui dis: "j'étais en face, le temps 
de venir." "Qu'est-ce tu fais?!" "Voici, je voudrais renouveler." "Ah, vous 
êtes étudiant." Déjà le "tu" avait changé en "vous". "Attendez on va 
regarder."138 
 
In the case of David Yohana, the fact that he was not an immigrant worker 
improved the reception he had at the prefecture. His student status and the fact 
that he spoke French fluently helped considerably: 
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Il y avait un regard particulier. Parce que j'étais pas un travailleur émigré, 
j'étais un étudiant. C'était les différences que j'ai vu surtout par rapport 
aux dames qui étaient à la préfecture. Et puis quand elles me posaient des 
questions je leur répondais tout de suite. Plusieurs fois elles m'ont dit: 
"Est-ce que vous comprenez?" "Oui bien sûr, je comprends, laissez moi le 
temps de réfléchir…" Ils étaient tellement agressifs quand les gens 
venaient et ne comprenaient pas comment remplir le papier… Le fait de 
connaître le français, de connaître la langue, d'être instruit a fait 
beaucoup. On a beaucoup avancé. Et ils nous ont automatiquement un 
peu mieux considéré.139 
 
The prefecture was not the only place where the non-French refugees from 
Egypt were treated badly by the administration. The same kind of experiences 
happened when trying to obtain a work permit at the Services de la Main 
d'Œuvre Etrangère. The refugees from Egypt were treated with discriminated 
against, having to queue for hours in very humiliating circumstances to have 
their work permit renewed: 
 
En fait, faire une carte de travail en France c'était très difficile: pour avoir 
une carte de travail, il fallait une carte de séjour, pour avoir une carte de 
séjour, il fallait une carte de travail… Ça se mordait la queue, et 
beaucoup de gens finalement, fatigués, épuisés, quand ils le pouvaient, 
retournaient dans leur pays d'origine ou partaient ailleurs. C'était pour 
démoraliser. Dans la rue de Vaugirard, tout au bout, à côté de la Porte de 
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Versailles, il y avait le bureau pour faire les cartes de travail. On arrivait 
le matin très tôt pour faire la queue. En fin d'après-midi on avait le droit à 
un petit ticket rouge avec un numéro qui était prioritaire pour le 
lendemain. Donc on avait passé toute la journée debout. Il y a un policier 
qui disait: si quelqu'un veut pisser c'est là-bas, mais si il sort du rang il 
recommence. Donc on ne pouvait pas pisser… Ça a duré comme ça de 
'60 à '64.140 
 
If the relations with the French from France already made the refugees from 
Egypt feel that cultural differences existed between them, the treatment they all 
received from the French administration in general confronted them with the 
limitations of their French culture. Before being considered as French or 
Francophone, they had to produce proof of their French nationality or culture. 
 
For the stateless refugees, it had another effect. Many felt that their treatment, 
by associating them with the Algerian immigration, had sometimes been 
inadequate and different from what they expected. Some of the refugees clearly 
came to believe that they had been granted French citizenship because it was in 
France's interest, rather than it had been primarily motivated to support the 
refugees' situation. Emile Gabbay, who had lost his Egyptian nationality and 
become stateless, felt that his naturalisation was granted because the French 
government needed his skills to work on the nuclear programme.141 
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The context of the Algerian War meant that many refugees delayed formalising 
their situation in France because they did not want to take part of it, either 
because they did not approve of the war, or because they felt it would be more 
useful to stay in France and provide for their families. Isaac Saporta waited 
because leaving for military service would have left his family in a precarious 
condition so he decided to wait until he was too old to serve in the military: 
 
Autrefois le service militaire était de deux ans et demi. Et moi je suis 
resté apatride jusqu'à l'âge de 29 ans, car à partir de 29 ans, si je me 
faisais naturaliser français, je ne faisais pas le service militaire. Parce que 
là, j'étais obligé de travailler pour aider mes parents! Pour aider la 
famille! Il fallait payer pour la famille! Il fallait travailler… Je ne pouvais 
pas partir pour le service militaire pendant deux ans et demi, mes parents 
crèveraient de faim.142 
 
For many refugees, it was more important to provide for their family than to 
fight in the Algerian War. Despite Isaac Saporta's aspirations and pride to 
become French, he preferred to wait to be able to financially support his 
family. The war with Algeria was one of the main reasons that he had 
postponed his application for naturalisation. David Yohana, just like Isaac 
Saporta, waited a few years more before applying for French citizenship:  
 
J'ai fait une demande de naturalisation en 1962. J'avais pas envie de faire 
la Guerre d'Algérie mais j'ai fait une demande après l'indépendance de 
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l'Algérie. J'ai fait une demande de naturalisation et deux ans après j'ai 
obtenu la naturalisation en '64 ou '65. J'étais totalement intégré. J'ai pu 
changer d'employeur, j'étais plus dans le quota étranger. J'étais reconnu, 
l'intégration malgré mon nom, mon accent. Mais j'étais beaucoup plus 
intégré.143 
 
Others felt that it was their duty to serve France during the Algerian War to 
show their gratitude for the help they received. Harry Guened, for example, 
tried to enrol in the military to fight in Algeria. However, his application was 
rejected as he did not have French nationality at the time.144 There was thus not 
one single approach to integration for the refugees from Egypt. Naturalisation 
was a step forward integration for many of the stateless refugees. It gave them 
a passport, a new national identity, which had been missing since their 
expulsion from Egypt. It allowed them to be finally considered as French and 
not French-speaking foreigners. 
 
Another case is that of the French refugees from Egypt who settled in Britain. 
Raymond Levy, a refugee from Egypt with a French passport studying in 
Britain in October 1956, decided to change nationality in order to stay in 
Britain and to avoid military service during the Algerian War, as he did not 
consider living in France. Despite changing nationality, he still feels French 
today: 
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I felt more French than anything else. I have spent now more than 50 
years in England. I still don't feel British. I changed my nationality, 
because when I finished my medical degree, I got called up for national 
service or service militaire during the Algerian War. I said no, thank you 
very much!... So I switched nationality. At that time I had been there 
longer than 5 years, I married a British woman, I had children. It didn't 
take me long to get British nationality, but it was very difficult to give up 
my French nationality, because the French said: "ok, you're English now, 
but the minute you set foot in France, we'll get you because you're a 
deserter." So for a while… I couldn't go to see my parents in Paris.145 
 
The complexity of the identity of the Jews from Egypt is to be found here 
again, as while he gave up his French nationality to avoid military service and 
the Algerian War, Raymond Levy still feels French despite having been British 
for about fifty years, and is still able to speak French as well as English. 
 
 
 
-Conclusion 
 
The Suez crisis marked the beginning of the end for the Jewish community in 
Egypt, as by the end of 1958 only 10,000 remained there, and many among 
these were trying to leave the country.146 From the very beginning of the 
expulsions from Egypt, the French government tried to limit the number of 
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refugees from Egypt seeking refuge in France. They did not represent 
economic or demographic assets, and could not be used for propaganda. The 
reception of the refugees from Egypt in France was thus very different from the 
reception of the Hungarian refugees. 
 
The fact that the French Jews from Egypt were referred to as 'Français de Code 
Civil' shows that they were believed to be another category of French nationals. 
Their unofficial status referred to the purely administrative aspect of their 
French nationality. For the stateless Jews, the difference with the French was 
even more obvious. The French policy, especially regarding the stateless and 
denaturalised Jews, oscillated between obligation and genuine intention to 
support the Jews of Egypt. After a desperate attempt to resort to international 
law to prevent the Jews from Egypt from being expelled, the French 
government preferred to discreetly grant asylum to most of them to avoid 
raising questions on its North African policy on the international scene, and 
because of its collaborationist past.  
 
This treatment was in conformity with immigration policies and practices at the 
time. Because of the increase of Algerian immigration and the Algerian War, 
refugees from Egypt were seen as North Africans. Moreover, most were in 
large family units from middle-class backgrounds, which did not match 
economic and demographic criteria for immigration and resettlement in France. 
 
This chapter has also shown that the French culture or nationality of the 
refugees from Egypt only played a minor role in being accepted for asylum in 
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France. Despite their French nationality and culture, the French government 
first reaction was to try to prevent the expulsions from Egypt and then try to 
grant asylum only to French nationals and refugees with French relatives. On 
the other hand, the Hungarians, because of the French immigration policy, but 
also because of the Cold War context, were accepted without limit for 
permanent resettlement.  
 
Undesirable according to the 1945 Ordinance, the French government preferred 
to delegate their resettlement to the Cojasor. By making the Cojasor one of the 
main actors to support the refugees from Egypt, and by resettling French Jews 
with stateless Jews in places like Villiers-Le-Bel, the government turned their 
reception into a Jewish problem, and the experiences of the Jews with French 
nationality and stateless Jews became similar at this point. Following the 
problems to resettle the refugees in the places with a large Jewish community, 
the Fonds Commun, gave up the idea of resettling the refugees in spaces shared 
with French Jews, and resettled them in places with virtually no existing 
Jewish communities. It was a striking contrast with the Hungarian refugees' 
resettlement as it was oriented towards employment with the creation of the 
CNARH. The handling of the resettlement of the refugees from Egypt shows 
the opposite. The French government did not believe in the possibility of using 
this group of refugees to the country's economic and demographic profit. The 
different policies and considerations regarding refugees from Egypt and from 
Hungary framed their treatment, and the refugees from Egypt benefited from a 
more compassionate support than the Hungarians did. 
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Their resettlement in Villiers-Le-Bel and other suburbs around Paris, where the 
Jewish traditions from Egypt could be recreated, slowed down their integration 
in the French society as many of them, especially among the older generation, 
preferred to stay together as a group. This group resettlement nevertheless 
enabled them to face together the difficulties of their refugee and repatriate 
experience, and those who did not benefit from the scheme as they refused any 
kind of help might have regretted it looking back later.147 
 
Once in France, the refugees' French culture and identity were put to the test. 
There were several categories of refugees. The first was those who felt treated 
like labour immigrants, and faced ignorance of their background when 
renewing official papers. The second category was the French nationals who 
felt they were treated like second-class citizens or foreigners because they 
came from an Arab country. Finally, a minority of French nationals among the 
interviewees felt that they were accepted as French in France, and did not feel 
any different from other French nationals. 
 
Despite being considered as liabilities, the French economy eventually 
benefited from the refugees from Egypt, from those who took up manual work 
despite better qualifications to those who started shops and businesses.148 Many 
of the younger refugees continued their studies to become successful in their 
field.149 In one exceptional case, a stateless refugee even helped to develop the 
French nuclear weapons programme in 1964-1965, having access to restricted 
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areas despite having no nationality at the beginning.150 His knowledge of 
radiography and being the owner of several patents convinced the authorities to 
grant him French nationality. Despite a slow resettlement, France thus 
benefited from the arrival of the refugees from Egypt in many sectors. The 
refugees from Egypt were able to put into good use their level of education in 
the long term, while others were downgraded to more menial jobs in order to 
provide for the rest of the family.151 
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7. Anglo-Egyptian refugees in Britain 
 
The French and stateless Jews from Egypt were not the only ones affected by 
the expulsions by the Nasser government: 6,000 refugees from Egypt came to 
Britain in late 1956, of whom a total of 4,000 were accommodated by the 
government in hostels across the country.1 Like the French nationals from 
Egypt, the Anglo-Egyptians had lived all their lives in Egypt, and while some 
spoke English and went to English schools, many were of French culture. 
 
Reactions to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the military intervention 
that followed differed in comparison with France. Anthony Eden did not have 
the full support of the government and public opinion was left divided on the 
question of the military intervention. There was little public support for the 
refugees from Egypt as they were considered the responsibility of the 
government. 
 
Like the French government, the British government had anticipated the 
immigration of its nationals at the time of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal 
by Nasser in the summer of 1956, and surveyed possible places of 
accommodation without drafting any definitive policy. When the expulsions 
began the British government tried to limit the number of refugees by only 
accepting British subjects and stateless Jews with close relatives in Britain for 
asylum. 
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The refugees from Egypt were considered to be liabilities by the British 
government for two reasons. First because this group of refugees was 
associated with postcolonial immigration, at a time when immigration from the 
West Indies, India and Pakistan was on the increase. The question of restricting 
postcolonial migration had been surveyed by the Cabinet since the arrival of 
the Empire Windrush in 1948, and was much discussed in the press.2  
 
Moreover, the British government had a tradition of limiting Jewish 
immigration to Britain, from the Aliens Act of 1905 to the Jewish refugees 
from Nazi Germany, and the treatment of Displaced Persons. In 1956, the 
refugees from Egypt were seen as another wave of Jewish refugees. The Home 
Office tried to limit the number of refugees from Egypt coming to Britain as 
much as it could, while questioning the nationality of those who had a British 
passport. Refugees from Egypt were associated with undesirable immigration. 
This group, composed of Jewish large families from a predominantly middle-
class background, did not match the country's economic needs. 
 
However, the government was criticised in parliament for not doing enough. 
The unpopularity of the Suez crisis motivated the Government to give the 
impression that refugees from Egypt were treated as British nationals, and at 
least as well as the Hungarian refugees in Britain at the time. The Home Office 
created the Anglo-Egyptian Resettlement Board to manage the hostels and 
resettle the refugees from Egypt in the most efficient way possible, Jews and 
non-Jews alike. Yet, these efforts were limited by views within the British 
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administration according to which the refugees from Egypt were colonial 
immigrants rather than British citizens, and by the desire to let in to Britain as 
few Egyptian refugees as possible. This chapter analyses the impact of the 
Anglo-Egyptian Resettlement Board (AERB) on the reception of the refugees, 
and how it was an attempt to have better control of the resettlement process. 
The chapter also studies how the government was divided on the question of 
the reception of refugees, and how they lacked support compared to the 
treatment of Hungarian refugees. 
 
The consequences of this policy regarding the refugees from Egypt can be 
analysed by studying the treatment of the refugees in some of the hostels. Two 
hostels, Crowborough and Oxton, were remarkable for being experimental, and 
were tests intended to enhance the resettlement process. The main concerns of 
the Anglo-Egyptians that manifested themselves in the hostel are also 
addressed. The cases of the Eastwood and Summerfield hostels show how 
refugees, when they felt that their treatment was inadequate, managed to get 
attention from the British government to solve their problems. These cases also 
reveal how this question of how they were treated was linked to identity. As 
Chapter 4 of the thesis introduced the reception of Hungarian refugees in 
Britain, this chapter analyses the similarities and differences of treatment of 
both waves of refugees in Britain. 
 
Attention is given to the work of Anglo-Jewry regarding the relief of the 
Jewish refugees from Egypt. As the British government did not consider the 
refugees from Egypt to be a Jewish issue, the responses of the British Jewish 
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community will be studied. Finally, the chapter discusses how the refugees 
managed to leave the hostels, and discusses whether the British policy of 
resettlement was adapted to the situation. 
 
 
 
-Responses to the Suez crisis  
 
Before the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, rising nationalism in Egypt 
associated itself with the situation in Palestine, under British mandate. As a 
result anti-British sentiment became more and more widespread, and was 
directed at both Britain and its supporters in Egypt.3 During his speech in 
which he announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956, 
Nasser also made verbal attacks on Britain, as being responsible for the 
creation of Israel: 
 
Who allowed Israel to rise in this region? Who administered the mandate 
in Palestine? It was Britain. Who was it that proclaimed the Balfour 
Declaration in 1917? It was Britain. Who was it that caused the tragedy 
of the people of Palestine by making it possible for Zionists to arm 
themselves and by preventing the Arabs to arm themselves? It was 
Britain!4 
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The nationalisation of the Suez Canal happened at a time when Britain was 
considered to be an enemy of Egypt and an invader, and as the main body 
responsible for the creation of the State of Israel. According to Nasser, the 
presence of Israel in the region prevented Arab nationalism from developing, 
and he considered the country to be a 'vanguard of imperialism'.5  
 
Anthony Eden considered that Nasser's seizure was illegal and a breach of the 
Convention of 1888, guaranteeing free use of the canal at all times. Nasser, in 
nationalising the canal, had 'destroyed all assurance that the rights guaranteed 
by the Convention to users of the canal would continue to be enjoyed'.6 Eden 
then recommended that the canal be placed in international custody. Eden’s 
moves were also an excuse to try to overthrow Nasser. Eden considered Nasser 
to be an enemy of British policy in Middle East and possibly to be serving 
communist interest.7 Ideas about Nasser were confused, as R.A. Butler stated. 
Although Butler saw in Nasser a 'proud nationalist', who had no love for 
communism, Eden considered that the arms deal signed in1955 with 
Czechoslovakia turned Egypt into a hostile country, and saw in it the influence 
of communism in Egypt.8  
 
In order to isolate Nasser, Eden wanted to create an adverse world opinion 
against him. With the prospect of military intervention, he felt that, in that way, 
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it would have less negative repercussions.9 Thus, Eden compared Nasser with 
Hitler on several occasions and considered, in the light of the events preceding 
the Second World War, that military intervention in Egypt, and the 
overthrowing of the Egyptian leader, referred to as a dictator, could avoid a 
major disaster.10 The comparison was repeated in the press, and after the 
conflict, The Times, as well as other British newspapers, sometimes branded 
Nasser as the 'Egyptian Hitler' either because of the internments of British 
nationals or because of his foreign policy.11  
 
Yet, once the bombing of Suez started, the situation changed for the 
government, and the legitimacy of the intervention was questioned. Unlike the 
French government, which benefited from large public and parliamentary 
support during the intervention in Egypt, the British government and public 
opinion were divided over the question. During the preparation of the military 
intervention, two junior ministers had resigned.12 Labour leader, Hugh 
Gaitskell, who, in August, had been supportive of Eden's policy towards Egypt 
and Nasser, and had compared him to Hitler too, called for his resignation, 
though some Tories accused Gaitskell and the Labour Party of a political volte-
face as soon as the military intervention started.13 
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As far as the press was concerned, it was divided between support and criticism 
of the government. The reasons given by the government for the military 
intervention in Egypt confused the public, which had trouble finding coherence 
in Eden's policy: from the protection of British interests in Egypt, to 
peacekeepers, or to keep the Suez Canal open. If during the summer of 1956, 
the press, when not supportive of a military response to the nationalisation of 
the canal, at least understood the reasons for action, the lack of consistency in 
Britain's policy towards Egypt provoked mixed reactions. The Conservative 
press supported the government while questioning its motives. The opposition 
newspapers were much more critical of the military intervention.14  
 
The Communist press called on Eden to stop the war and focused on the 
demonstrations against the Suez campaign.15 The Daily Worker reported a first 
demonstration of 1,000 people against Eden, which led to skirmishes with the 
police.16 Three days later, the Daily Worker claimed that '40,000 took up the 
roar: Eden must go!'17 The Communist line was thus to ask for Eden's 
resignation and present the British military intervention as a colonialist move. 
 
As a consequence, the context was delicate for the British government, as its 
policy was questioned from many sides of the press and in parliament. The 
expulsion of the British subjects from Egypt came as an additional problem to 
solve for the government, as an unwanted group of immigrants, and as 
reminders of the failed attempt to seize the Suez Canal. 
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-The expulsion of Anglo-Egyptians 
 
Just like the French government, the British government closely followed 
political changes in Egypt. When the country became a republic in 1953 after 
the Free Officers coup, the Foreign Office proposed a plan to evacuate 
'between 7,000 and 8,000 British residents of Maltese origin'.18 A working 
party was created at the initiative of the Foreign Secretary to assess the 
situation in Egypt and the need to evacuate the British residents to Britain. 
However, what transpires from the archives is that no department within the 
British government was willing to be in charge of organising the evacuation of 
the British residents in the event of crisis.19 Moreover, figures on the number of 
people willing to evacuate to Britain varied from 600 to 13,000 and reflected 
the lack of knowledge of the situation. In addition, the Home Secretary 
objected to the British residents of Maltese origin being evacuated to Britain.20 
In the end, there was no mass evacuation.  
 
However, the recommendations of 1953 actually framed the policy for the 
asylum of the refugees from Egypt in 1956, as it never had been the intention 
of the Home Office to grant asylum to the Anglo-Egyptians even though they 
were British. Anticipating the evacuation as a precaution, Selwyn Lloyd 
estimated that 13,000 British subjects were in Egypt, of whom 6,000 were 
United Kingdom based.21 
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A working party had been created to determine whether evacuation from Egypt 
was needed and how and by whom it was to be conducted. It included 
representatives from Treasury, National Assistance Board (NAB), War Office, 
Home Office, Ministry of Works, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Supplies. 
The first notable point about this working party is that it did not include any 
members of the Foreign Office, the first point of contact with the British 
residents in Egypt. The working party drafted a secret report in August 1956 on 
the evacuation of the British in Egypt following the nationalisation of the 
Canal. The report stated that the NAB agreed reluctantly to be in charge of the 
evacuees as an ad hoc arrangement. The evacuation policy for September 1956 
was decided as follows: the evacuees from Egypt were to be screened in 
Cyprus and divided into two categories. The first category was those who 
would need temporary accommodation until they found employment. The 
second one included the British of Maltese origin, who were considered long-
term problems and were thought not to speak English. If the first group was to 
be sent to Britain quickly after being screened, the working party wanted the 
British of Maltese origin to stay in Cyprus for a longer time and that other 
destinations should be considered, sending them to Britain being the very last 
option and preferably avoided.22 Although this policy was not applied, mostly 
due to the fact that the British of Maltese origins left by their own means by 
plane or by boat, it shows that the British government had no intention to 
repatriate those who were not born in the United Kingdom. As they were not 
native speakers and were born in the Mediterranean region, they were 
considered to be a potential resettlement problem in Britain. 
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When the Africa department of the Foreign Office was assessing the British 
population in Egypt to prepare plans for evacuation, it made a clear distinction 
between the origins of British nationals. Three categories of British nationals 
were considered: 'Anglo-Saxons', citizens of 'old Commonwealth' countries, 
and Maltese. Of a total 6,500 individuals, 85 per cent of 'Anglo-Saxons', 30 per 
cent of Maltese, and only 15 per cent of citizens of 'old Commonwealth' 
countries were though likely to leave.23 The term 'Anglo-Saxons' was used to 
make a contrast with colonial or postcolonial subjects, in a way to privilege the 
repatriation of this category of British nationals rather than colonial ones as if 
they were not belonging in Britain.24 
 
This plan of evacuation was linked to the possibility of military intervention in 
Egypt. It included the drawing up of a list of possible accommodation in 
hostels for refugees. On this list, from September 1956, were Frobisher Hall 
and Drake Hall, both in Swynnerston, Staffordshire, Eaves Brow between 
Manchester and Liverpool, Minor's Hostel in Alfreton, Derbyshire, and Stowell 
Park near Cirencester, Gloucestershire.25 All these hostels were at some 
distance from large cities, and even remote from villages. This meant that 
refugees were quite far from areas of potential employment. This list served as 
a basis for the accommodation of refugees from Egypt after the bombing of 
Suez. 
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Unaware of this policy, the World Jewish Congress questioned the intentions 
of the British government, as it was concerned by the situation of Egyptian 
Jewry following Nasser's threats of expulsion. The reply was that Britain 
would only deal with refugees in possession of a British passport and even 
those nationals would be a problem since 'many of them had lived all their 
lives in Egypt and had nowhere to go in any other country'.26 This statement 
was of major importance as it informed the reception of Anglo-Egyptians in 
Britain, since the composition of the expellees in November 1956 was different 
from the numbers assessed during the previous summer. 
 
The Anglo-Egyptians came at a time when the government was considering 
restricting immigration from the West Indies, India and Pakistan. Since 1948, 
the year of the passing of Nationality Act permitting all citizens of the British 
Commonwealth countries to work and reside in Britain, the Cabinet had been 
trying to find a way to reduce Commonwealth immigration to Britain.27 The 
main reasons, according to the Conservative government, were that 
Commonwealth immigrants were considered to be of limited employability and 
could be the source of potential social unrest. There were also fears within the 
government, that these immigrants tended to congregate together in major 
cities, like London or Liverpool for example, and could unbalance the ethnic 
composition of Britain.28 Despite reports stating that social and employment 
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problems were still relatively minor, the Cabinet clung on to predictions of 
unmanageable problems if Commonwealth immigration was to continue.29 In 
1954, the Cabinet felt that public opinion was becoming more and more 
concerned about Commonwealth immigration and that former opponents to 
immigration control started to revise their position, even if legislation could be 
perceived as a breach of tradition of unrestricted entry into Britain for 
Commonwealth subjects.30 The Times reported accommodation problems for 
West Indians, and predicted how, in the event of mass unemployment, feelings 
against them would rise.31 To justify the need to impose strict control on this 
immigration, much was made of potential bad consequences. This included 
portraying these as taking advantage of Britain's social services, and talk of 
inter-breeding and miscegenation with long-term consequences for British 
society.32 
 
Although they were not black, nor was Egypt a British colony in 1956, the 
Anglo-Egyptians were associated with this Commonwealth immigration, and 
were considered undesirable immigrants and the British government saw them 
as a racial problem rather than an asset. Despite Britain’s claims to a liberal 
immigration policy, their North African origins led some officers to associate 
Anglo-Egyptians with 'southern races' adding another unwanted element to 
their identity as racial tensions were brewing in Britain.33 British immigration 
policy was framed by the concept of race and good race relations, rather than 
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assimilation as in France.34 It explains the fears of social unrest of the Cabinet 
if Commonwealth immigration continued to increase. The Cabinet meetings on 
colonial immigration tended to hold immigrants responsible for social tensions 
and racism. 
 
In 1956, the Cabinet Committee on Colonial Immigrants was still assessing the 
legal means at its disposal to control some migration without having to restrict 
Irish immigration.35 The main problem was not considered to be employment 
but shortages of housing, notably in London and in Birmingham. Yet, in the 
short term, the Cabinet was worried about a possible change in the employment 
situation, while in the long term it expressed concern about 'miscegenation on 
any significant scale, with its gradual effect on the national way of life', and the 
creation of 'a plural way of society'.36 Even if there was no evidence of major 
problems in 1956, the recommendation was to restrict immigration from the 
Commonwealth which was deemed to be too large in comparison with 
European immigration.37 Coming from Africa, the Anglo-Egyptians fell under 
the category of immigration that the Cabinet was looking to restrict. The 
distinction by the Africa department of the Foreign Office between 'Anglo-
Saxons' and citizens of 'old Commonwealth' countries falls within this logic.38 
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Moreover, the fact that most of the refugees were Jewish was also considered a 
problem. The British government, which did not have to conceal a 
collaborationist and antisemitic past as France did, limited entry to Jewish 
refugees in 1930s, but was nevertheless celebrated in the 1950s for what was 
perceived as a generous contribution by the Association of Jewish Refugees in 
Great Britain.39 The British government did not have to accept refugees from 
Egypt other than those with a British passport, as it was already praised by 
former Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany.  
 
The first major wave of post-war immigrants to come to Britain was made up 
of 345,000 eastern and southern Europeans through the European Voluntary 
Workers scheme between 1947 and 1949.40 David Cesarani argues that through 
the EVW, the British government knowingly recruited approximately 10,000 
Waffen-SS.41 On the other hand, Jews were discriminated against by the 
scheme as they were considered a problem due to their support for the creation 
of Israel and anti-Jewish feelings in Britain, and also because they were 
regarded as not easy to fit in.42 During the 1930s, the British government 
limited entry to Jewish refugees from Germany. One of the reasons was that 
Samuel Hoare, Home Secretary from 1937 to 1939, believed that admitting too 
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many Jews in Britain would cause an unacceptable rise in antisemitism, 
making Jews responsible for antisemitism.43  
 
In 1956, the fact that the Home Office deemed it unadvisable to link the 
expulsion of Jews from Egypt to event prior to 1951, as defined by the status of 
refugees under the 1951 Geneva Convention, was part of this discriminatory 
immigration policy against Jews inherited from the 1905 Aliens Act.44 The 
Foreign Office nonetheless considered that there was a relationship between 
the creation of the State of Israel and the persecution of the Jews of Egypt 
following the Suez military intervention in October 1956. Although the Home 
Office acknowledged that the definition of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the 
status of refugees could be easily stretched to the Jews of Egypt, it considered 
that it was politically inconvenient to do so in this case.45 The Home Office did 
not want to issue refugee passports to stateless Jews from Egypt as required by 
the Geneva Convention. Such a document would have enabled the holder to 
leave and re-enter Britain without restriction for a period of two years. Yet the 
Home Office did not want any of the stateless refugees to be able to resettle in 
Britain if they had re-emigrated somewhere else. As a justification, the Home 
Office preferred to mention the British retreat from the Canal Zone in 1951, 
Nasser's rise to power and the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, resulting from 
the refusal to finance the Aswan Dam.46 By recognising their international 
status as refugees, but by partly applying the Convention, the British 
government was able to keep a stricter control on their immigration, and 
                                                 
43
 London, Whitehall and the Jews, pp.38-9. 
44
 TNA, HO 352/158, Home Office, minutes, 21 May 1957. 
45
 TNA, HO 352/158, HO minutes, 21 May 1957. 
46
 TNA, HO 352/158, HO minutes, 16 May 1957. 
 284
managed to appear as a tolerant country since it applied the Geneva 
Convention despite not recognising their expulsion as linked to events prior to 
1951. The Home Office, by rejecting the interpretation of the Foreign Office 
that the stateless Jews fell under the mandate of the Geneva Convention, found 
a legal way to justify its restrictive policy of asylum on the international scene. 
 
Prejudice towards colonial immigration and Jewish immigration applied in the 
case of the refugees from Egypt. The Anglo-Egyptians were described, in the 
African department of the Foreign Office, by John Wilton, who later became 
ambassador to Kuwait and to Saudi Arabia, as Jewish British subjects in Egypt 
who 'cannot, of course, be prevented from coming to this country, and those, 
presumably, are Mr Montefiore's "Gypsies displaying British passports". Any 
attempt to distinguish between HM pink and HM coffee-coloured subjects is 
fraught with great political peril.'47 This comment was the bluntest expression 
of a common idea that the Jews from Egypt were different from the British 
born in the United Kingdom. In a context of increasing immigration from the 
West Indies, the refugees from Egypt were regarded as adding to 'Britain's 
colour problem', and it was not possible to refuse them entry.48 The comment 
referred to Leonard G. Montefiore's49 response to a Foreign Office's official 
description of 'Gypsies, or as I should say Jewish refugees from Egypt, 
displaying, poor dears, British passports' and its surprise at their 'social 
standing' as some of them were members of the Jockey Club Cairo.50 
Montefiore also referred to the work done by British Jewish organisations to 
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rescue the Jews from Nazi Germany in the 1930s, implying that the situation in 
1956-1957 was similar.51 He implied that the Jews from Egypt belonged to the 
same upper-middle class as some German Jews. Not only were the comments 
of some officers at the Foreign Office racist but also they were based on social 
class, meaning that the British Jews from Egypt were at times considered as 
uneducated southern second-class subjects. In 1956, the Anglo-Egyptians were 
perceived as possible threats to the balance of race relations at a time of 
increasing tensions between communities. The immigration policy regarding 
Anglo-Egyptians was thus influenced by antisemitism and racial prejudice.  
 
The British government therefore only accepted refugees from Egypt who were 
British subjects. It resisted pressure to admit a larger number of refugees than it 
would legally have to. However, in order to avoid criticisms from the press or 
the political opposition, the government made one exception. It was decided to 
allow the admission of stateless and foreign refugees as long as they came from 
a 'predominantly British family group', but they were not entitled to the same 
rights as British refugees: 
 
An alien refugee from Egypt… will not be considered eligible in his own 
right… for a resettlement grant to enable him to set up in business or to 
help him buy a house. The principle as outlined above is that we may 
help an alien refugee from Egypt by virtue of his association with, or 
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membership of, a British family group who have been evicted from 
Egypt.52 
 
The Home Office adopted the same line as the French government: only those 
who had British family members could seek refuge in Britain. The only, yet 
major, difference was that the Home Office would not help those who only had 
a distant family association, leaving them in a precarious condition, while in 
France they benefited from the help of the Cojasor. The Home Office followed 
a very strict line in limiting relief to the refugees from Egypt in order to reduce 
their numbers in British care. The reaction of the British government, by 
limiting admission in Britain strictly to Anglo-Egyptians and accepting 
stateless Jews on condition they had British family and refusing Jews of 
another nationality for resettlement, shows that it still considered Jews as 
undesirable immigrants in 1956.53 
 
Despite appeals from Jewish organisations, the British government remained 
strict regarding asylum for Jews from Egypt. One of the concerns of the Board 
of Deputies of British Jews, and other Jewish organisations was Nasser's 
attitude towards the Jews of Egypt. The Jewish Chronicle compared him to 
Hitler and drew comparisons with the Nazi methods of internment and 
expulsions before the Second World War.54 According to Israel Sieff and Alex 
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Easterman of the World Jewish Congress,55 the similarity between Nasser and 
Hitler was striking since Nasser's aim was to make Egypt "Judenrein", that is 
to say free of Jews. Sieff and Easterman were concerned about the silence of 
the United Nations regarding the fate of the Jews from Egypt, and the silence 
of the governments involved in the Suez Crisis.56 It was feared that what 
happened to the Jews during the Second World War would happen again 
because of diplomatic weaknesses from the British and French sides: 'Are we 
faced once more with the same diplomatic niceties and reticences which, 
before the last war and until 1942, embedded the Great Powers in silence and 
unwillingness to act in the case of Hitler's anti-Jewish outrages, culminating in 
the massacre of six million Jews in Europe?'57 The parallel could be pushed 
further, since both situations created refugees who sought asylum in Britain 
and France. This echo of the Second World War, and especially of the 
appeasement debacle, led some MPs and the refugees to think that the situation 
of the Jewish refugees from Egypt had been forgotten by Britain and France, 
and that no lesson had been learnt from the previous war.58 But Britain did not 
regard the situation in Egypt as a Jewish problem, and merely promised to raise 
the matter at the UN Assembly, leaving Jewish organisations to organise relief 
for those Jews in Egypt who were ineligible for refuge in Britain.59 
Acknowledging that the Jewish population was in immediate danger would 
have pressured Britain to accept them as refugees under international law, 
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which would have gone against its policy of restricted admission and acted as a 
sort of tacit admission that their earlier policy of restricting immigration to 
mandate Palestine had been wrong.  
 
As British nationals, the Anglo-Egyptians left under the same conditions as the 
French nationals, that is to say after receiving a notice of expulsion, sometimes 
after being interned, with only a suitcase and 20 Egyptian pounds, their 
valuables and extra money being confiscated by the Egyptian authorities at the 
border. Although some of the Anglo-Egyptians were simply notified, some 
were terrorised by the Egyptian army or police who locked them up in prison 
or abandoned houses or schools, with other British nationals.60 Similarly in 
Port-Said, David M., on his way back from Heliopolis with his father, 
following the closure of the English School in Cairo by its director, 
experienced the radical change of atmosphere following the bombings. On the 
train, people were shouting anti-European and sometimes antisemitic slogans: 
 
It was the most horrific experience… By that time, everybody was anti-
West and were shouting and screaming on the train: 'to death with the 
British!'… My father and I were really petrified. We heard one or two 
people saying something about the Jews. We kept our heads down for 
about two and a half hours. We didn't want anybody to notice us. It was 
an amazing change in attitude, so quickly in the whole of Egypt.61 
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For David M., the situation went to the point that he was spat on in the street so 
it became very difficult to go out. One of the worst feelings for the British Jews 
of Egypt was that they were suddenly rejected by the Egyptian population 
which had been considered to be very friendly before that. It was also for some 
of them the realisation that they were not as integrated in the life of Egypt as 
they thought,62 as the country was taking a more nationalist stance led by 
Nasser, based on Islam as an Arabic culture, in which Jews and Europeans did 
not have a place. 
 
Not all the refugees followed the same route to Britain. They either travelled by 
boat or by plane. As long as the British army was in Egypt, it was possible for 
the refugees to be evacuated by the army by boat. However, when the British 
embassy closed, it became more difficult for the refugees to organise their 
evacuation. The Swiss embassy, which was representing the interests of Britain 
and France, advised the Anglo-Egyptians on how they could leave the 
country.63  
 
When flying, refugees usually arrived at London after a stop somewhere else in 
Europe. Other refugees went by boat to Marseille, like David M., and took the 
train to cross France, to finally take the boat to Dover or other Channel ports. 
However, those who stopped at Marseille were sometimes taken care of by the 
Jewish Agency which was helping the refugees willing to go to Israel.64 
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Jenny Stewart, who was 21 in 1956, claims to have been one of the very first 
refugees to have arrived in Britain after being expelled from Egypt, being born 
to British parents. The Egyptian authorities gave her, her mother and her 
stepfather, three days' notice on 21 November to leave Egypt. They boarded a 
plane chartered by the United Nations to Naples, because there was no direct 
flight to London, but had to pay for the ticket. From there, they took a train to 
Milan, and flew to London via Amsterdam: 
 
We arrived on the 25th of November 1956. Basically, we were the very 
first ones. They said: "what are you doing here?" And we said: "you will 
have a whole army of people. All the British people will come." They 
knew nothing about it. We had relatives at London airport so we could 
stay a little while there until everything was sorted out. Within a few 
weeks, all the British people left or were given a few days to leave, but 
we were really the very first ones.65 
 
Although aware of the situation of the Jews in Egypt, and of the British 
nationals, the Home Office arranged only in December for the refugees to be 
met at points of arrival by members of the National Assistance Board, the 
British Red Cross, or the Women's Voluntary Service.66 Anna Lüdwig 
remembers her arrival in London: 
 
I think it was beginning of December 1956. The WVS and some Jewish 
people were at the airport to welcome us… We went to Cyprus for a 
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week then sailed to Malta. We spent one night there. Then we took the 
plane to London. We stayed in London for one day. We arrived early in 
the morning and then they put us on a bus to Eastwood. We did not know 
where we were going. You could not choose.67 
 
The aim was to screen as many refugees as possible to help them join relatives 
in Britain if they had any, or to accommodate them in hostels.68 Anna Lüdwig's 
description of her reception indicates how cold it was for many refugees. Very 
little information was given to the refugees on their destination, and the places 
they were sent to were so remote and isolated that they usually were unknown 
to them. They had no choice regarding the hostel they were sent to. The fact 
that few among them spoke English did not help, and added to the general 
confusion in which the refugees could be found when they first arrived in the 
country.69 For the refugees who did not have family to accommodate them, 
staying in hostels was the only option. Anthony Eden, who partly justified the 
military intervention to protect 'some 13,000 subjects still in Egypt', had failed 
to do so, and his government had to quickly set up a plan to accommodate the 
refugees from Egypt.70 
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-The reception of Anglo-Egyptians: first phase  
 
The reception of the Anglo-Egyptians can be divided in two phases. The first 
phase of the hostel system refers to the management of the hostels by the NAB, 
under the supervision of the Home Office. It lasted from November 1956 until 
April 1957, and is characterised by sharp criticisms in parliament of the 
handling of the refugee situation in Britain. It eventually led to a rethinking of 
the asylum policy. 
 
Jenny Stewart arrived on 25 November 1956 in London with her mother and 
stepfather and remembers warning that many other British nationals in Egypt 
were to follow soon. Two days later the policy regarding the reception of 
Anglo-Egyptians refugees was drafted, at an emergency meeting of the 
Defence Committee. The Committee agreed that the Home Secretary, Gwilym 
Lloyd George, would be responsible for the coordination of the resettlement of 
the British refugees from Egypt, while delegating executive powers to relevant 
departments for the support of the refugees. The Ministry of Works was to be 
in charge of providing the hostels buildings, while the NAB managed them, 
with financial means voted by the Home Office.71  
 
This list thus served as a basis to establish the policy of reception in late 
November, and was modified for practical purposes. The accommodation of 
refugees from Egypt in hostels was carried out in two steps. At their arrival in 
London, families and single men were sent to a RAF hostel in Hendon, run by 
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the NAB. Women and children, who were not accompanied by their husbands 
or fathers, were accommodated at a WRAC camp in Richmond, separating 
men and women.72 After a few days to register the refugees and verify their 
identity, they were moved to five other hostels in Britain. The list differed from 
the one established in September, except for two hostels, and offered better 
accommodation closer to areas of potential employment: Frobisher Hall and 
Drake Hall from the initial list, Bridgend hostel in Gloucestershire, Eastwood 
hostel in Nottinghamshire, and the Summerfield hostel in Kidderminster, all 
managed by the National Assistance Board. These had enough space to 
accommodate for 2,500 persons, showing that they were not initially expecting 
the whole community of Anglo-Egyptians to come to Britain for refuge.73 
However, following the continuous arrival of refugees from Egypt, new hostels 
were added from early January to early March 1957: Eaves Brow, between 
Liverpool and Manchester, Crowborough, in Sussex, and Henstridge, in 
Somerset, were hostels managed by St John's Ambulance; Greenbanks, near 
Leeds, Bishopwood, near Reading, Caerwent, near Newport, and Wrens 
Warren, in Sussex, were hostels managed by the British Red Cross.74 These 
hostels, except for Greenbanks and Bishopwood, were isolated from major 
cities. 
 
It was decided that the refugees without means would be accommodated on a 
free basis and given 12 shillings a week for an adult and 5 shillings a week for 
a child. Those with means were charged for board and lodging in such a way 
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that they would be left with a least £2 a week. A situation which Anna Lüdwig, 
a British refugee from Egypt, finds very unfair: 
 
When we came to England we got nothing, not a penny, and we were 
thrown in a camp! And we were British subjects! We had British 
passports and we were not privileged at all. In my time I have been 
thrown away in a camp! We got a pound maybe per week. It was nothing! 
I feel very upset about that compared to what they get now.75 
 
Anna Lüdwig considered that the sum provided as pocket money by the 
National Assistance Board was insufficient to start anew in Britain. Many of 
the refugees could not understand how they were supposed to leave the hostels 
quickly when financial support was so low, while those who worked were 
angered by the fact that they had to pay for their accommodation in hostels 
when the majority of their assets had been confiscated in Egypt.76 In one sense, 
the Home Office plan worked, as they moved as soon as they could from the 
hostels, preferring to spend money on better accommodation, while leaving the 
refugees embittered. This limitation in support had been decided by the 
Treasury which did not want to give them better financial treatment than other 
refugees at the time, regardless of their British nationality.77  
 
Sir Frank Newsam, Permanent Under Secretary of State of the Home Office, 
and Gwilym Lloyd George, Home Secretary, found themselves in a difficult 
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position since they had agreed that a special financial effort was to be made to 
show that they supported the British refugees: 
 
I think there is a special responsibility to make provision for British 
subjects who through no fault of their own have been reduced to a state of 
temporary destitution… I think it would be most unwise politically for 
the Government to take the line that we are not prepared to do any more 
for these people than arrange for them to be accommodated in National 
Assistance Board hostels, and provided for, if they are in want, at 
National Assistance Board rates.78 
 
They were both worried that if nothing was done to show that the government 
helped them the best way it could, it would suffer criticism. The decision was a 
political move in a difficult context to spare the government further difficulties, 
rather than a genuine attempt to do more to help refugees, at a time when 
public opinion and the press were criticising the government for the handling 
of the Suez crisis.79 
 
Nonetheless, the scheme to help the refugees was set up quickly. It was 
announced to parliament on 13 December 1956, by R.A. Butler, Lord Privy 
Seal, that the Home Secretary had 'undertaken responsibility for co-ordinating 
the arrangements for the reception of British subjects returning to this country 
from Egypt'.80 He then reminded MPs that, even if the NAB made 
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arrangements for the needs of the refugees, a grant of £100,000, announced on 
6 December, was to be made by the Home Office to the Anglo-Egyptian Aid 
Society (AEAS) for the relief and reception of the British nationals from 
Egypt, and that the AEAS had made a public appeal for funds, so that the NAB 
would deal with cases of urgent need in the future.81 The AEAS benefited from 
a good reputation as it had the experience in supporting and dealing with the 
British from Egypt.82 The AEAS was a charity chaired, at the time, by 
Frederick Smith, 2nd Baron Colwyn, and had been called upon by the British 
government three times before the Suez crisis for relief. The first occasion was 
before the Second World War when British officials had been dismissed from 
their occupations, and the Foreign Office gave the Society a grant for their 
resettlement in Britain. Then, the AEAS helped when women were evacuated 
following the presence of Rommel in North Africa in 1942. Finally, following 
new discriminatory commercial laws in Egypt in 1948 and 1949, the AEAS ran 
a hotel in London to accommodate those who were not able to make a living 
anymore in Egypt.83  
 
Hugh Gaitskell, the leader of the opposition who had expressed stern criticism 
of the Suez military intervention,84 had doubts about the financial efforts 
provided by the government which kept branding the £100,000 as a token of its 
financial participation to the resettlement of the British refugees from Egypt.85 
As Macmillan estimated the number of refugees in Great Britain to be 4,000, 
Gaitskell mentioned that it amounted to £25 per person, and wondered how 
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such a sum would be sufficient to cover for all the refugees in Britain. Richard 
Crossman, MP for Coventry East, considered that the government had a 
responsibility toward the British refugees then in the country regardless of 
payments from the Egyptian government, if any compensation was to ever be 
given for the seizure of private property and assets, as well as Egyptianisation 
of businesses.86 Despite their questioning, it appears that Macmillan did not 
plan to use more money at the time for the relief of the refugees.87 No other 
grant or action was promised. Macmillan's attitude was rather to wait to see 
how much the cost of resettling the British refugees would be in case the initial 
grant was not enough. 
    
Gaitskell was right in his accusations regarding the financial effort made by 
Britain, as the Home Secretary indeed had difficulties securing a grant for the 
refugees: 'With some difficulty we managed to persuade the Treasury to 
authorise a grant of £100,000 to the Anglo-Egyptian Aid Society, but it was a 
condition of this grant that any payments made out of Government funds 
should be on approximately the same scale as the National Assistance Board 
rates.'88 The Home Office wanted to provide relief on the NAB normal rates 
and wanted to do it through the AEAS so that public opinion believed that a 
special effort was made for their relief. The Home Office believed that making 
payment through the NAB showed that the Anglo-Egyptians were treated as 
nationals and not as foreign refugees. The Home Office did not offer much 
financial help to the refugees from Egypt, as the Treasury showed a total lack 
of interest in their situation, and ignored the fact that the refugees came to 
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Britain stripped of their possessions. This is emphasised by the fact that the 
Treasury had to be persuaded to deliver a grant. Anglo-Egyptian resettlement 
was thus limited by restricted funds. 
 
As far as funds were concerned, the AEAS was a façade as assistance was 
coming from the NAB, the Ministry of Works and the Ministry of Supply 
under the supervision of the Home Office. Its role was quickly reduced to the 
minimum following the creation of the AERB by the Home Office, in an 
attempt to reorganise the hostel system and improve the coordination between 
local, national and associative administrations.89 
 
 
 
-The Anglo-Egyptian Resettlement Board: second phase  
 
Although hostels were initially run independently by the NAB, St John's 
Brigade and the British Red Cross Society, their aims were all the same: to put 
the refugees from Egypt into employment and private accommodation quickly 
so that they could resettle, or to organise the re-emigration of those willing to 
resettle in another country. Locally, hostels were working with local authorities 
in order to check if housing and work were available for the refugees. Councils 
of the nearest cities were regularly consulted on this matter. However, 
collaboration with local councils was not always easy, as suggests the case of 
Greenbanks, near Leeds. In February 1957, the clerk of Horsforth Urban 
                                                 
89
 TNA, T 221/471, Memorandum on the British refugees from Egypt, 15 January 1957. 
 299
District filed a formal complain to the Home Office as it was feeling 
increasingly exasperated that the Council was not receiving any help in dealing 
with the refugees arrival and their welfare. It criticised the British Red Cross 
Society for the management of the hostel, and feared that the charge of the 
refugees would eventually fall upon the Council.90 The Council felt left without 
assistance from the Home Office and witnessed how poorly managed the camp 
was. It accused the Home Office of a blatant lack of organisation between the 
hostel management, the Home Office, and local authorities in the early days of 
the hostel system. The AERB was created in order to re-organise and 
coordinate the resettlement of the Anglo-Egyptians. 
 
The creation of the AERB was announced at the House of Commons on 5 
February 1957 by Harold Macmillan, then Prime Minister in place of Anthony 
Eden, to deal with the 4,000 British refugees from Egypt then in the United 
Kingdom.91 The Home Office decided that the AEAS, as a voluntary welfare 
organisation, could not carry on alone making payments from government 
funds. The function of the AERB was 'to co-ordinate all the work at present 
being done to assist British subjects from Egypt, including the running of the 
hostels and the giving of financial help'.92 The financial help referred to 
resettlement grants. The AEAS from that point mainly dealt with the payment 
of weekly allowances to refugees, instead of the NAB, and the organisation of 
their re-emigration.  
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The AERB was composed of representatives of the British Red Cross Society, 
St John's Ambulance Brigade, Women's Voluntary Service, National Council 
of Social Service, and the AEAS. The staff came from the AEAS, as well as 
the Home Office and other departments, while other posts were occupied by 
external people hired for the occasion. The AERB employed some of the 
refugees too, in order to have a better understanding and communication with 
the refugees in the hostels, because they were not born in Britain and had no 
experience of living there.93 Out of 146 employees working for the AERB, 21 
were Anglo-Egyptians.94 The AERB was scheduled to take over the Anglo-
Egyptian refugee hostels on 1 April 1957. 
 
The first task of the AERB was to reorganise the hostel situation. The fact that 
the hostels in Britain were so far apart added to the difficulty of the refugees 
resettlement. Just like in the case of the Hungarian refugees, the government 
had little accommodation available, and once again, hostels were supposed to 
be situated near places of potential employment. When the AERB took over as 
the leading organisation for the resettlement of the Anglo-Egyptians, hostels 
were situated as follows: 
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Map 7.1: Hostels run by the AERB from 1 April 1957 to March 1960 
 
 (Source: TNA, HO 240/18, Hostels accommodating refugees  
from Egypt, 3 May 1957)  
 
The map shows that, apart from Oxton, the hostels were all far from London 
and other major cities. In order to get the refugees in employment and 
permanent accommodation as quickly as possible, the Home Office and the 
NAB re-organised the hostel system. Each hostel was to have a Consultative 
Committee, with a representation of all the voluntary organisations and 
departments involved in the life of the hostels, and a Working Committee, 
which was a nucleus of the Consultative Committee including officers of the 
voluntary organisations, representatives of the Ministry of Labour and the 
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Local Authority Health and Education Services, and also temporary members 
from the Consultative Committee. The Chairman of the Consultative 
Committee was to be approved by the AERB. The Consultative Committee 
was to record and inform the AERB every month of the progress made at the 
hostels in matters such as employment and resettlement, emigration, and the 
efficiency of the AERB policy in resettling the refugees from Egypt.95  
 
The Working Committee was concerned primarily with the coordination of 
group welfare arrangements and with the general welfare issues. This 
committee met weekly under the chairmanship of the hostel warden, and the 
minutes of the meetings were sent to the AERB.96 The idea was that. by April 
1957, refugees who could find work or accommodation would have left, and 
the hostels would be left with more difficult cases to resettle, hence the need 
for a more solid organisation in the hostels with all the bodies involved in the 
resettlement of the refugees from Egypt. Those refugees were usually 
described as the elderly, not easily employable, people lacking knowledge of 
English, or people who did not want to leave the community inside the hostel.97 
This communal attitude was also found in France, as some of refugees stayed 
together to face the ordeals of settling in a new country. The Home Office 
feared what they called the 'hostelization' of the refugees and issued 
recommendations to staff in hostels to form advisory panels in order to 'make 
every effort through local connections to place them into work'.98 In order to 
tackle this issue, which, as far as the AERB was concerned, was delaying the 
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resettlement work, the Home Office expected wardens to lecture refugees 
about life and social conditions in Britain, showing that for the Home Office, 
their British passport was their only link with Britain.99 
 
The AEAS shared this view of the refugees and described the work regarding 
their reception as a 'key job' to the right-wing diplomat, Lord Colyton, 
chairman of the AERB:  
 
Personnel must have an understanding and sympathetic approach to these 
people – most of whom tend to have the temperament of southern races – 
knowledge of their former way of life and their languages, and sound 
knowledge of social and welfare work in this country… Perhaps the most 
important factor is knowledge of the people concerned.100 
 
The terms in which the British refugees from Egypt are described shows the 
extent to which the refugees were considered different from the British living 
in Britain. Despite Egypt not being part of the Commonwealth, Anglo-
Egyptians were part of this multi-racial community.101 Although British, the 
quotation above suggests that Anglo-Egyptians lacked 'Englishness'.102 A 
leaflet was produced for the attention of the refugees in which a set of practical 
recommendations about life in Britain was formulated.103 For example, the 
leaflet mentioned that refugees should not bargain in shops and recommends 
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that refugees be accompanied by friends or relatives already settled in Britain 
for these occasions. 
 
Still in the spirit of limiting support to the refugees from Egypt when possible, 
the Home Office instructed the AERB not to accept refugees from Egypt who 
had no affiliation with a British family, and that an enquiry be made if there 
were any doubts on affiliation before admitting the refugee as a hostel resident. 
The staff in hostels were ordered not to encourage residents to think that their 
relatives in other countries would be admitted to hostels, in order to limit the 
influx of refugees from Egypt in the country.104 Unlike the French Ministry of 
the Interior, which eventually adopted a rather flexible attitude towards the 
refugees from Egypt in spite of a strict policy of immigration, the Home Office 
and the AERB worked together to limit the arrival of non-British nationals, or 
part of a British family.105 The AERB was to be consulted on the admission of 
non-British relatives joining British refugees for resettlement. The role of the 
hostels was to support and resettle the refugees, but also to refuse those who 
were not supposed to be claimants for relief in order to limit the help provided. 
However, in order to avoid bad publicity, the Aliens Department of the Home 
Office, would issue a refusal to stay in the country rather than the AERB 
itself.106 The role of the AERB was thus not only social but to make sure that 
support was provided to the refugees as defined by the Home Office general 
policy and to limit as much as possible relief to non-British nationals. 
However, the AERB could not decide what to do with problem cases such as 
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people who refused to leave the hostel. It considered but abandoned the idea of 
eviction, fearing bad publicity.107  
 
Hostels had to be considered as temporary accommodation by the refugees. 
The plan for the AERB was to resettle all refugees by the end of 1957, 
although this did not happen until 1960 and the closure of the last hostel:108  
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Table 7.1: Numbers of residents in hostels from since AERB take-over  
 
*Bridgend stayed opened until March 1960 with a small number of refugees. 
(Source: TNA, HO 240/77, Notes on hostels, n.d.) 
 
This table does not take into account the refugees who were accommodated in 
hostels before the AERB took over. Since approximately 4,000 refugees from 
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700 378 245 300 524 551 52 611 177 127 55 3,720 
5 April 
1957 
553 211 184 221 416 452 47 498 97 115  2,774 
28 June 381 140 174 201 335 422 28 442 114 106  2,343 
30 Aug. 287 109 223 168 396 428  172 114 91 24 2,012 
27 Sept. 240 124 235 151 409 414  27 101 96 45 1,842 
1 Nov.  301 225 138 379 378  3 93 94 48 1,659 
31 Jan. 
1958 
 322 241 46 390 115   26 58 48 1,246 
28 Feb.  303 198 10 389    8 38 44 990 
25 Apr.  199 162  332     9 33 735 
30 May  176 156  316      16 664 
25 July  227 204  33       464 
26 Sept.  12 246         258 
26 Dec.   167         167 
June 
1959 
  13*         13 
 307
Egypt were accommodated since November 1956, and the AERB was in 
charge since April 1957, it had to deal with roughly three quarters of the total 
number. The elderly were accommodated in residential clubs when spaces 
became available, whereas the refugees who could be employed found a job 
and moved out of the hostels after finding private accommodation. For 
example, in December 1958, the AERB managed to secure 19 flats in Stroud, 
near Bridgend hostel, with the help of the Stroud Rural District Council, in 
order to resettle some of the residents at the hostel and to speed up its 
closure.109 
 
With the AERB managing all the hostels, it became easier to draft a common 
policy to place the refugees into work. It contrasts with the disorganisation in 
the first steps of the hostels system before it was in charge. To facilitate the 
employment process, the AERB paid for the cost of transportation for refugees 
to attend interviews.110 The AERB benefited from the support of the Citizens' 
Advice Bureau (CAB), and every hostel had a CAB liaison officer. Their role 
was 'to assist their resettlement and integration with the general community'. 
When refugees found work and accommodation outside hostels they were put 
in touch with the CAB organisation in their district. The CAB liaison officers 
provided valuable help in finding work and permanent accommodation. The 
CAB liaison officers were also competent to deal with the questions of 
emigration.111 By involving the CAB in each hostel, the AERB managed to 
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harmonise the resettlement of the refugees, though the CAB liaison officers 
were expected to respect the AERB's policy.  
 
One of the most problematic aspects for the AERB was that refugees in large 
family groups often wanted to live together. In mid-April 1957, it decided to let 
local authorities solve this problem by paying them £300 to house family units. 
The AERB insisted on the need to 'impress' upon the refugees that they could 
not let other relatives join them after they were allocated a house.112  
 
By October 1958, only 90 families representing 342 individuals had been 
resettled in council houses.113 The AERB and the Home Office failed to have a 
resettlement plan similar to the one of the French government and the Cojasor 
which managed to resettle large groups of refugees together around Paris. The 
housing situation in Britain was also difficult at the time, but, unlike France, no 
new sites were reserved for the Anglo-Egyptian refugees although they came to 
Britain in similar numbers.  
 
 
 
-Hostel life 
 
In order to improve the chances of a quick resettlement, the Home Office 
decided to open two experimental hostels: Crowborough and Oxton. 
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Crowborough was opened when the AERB took over the management of the 
refugee hostels, and was initially on a peppercorn rental. The small capacity of 
the hostel, 52 persons, was thought ideal to try to resettle a few of the Anglo-
Egyptian refugee families who could be employed locally and paid 
maintenance charges. The experiment was however short-lived as it took a lot 
of persuasion to convince families to move there, as they were reluctant to 
leave their initial hostel. Once in Crowborough, they did not get on well due to 
social class differences. The AERB closed down the hostel in July 1957 and 
relocated the refugees.114 Crowborough hostel is a good example of the 
heterogeneity of the Anglo-Egyptian refugees, who in Egypt did not mix 
between classes. Moreover, the fact that families were reluctant to leave their 
initial hostel shows that a sense of community was built up in some of the 
hostels among the refugees who could be together, among people of the same 
social class, in larger hostels.115 
 
Oxton, near Birkenhead, was the second hostel experiment led by the Home 
Office. Formerly the married quarters at an army anti-aircraft unit, it offered 
accommodation in huts.116 The Home Office thought refugees would easily 
find work in Birkenhead and Liverpool.117 The main difference with the other 
hostels was that families lived in self-catering wooden bungalows including a 
living room with a fire-place, a kitchen, a bathroom, and two or three 
bedrooms, greatly improving the standards of accommodation in comparison 
with the other hostels. In order to make sure that the families in Oxton did not 
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mistake the hostel with permanent accommodation, the Ministry of Labour 
employed a superintendent and residents were told not to confuse the 
maintenance charges with rent. Residents were selected on the basis that they 
were 'good mixers', keen to get work, and sure to understand the set-up of 
Oxton hostel. 118 The Home Office and the AERB hoped to avoid a repeat of 
the Crowborough experiment. Oxton demonstrates that despite the initial 
claims that the other hostels had been chosen for their proximity to 
employment opportunities, the Home Office was aware that they were too 
isolated, and that the general policy of reception was far from satisfying. 
 
Although supervised by the AERB, Oxton was run by the British Red Cross. 
The hostel started receiving residents in August 1957,119 all 49 of whom were 
married couples with children.120 However, by February 1958, it became clear 
that the experiment was a failure too. It was hard to find families willing to 
move to Oxton, and the employment situation in the Merseyside region had 
deteriorated since the hostel was set up. The only sectors where employment 
was available, draughtspeople, domestic workers, and clothing workers, did not 
match the refugees' skills or desires. As a result, only five people had left the 
hostel within six months.121 Considering the spirit in which Oxton hostel was 
set up, the experiment was hardly a success. 
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Despite an overall bad report and a recommendation to wind up the hostel, the 
AERB refused to see the experiment as a total failure, and saw in Oxton a 
'useful transition stage to complete resettlement' for some, blaming the 
employment conditions on Merseyside, the lack of offers of help from local 
residents, and the fact that the potential transferees had been resettled between 
March and August 1957, when the hostel was being prepared.122 It was not 
until May 1958 that all the refugees moved out of Oxton.123  
 
The creation of the AERB, although it standardised the reception of the 
refugees, while experimenting with other hostel systems, did not solve all 
problems. Focus will now shift to the cases of the refugees of Eastwood and 
Summerfield hostels, who decided to act to improve their conditions as 
refugees in Britain. It shows that the responses to the Anglo-Egyptians were ill- 
adapted, and that refugees were far from passive. 
 
On arrival in Britain, refugees from Egypt received little popular support, and 
far less than the Hungarians: '[We] have no official support for our Appeal. 
Some of the Press, notably The Times, is antagonistic, the rest are lukewarm… 
And so the future results of our Appeal are not rosy unless we discover means 
to arouse more enthusiasm than now exists.'124 The refugees' reception was 
conditioned by widespread hostility to the campaign led by Britain in the Suez 
Canal and its failed attempt to regain control over the region along with France 
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and Israel. As a result, the appeal launched by the AEAS did not receive the 
official support from the government that it expected.  
 
There was then a problem of perception from the public of the Anglo-
Egyptians' identity by the public and the press. The fact that they were 
described as British nationals led newspapers and the public to believe that 
they needed less help in comparison with the Hungarians who were 
foreigners.125 Hungarian refugees were described as freedom fighters in 
November and December 1956 and their situation was much more appealing to 
the British press and population. The construction of the image of the 
Hungarian refugees in the press and in parliamentary debates constantly swung 
between the concepts of the Hungarians who 'came not merely as refugees 
from oppression but as fighters for freedom with the light of battle of their 
eyes'126 and the 'men, women and children [who] have had to flee from 
possible death and imprisonment at home to an uncertain life abroad'.127 In the 
first couple of months following the revolution, references to Hungarian 
refugees oscillated between freedom fighters and victims of oppression. They 
were not perceived as economic immigrants nor referred to as such publicly. At 
a popular level, the Hungarian refugees reached a level of acceptability that the 
refugees from Egypt were not even close to achieving due to the unpopularity 
of the Suez Crisis in Britain, and being unwanted by the British government. 
The emphasis both in the government and in the press and public had always 
been on supporting the Hungarian refugees, while the support for the Anglo-
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Egyptians was left to the care of the government, and the stateless refugees 
from Egypt were almost completely forgotten in all public discourses. 
 
The refugees from Egypt felt that their treatment was far from what they 
should have received as British nationals, and believed that not only were they 
poorly helped and treated by governmental organisations, but that Britain was 
more interested in helping the refugees from Hungary. This situation led to 
protests by some of the refugees. In two of the hostels, the refugees started to 
complain quite vociferously: in Eastwood Hostel in Nottingham they organised 
a campaign,128 while the residents at the Summerfield Hostel, near 
Kidderminster, went on hunger strike.129   
 
At Eastwood Hostel, a group of residents organised a committee to protest 
against their reception in Britain. They elected a chair, contacted the press and 
wrote a petition to the Home Office. Seventy of the 300 residents signed the 
petition to complain mainly about compensation and emigration.130 Their case 
was supported by an article in the Manchester Guardian which, they claimed, 
meant that 'all of England knew how the refugees in Eastwood hostel were 
treated'. The article itself reported that 'everybody considered the refugees from 
Egypt to be an embarrassment' despite them being British subjects.131 
However, the two main complaints in the petition and the article were 
compensation and re-emigration. It claims that since the Egyptian authorities 
confiscated all of their assets the refugees were left with virtually nothing and 
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were expecting more than a low weekly allowance. As far as re-emigration was 
concerned, the article claims that two-thirds of the refugees wanted to re-
emigrate to Canada but they did not qualify because they had no sponsor there. 
The last complaint concerned the very poor state of the accommodation in the 
hostel, with two or three families having to share the same room. By having 
this article published the refugees managed to catch the attention of the Home 
Office which sent a representative on 15 March. But more than that, it shows 
how much these refugees feared to be silenced and forgotten in Britain. It 
shows as well how the hostel system put in place by the Home Office was 
inadequate in solving the refugees' issues. 
  
The Home Office representative described the 70 refugees who complained as 
young men, single and married, who refused to co-operate and to take up the 
jobs offered. The representative proposed no solution nor recommended any 
particular action to be taken. He also denied in his report that some families 
were sharing the same room but confirmed that the main issues were 
compensation and re-emigration,132 though Anna Lüdwig remembers very 
clearly that if families were not staying together, older women had to share the 
same room with younger women, which everyone found very difficult: 
 
We stayed in a big room. The women were in one place and the men 
were somewhere else. It wasn't very nice because old women and young 
people with small children had to be together… During the day we met 
somewhere else. It was a big hall, you meet the men, the children, after 
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that they put you somewhere else: women on one side, men somewhere 
else.133 
 
The separation from her husband proved difficult, because, although she had a 
British passport, she spoke little English. The handling of the refugee crisis at 
Eastwood accentuated the feeling of loss and loneliness, common to the 
refugee experience. Anna Lüdwig's testimony indicates that rooms were shared 
by different people and contradicts the report. A mother and her child still 
makes a family, despite the Home Office more conservative vision of a family 
being husband, wife and children. 
    
The Home Office visitor in Eastwood explained as well that the reason some 
refugees refused to take up the jobs offered was because after all the years of 
experience they had in Egypt and their age, they refused to start from the 
bottom again, with a salary much below their needs; claims which were 
obviously not those of young men. The trend became general in April 1957 as 
more refugees refused to take up jobs and housing far from hostels if that 
meant leaving their wives and hostel community behind.134 Victor Lagnado, 
the Chairman of the newly founded Eastwood Hostel Refugees Committee, 
expressed concern about the way the British refugees from Egypt were treated 
as if they were not entitled to the treatment of the other British citizens. 
 
The day of the visit, Lagnado wrote to the Chairman of the AERB to express in 
detail their complaints in six main points: the insufficient amount of paid in 
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allowances to the refugees, the absence of compensation, the absence of a 
public campaign matching the one for the Hungarian refugees, the difficulties 
for the refugees from Egypt to emigrate to Australia or any other country of the 
Commonwealth, the poor jobs offered, and the insufficient pocket money 
received.135 In the letter, Lagnado held the British government responsible for 
the situation of the refugees from Egypt. His argument was that if Britain had 
never launched a military operation with France and Israel to regain control of 
the Suez Canal, the Anglo-Egyptians would still have had their assets and 
properties. That was why the refugees from Eastwood hostel asked for proper 
compensation in order to resettle. The letter appeals for basic human rights and 
dignity: 
 
We believe that the Government should advance money from public 
funds… for this is a matter which touch deeply everybody in his dignity 
and selfpride and the least we would expect from the Government, to 
show that the British refugees are well looked after and treated on the 
same level as any British citizen in the United Kingdom.136 
 
Lagnado stated that the British refugees from Egypt felt like 'poor cousins 
abandoned in hostels living like animals'. The refugees from Eastwood hostel 
obviously played on their nationality as British citizens to catch the attention of 
the Home Office accused of not taking care of their nationals, while the 
expression 'poor cousins' emphasises how the refugees in this hostel actually 
felt. Anna Lüdwig recalled that: 
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Eastwood was like an army. You go, take your plate and they put the 
food on it and so on. It wasn't very good, really. We felt like we were 
nothing in Eastwood. We had to do the washing ourselves by hand, I 
wasn't used to that, I had a maid to do everything. My hands used to be 
swollen. We didn't have any support really at all from them. They treated 
you like nothing. There were some poor people and they were happy to 
find the food for them but we weren't happy…I don't want to know about 
Eastwood anymore. It is like a nightmare I don't want to remember. I 
haven't got a clue what it has become, I don't want to know. I was happy 
to leave it, that's it. It was the end of it!137 
 
Though she did not sign the petition, it is clear that she had difficulties 
adapting to her new environment. Despite the work of the AERB, the change 
was too brutal for some of the refugees from Egypt, used to a better life in 
Egypt, where they could enjoy the comfort of upper-middle-class life, as most 
of them had servants and cars. The change of life was very hard to handle. As 
the refugees from Egypt in Britain were British subjects for the great majority, 
some of them expected better conditions after their reception. 
    
Reports such as that by the Home Office representative show that the Home 
Office and the AERB considered the refugees from Egypt as foreign to British 
culture. This cultural difference meant that regardless of their citizenship, the 
British refugees from Egypt were Britons of another kind as far as the British 
government was concerned. The claims made by the refugees at Eastwood 
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hostel that they felt like 'poor cousins' was well founded, for if their British 
citizenship was indeed acknowledged, they nevertheless considered them 
having an Egyptian culture. This attitude was common among the British 
government as well as the AERB and other voluntary organisations like the 
WVS.138  
 
The Eastwood campaign succeeded in reaching the House of Commons. 
Maurice Orbach, Labour MP for Willesden East, denounced the hesitancies of 
the government to help the British refugees from Egypt in comparison with the 
help the refugees from Hungary received.139 He accused the government of 
'niggardliness', and strongly criticised the fact that refugees could file their 
claims to the Foreign Office for restitution from the Egyptian government in 
what he saw as a 'clerical exercise and not any desire to help our own people 
who were in such grave trouble'. But, above all, Orbach criticised sharply the 
general silence surrounding the situation of the refugees in Britain, blaming the 
government for taking no action due to its embarrassment regarding the whole 
Suez crisis, which he himself had opposed:  
 
But what is more alarming… is the fact that everybody is so ominously 
quiet about the Egyptian expellees. Why such generosity, which I 
applaud, towards the Hungarians, in contrast to the way in which we have 
forgotten the fact that we have our own folk, stateless people and others, 
not from Hungary? Do the Government feel so guilty about what they 
were responsible for some months ago, that they cannot do the honest, 
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decent and simple thing? I think this problem should be aired, and I hope 
that we shall put it in its proper proportions.140 
 
Orbach suspected that the British action in Egypt discredited the government 
so much, that it preferred not to advertise the situation of the British refugees 
from Egypt, leaving them forgotten in the hostels in inadequate conditions. In 
not putting forward the case of the refugees from Egypt, the British 
government was able to play down the consequences of a lost fight with Egypt 
and the human forced migration which resulted. The fact that the refugees were 
rarely mentioned in the press minimised their visibility to the public and they 
became just a minor event caught in the middle of the Suez crisis.  
    
As far as the AERB was concerned, Lord Colyton tried to brush their worries 
aside claiming that the AERB was not in a position to discuss the question of 
compensation since it was not its role, but reminded them that the question 
would be treated during a parliamentary debate in the near future.141 Lord 
Colyton mentioned as well the grants that were at the disposal of the refugees 
to help them resettling, implicitly admitting that the payments they received 
were insufficient alone. On the public appeal, though he refused to extensively 
comment on it or blame anyone for the lack of funds received, he suggested 
that because it was made in 'the shadow of the appeal' for the Hungarians less 
money had been raised.142 
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Lord Colyton argued as well that the fact that the AERB was created showed 
'the strong public sympathy for our fellows subjects from Egypt in their plight'. 
Then, he reminded the residents as well that the positions that they held in 
Egypt could not be offered in Britain as the system was different in Britain 
from the one in Egypt and that standards could differ greatly. Finally, as far as 
emigration was concerned, he reminded the refugees that the Australian 
authorities were the only body dealing with admission to Australia, and that the 
AERB would pay for travel expenses if they were eligible for emigration.143 
 
Although the protest was not of the same scale as in Eastwood, 150 out of the 
400 refugees at Summerfield Hostel went on hunger strike in February 1958, a 
few days before a meeting to complain about the fact that after a transfer from 
another hostel to Summerfield, some of the out of work refugees had to pay 
maintenance charges from their unemployment benefits.144 Money was again 
the problem, and the refugees felt they were struggling too much. Emigration 
was also a reason for the hunger strike, which was triggered after one 
individual was refused emigration to Australia on medical grounds. The 
refugees felt that they should be authorised to emigrate to Australia if this was 
their wish, and that the AERB should help them regarding this matter.  
 
The AERB's answer to the hunger strike demands was that maintenance 
charges had to be taken off their unemployment benefits, whether or not the 
refugees were familiar with this system.145 Regarding emigration, the AERB, 
even though it was not its role, appealed to the Australian authorities to 
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reconsider their decision. The AERB and the Home Office considered that they 
were not in a position to do more than what they were already doing for the 
refugees. 
    
The case of Eastwood Hostel reflects how inadequate the treatment of the 
British refugees from Egypt in hostels was, mirrored by the hunger strike at 
Summerfield.146 The British government failed to understand the condition of 
the British refugees from Egypt, and their basic needs. They responded to this 
refugee crisis by privileging an administrative approach rather than a 
humanitarian one. Moreover, Anglo-Egyptians did not represent economic or 
political interests the way Hungarian refugees did. They were more of an 
embarrassment, consequence of the failed campaign in Egypt, and the British 
government wanted to avoid any publicity on their situation.  
 
The financial difficulties that the reception of Anglo-Egyptians were facing led 
Israel Sieff, who had previously been worried about Nasser's treatment of Jews 
in Egypt, to interrogate whether refugees from Egypt and Hungary had been 
treated differently. 
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-Questioning differences of treatment 
 
So far this chapter has argued that, despite considering them as undesirable 
immigrants, the government tried to make a special effort for the Anglo-
Egyptians, which the refugees felt was unsuitable in some cases. I will now 
compare the treatment of the refugees from Egypt with the refugees from 
Hungary to uncover differences but also similarities in their treatment. 
 
A year after the first refugees from Egypt arrived, Political and Economic 
Planning (PEP), a think tank whose vice-chairman was Israel Sieff, made a 
comparative study of the reception and treatment of the refugees from Hungary 
and the refugees from Egypt.147 When it was published in 1958, less than 1,500 
Hungarians and a similar number of Anglo-Egyptians were still in hostels, 
which gave PEP a basis to draw early conclusions.148 It especially questioned 
the extent to which the refugees' origins influenced governmental and public 
responses. It considered that the Hungarian refugees were 'typical of many 
refugees of the past: citizens of a foreign nation who came here for political 
reasons. The Anglo-Egyptians on the other hand were not foreigners, but 
British subjects: not strictly speaking refugees, but expellees, expatriates.'149 If 
the Hungarians were typical in the sense that they left their country for political 
reasons, and in some cases to avoid possible imprisonment, deportation, or 
death sentence, the Anglo-Egyptians were different as they were forced out of 
Egypt and because they were British subjects. There was thus a negative 
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connotation regarding the Anglo-Egyptians, as they were undesirable, expelled 
from another country and imposed on to Britain for resettlement. The mixed 
reactions in Britain caused by the Suez crisis added to this negative 
connotation. PEP concluded that their arrival was thus more problematic than 
that of the Hungarians:  
 
Irrespective of the views about the rights or wrongs of the Suez 
intervention, the expellees could hardly be other than an embarrassment. 
The Hungarian refugees were a national political asset: the Anglo-
Egyptians a considerable liability. A fairly general reaction was that the 
Government should be responsible for helping those who had suffered, in 
some measure at least, as a result of their own policies.150 
 
In both cases, the perception of the public about refugees was linked to its 
feelings regarding the Suez crisis and the Hungarian revolution. This situation 
meant that there were less public funds available for the refugees from Egypt 
than for the Hungarians who benefited from the Lord Mayor's fund.  
 
Yet, there were moral and political imperatives for the British government to 
support the refugees from Egypt, especially since most of them were British 
nationals, in order to avoid further criticism regarding the Suez campaign. To 
compensate for the publicity and financial aid refugees from Hungary received 
and to tackle any criticism on the human consequences of the Suez 
intervention, refugees from Egypt received higher maintenance through the 
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AERB than Hungarian refugees were receiving through the NAB. They thus 
relied more heavily on public funds, and were regarded as financial burden. 
They also benefited from favourable resettlement grants.151  
 
The vocabulary used in the quotation above perfectly sums up the British 
immigration policy regarding the two waves of refugees: liability and asset. 
The economic and political advantages that Hungarian refugees represented 
were opposed to the cost and the negative impact linked to Suez that refugees 
from Egypt represented for the British government. The Anglo-Egyptians were 
considered a political liability by the British government as they were one of 
the consequences of the failed attempt to reclaim control of the Suez Canal. 
Their expulsion from Egypt and their British nationality turned them into 
British casualties, and the government was responsible for their support once in 
Britain. The word liability also suggests that despite their nationality, they were 
not desired in Britain by the government, and rather reluctantly accepted for 
resettlement as it was impossible to refuse entry to British nationals. 
 
As far as the PEP report was concerned, the Hungarian refugees were thus 
considered as political and economic assets. Welcoming Hungarians in Britain 
was a way to compensate for the mixed reactions that followed the Suez 
campaign. The economic potential of the Hungarians was accentuated by the 
NCB scheme. 
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Yet, the PEP report failed to see all of the government's reasons in having 
different organisations in charge of the two refugee groups. The composition of 
the BCAR and the AERB was similar in many points. The Hungarian 
Department in the BCAR was a creation of the government, composed of civil 
servants on secondment, retired civil servants, and voluntary workers. The 
AERB was also staffed by voluntary workers as well, including some of the 
AEAS, and civil servants on loan from their Departments.152 It meant, that 
despite the status of non-governmental organisation of the BCAR, its 
Hungarian Department was staffed in the way the AERB was. It thus gave the 
British government closer control on every matter regarding the resettlement of 
refugees. The situation was even clearer when the BCAR was stripped off its 
responsibilities in favour of the National Assistance Board in October 1957, 
following the exhaustion of the Lord Mayor's Fund.153 Despite having different 
organisations in charge of the refugees from Egypt and from Hungary, the 
British government kept a tight control over the two groups, contrary to France 
which relied on the Cojasor for resettlement of the refugees from Egypt. 
 
However the Anglo-Egyptians' attitude in comparison with the Hungarians was 
commended by the PEP report. The problem for the Hungarians was that 
having been welcomed as heroes and made the centre of attention, their 
demands became more and more pressing and they felt let down when they 
were not satisfied. The Home Office was expecting the Hungarians refugees 
simply to be grateful: 
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It might have been expected that the Hungarians would be particularly 
amenable, being filled with gratitude for the help and generosity of the 
British people, while the Anglo-Egyptians would be embittered at being 
expelled from Egypt and insistent on the duty and responsibility of the 
British Government towards them… Many of the Hungarian refugees 
came to Britain expecting far too much… In such a frame of mind it was 
not easy to settle down to learn English, take a job and build up a home 
from nothing.154 
 
While propaganda, notably through Radio Free Europe, may have given the 
Hungarian refugees false hopes, their popular reception and financial support 
both advantaged them and posed problems. Many refugees from Hungary 
quickly realised that Britain did not live up to their expectations, and being 
accommodated in camps, after their previous experience in Austria or 
Yugoslavia, did not help. On the contrary, while criticism was expected from 
the Egyptians and gratitude from the Hungarians, it proved to have been the 
opposite: 
 
Reports of the reactions of Anglo-Egyptian expellees show that although 
indeed they mostly held the Government responsible for their situation, 
they have not been unduly intransigent. The chief difficulty has arisen 
from their refusal to accept jobs which they consider beneath their status 
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and qualifications in Egypt, sometimes for language reasons, and 
sometimes because requirements in this country are more rigorous.155 
 
While the Hungarian refugees both in Britain and France represented an easily 
employable population, finding employment and accommodation for the 
refugees from Egypt was more problematic. Indeed, they were in general of an 
older group age with people in their forties or fifties, and they were mostly 
families.156 Moreover, many of the refugees from Egypt owned businesses or 
shops, and were well-educated, although some families were willing to make 
sacrifices. 
 
The PEP report therefore clearly established the economic and political 
advantages than the Hungarian refugees represented for the British 
government, in contrast with the Anglo-Egyptians. Although the PEP report 
made interesting points on the differences of treatment between the two groups 
of refugees, it remains incomplete. The report only partially analysed the 
different immigration policies for the two waves of refugees. Moreover, it did 
not mention the role of Anglo-Jewry in their reception, and finally did not see 
the influence of the Cold War context in accepting refugees.  
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-Anglo-Jewry and the Egyptians 
 
Like Maurice Orbach, the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Central 
British Fund were very concerned with the situation of the Jews in Egypt and 
Britain. As early as November 1956, the Board of Deputies asked its members 
to lobby their local MP in order to 'secure [the refugees] the maximum moral, 
financial and physical assistance to achieve a resettlement in this country 
should they ever require it.'157 A delegation from the Board of Deputies, led by 
their President, the MP Barnett Janner, met with David Ormsby-Gore and W. 
F. Deedes, ministers at the Foreign Office and the Home Office respectively, to 
discuss the position of Jews in Egypt, and what could be done by the British 
government to improve the situation. The delegation demanded that the British 
government use its influence at the United Nations to stop the persecution in 
Egypt, and that if refugees were to come to Britain, facilities of asylum of a 
similar fashion to the ones accorded to the Hungarian refugees be granted. The 
government promised that Britain would join Israel to defend the case of the 
Jews of Egypt at the United Nations but refused to offer any guarantees. The 
Foreign Office and the Home Office did not know how many refugees to 
expect, and told the delegation that if the British nationals were to be accepted 
for asylum without problem, consideration was to be given in the case of 
stateless Jews with British relatives, whereas Jews of other nationalities could 
not be granted asylum.158 While the British government showed apparent 
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goodwill to receive Hungarian refugees without number restrictions, it was not 
willing to do the same for the Jews of Egypt. 
 
As far as the few non-British Jews of Egypt who managed to seek refuge in 
Britain thanks to relatives in the country were concerned, the Board of 
Deputies, through its Aliens Committee, helped them with their applications to 
the Home Office in order to have their situation regularised. The Jews of 
British nationality were not in need of such help as they were able to come to 
the country and seek employment freely. However, the Sephardi community 
along with the Board of Deputies helped them with their religious needs, 
especially regarding kosher food.159 David M., who stayed at Eastwood hostel, 
remembers that only after a couple of days, Rabbi Posen from Nottingham, 
chose him to go to collect kosher meat from the butcher. With the rabbi's help, 
the 17-year-old David M. was placed into a Jewish family in Nottingham after 
only two weeks in the camp.160 
 
The Jewish Refugees Committee, created in 1933 by Otto Schiff in response to 
the first wave of German Jewish refugees in Britain, also helped the refugees 
from Egypt to resettle in Britain or emigrate elsewhere. By June 1957, the 
Egyptian Section of the London Branch of the Jewish Refugees Committee had 
dealt with 389 families, representing approximately 1,000 individuals, among 
whom 200 were stateless refugees or of a nationality other than British and 
allowed to stay in Britain thanks to close British relatives.161 The refugees were 
considered to be for the main part employable, except for those too old. Those 
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with low incomes were financially supported by the Board of Deputies. 
Accommodation out of hostels remained a far bigger problem, but the help of 
the Board of Deputies and the local Jewish communities was such that only a 
few people were left in hostels by mid-1957.162 The Anglo-Jewish 
organisations shared a similar goal with the British government: getting the 
refugees out of the hostels as quickly as possible.163 Of the 250 refugees in 
Frobisher Hall and Drake Hall, almost all had been resettled thanks to the 
Jewish Refugees Committee branch in Manchester, 25 families having been 
resettled in Manchester and the rest in or around London. All the 80 Jewish 
residents at Bridgend hostel resettled mainly in and around London. Residents 
at the other hostels in Eastwood, Greenbanks, and Eaves Brow Hall were 
almost all reaccommodated in Liverpool and Leeds.164 However, these Jewish 
refugees represented only those known by the service of the Jewish 
organisations in Britain, so the numbers provided by the Board of Deputies can 
only partly reflect the total population of Jewish refugees in British hostels. 
 
Indeed, the Board of Deputies was not mandated by the government for the 
relief of the Jewish refugees from Egypt, as it did not distinguish between 
Jewish and non-Jewish refugees from Egypt. As a result, the Jewish 
organisations could not reach as easily the refugees in camps in comparison 
with the Cojasor in France. The CBF counted in April 1957 only 225 Jewish 
refugees in British hostels,165 while the Board of Deputies estimated the 
number to be 410, taking into account only the hostels with a significant Jewish 
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population.166 Moreover, these figures do not acknowledge the Jewish refugees 
who managed to stay with relatives when they arrived in Britain, and those 
who were already in Britain, such as students, when the expulsions began. 
However, at its peak, in 1960, 723 families from Egypt representing 2,108 
persons, of which 354 families, representing 1,115 British nationals, were 
registered with the Jewish Refugees Committee.167 It took more time than in 
France for British Jewish organisations to be able to register most of the Jewish 
refugees from Egypt. 
 
The Jewish organisations were faced with the same problems of 
accommodation as the AERB. The CBF acknowledged that the fact that the 
middle- and upper-middle-class Jewish refugees who arrived penniless had a 
harder time adapting to the conditions in Britain, especially since most of them 
were composed of large family groups for which accommodation was hard to 
find.168 Families who came to Britain in smaller numbers could find suitable 
housing more easily. Sylvia Jordan's father benefited from the help of the local 
Jewish community to find accommodation in Birmingham with other Jewish 
families from Egypt in an old Victorian house, after her father had turned down 
a job and house offer in Kidderminster, near the hostel they were staying in, to 
join a bigger Jewish community.169 Thus, the Board of Deputies helped Jewish 
refugees to find both employment and accommodation, in addition to help from 
the government, allowing them to leave hostels quicker than some of the non-
Jewish refugees, especially those in old age.  
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The fact that those associations had mainly operated independently from the 
British government showed the difference with the French way of handling the 
Egyptian refugee crisis, as the French government largely relied on the Cojasor 
to provide support and relief. The British government did not turn the Egyptian 
crisis into a Jewish question, though it did rely to a point on Jewish 
organisations to provide Jewish support. It was only when the AERB closed 
down in 1960, that the Home Office contacted the CBF to assume permanent 
responsibility for the remaining Jews from Egypt who had not been resettled 
yet, granting an undisclosed amount to the CBF in order to support them.170 
The AEAS helped the Jewish Refugee Committee by paying weekly 
allowances to the refugees, while the AERB facilitated the access to the hostels 
for their officials. However, the appeal launched by the Central British Fund 
reached half of the £200,000 target by mid-1957.171 Despite these difficulties, 
the Jewish organisations managed to offer permanent accommodation and 
employment faster in comparison with other refugees who only relied on 
government support. 
 
 
 
-Leaving the hostels 
 
There were only a limited number of ways for the refugees to leave the hostels. 
Most refugees who had relatives in Britain prior to the Suez crisis were out of 
the hostels before the AERB took over, if those relatives had enough money or 
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space to accommodate them. The other solutions to leave the hostels were to 
find a job and private accommodation, or to re-emigrate to another country. 
 
For the refugees who decided to settle in Britain, being in employment was the 
prime concern in order to be independent. As many of the refugees from Egypt 
were family groups, small or large, getting a job was often not enough to cover 
all the cost of life outside hostels. To that end, the AERB continued to pay 
maintenance allowances, and spent £935,500 in total to that effect. Moreover, 
not all private accommodation was furnished, and the AERB once again helped 
the refugees in the form of grants and loans for a total of £1,371,800, between 
£750 and £1000 for a family.172 
 
Some of the refugees had no choice other than to go to Britain due to their 
British nationality, whereas the Jews among them could always choose to 
emigrate to Israel. Emigration was one of the themes that led to disquiet in 
some of the hostels as the Eastwood hostel case suggested. Many refugees felt 
that their chances to emigrate somewhere else were small. Despite those 
concerns, the bulk of the refugees candidates for emigration left Britain quickly 
as the following table suggests: 
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Table 7.2: Numbers and destinations of refugees from Egypt emigrated 
from February 1957 to 31 December 1959 
Origin and Destination 1957 1958 1959 Total 
Persons from hostels to 
Australia 
840 77 0 917 
Persons from private 
accommodation to Australia 
125 34 5 164 
Total to Australia 965 111 5 1,081 
Persons from hostels to other 
countries 
197 21 6 224 
Persons from private 
accommodation to other 
countries 
213 25 1 239 
Total to other countries 410 46 7 463 
Grand total 1,375 157 12 1,544 
(Source: TNA, HO 240/77 Notes on hostels, n.d.) 
 
Table 7.2 clearly shows the attraction of Australia for the refugees, as it was 
the destination for two-thirds of the refugees emigrating. It was at the time a 
country representing a better life much like the United States and Canada, not 
only just for the refugees, as skilled professionals were also emigrating to the 
old colonies in search of better quality of life and higher wages.173 Israel was 
the main destination for refugees leaving Egypt, and it was estimated that 
20,000 Jews from Egypt had emigrated there.174 The majority of the refugees 
who emigrated to Israel did not transit through Britain, which explains why 
Australia was the most attractive destination for Anglo-Egyptians. Other 
destinations included Brazil, Canada, Italy, Cyprus, France, Libya, Lebanon, 
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Sudan, United States, and East Africa.175 Although emigration to those 
countries was much smaller, it reflects the attachment of some of the refugees 
to the Mediterranean region, while others went to France or English-speaking 
countries. 
 
It was the AERB itself which initiated discussions with the High 
Commissioner for Australia to accept large numbers of Egyptians, despite 
earlier claims that the organisation was not dealing with emigration issues.176 
The Australian government accepted all the refugees who had permits or proof 
of permits issued by the Australian authorities in Egypt before their expulsion, 
on the condition that they did not occupy berths allocated for other British 
emigrants. This condition was decided because there were waiting lists of 
50,000 British for emigration to Australia, and the Australian government did 
not want to privilege Anglo-Egyptians for emigration. Other refugees could be 
accepted, subject to the Australian fulfilment of immigration requirements, and 
following interviews and medical examinations by Australian immigration 
officers in hostels.177 The Australian authorities accepted 1,400 refugees for 
resettlement.178 Table 7.2 shows that the offer exceeded the number of refugees 
who emigrated to Australia. It can be explained by the fact that some 
eventually decided to emigrate somewhere else or decided to stay in Britain 
after all. 
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A large number of refugees re-emigrated as the figure of 1,544 individuals 
suggests. If the refugees were not pushed to re-emigrate, their re-emigration 
was facilitated by the AERB who centralised all the demands and processed 
them with the concerned foreign authorities. More than just attractive places 
for work and living-standards, many refugees did not cope very well with the 
British climate, especially since most of them arrived during the 1956-1957 
winter.179 
 
All the hostels apart from Bridgend had closed by the end of 1959. Bridgend 
housed the refugees who represented the greatest problems for re-employment 
and permanent accommodation elsewhere. The hostel became the place where 
all the refugees having problems for resettlement were transferred to. Bridgend 
eventually closed in March 1960, while 25 mainly elderly and sick people were 
still receiving allowances from the AERB and were in private accommodation, 
unable or unwilling to move to residential clubs in Gloucestershire.180 They 
became the responsibility of the AEAS as the AERB was wound up. The 
AERB did not recommend the creation of a new ad hoc body, but encouraged 
the refugees to use the existing social services if needed.181 
 
It is difficult to draw a pattern regarding attitudes towards naturalisation as 
very few stateless Jews managed to resettle permanently in Britain. Yet, for 
some of them, despite the fact that the stateless refugees from Egypt in Britain 
had to report to the Aliens Department of the Home Office as foreigners, those 
interviewed barely mentioned it, and when mentioned it was far from being the 
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traumatic event it was for the stateless refugees from Egypt in France. Being 
naturalised British was all that mattered, as Sebastian Salama remembers: 
 
When I left Egypt, we came here. I took a decision and I thought, now, 
we are British! My loyalty is to this country. I owe this country a hell of a 
lot. My children are British…. Total loyalty to the country. I love it. I 
have absolutely no concern about Egypt or the Egyptians. I never had any 
wish to go back as a tourist or otherwise.182 
 
His gratitude towards the British government is framed by the expulsion from 
Egypt. He arrived with nothing in Britain, after having being expelled from 
Egypt. The help he received in Britain made him feel wanted there.  
 
 
 
-Conclusion 
 
When the Egyptian government began to threaten British nationals with 
expulsions, Anthony Eden interpreted it as a move to bring further pressure on 
the British government, which was already criticised for the intervention by the 
United States and at the United Nations.183 While mentioning in his memoirs 
the expulsion of 2,500 British nationals out of 10,000 and 3,500 French 
nationals, Eden claimed that no general expulsion took place thanks to British 
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diplomatic pressure.184 This chapter has shown that what happened was very 
different.  
 
Refugees from Egypt were only accepted reluctantly in Britain, and the Home 
Office tried to accept only those it could not refuse, since they had British 
passports or close families ties. British immigration policies and practices were 
such that as they were coming from Africa, they were associated with West 
Indian immigration at a time when the Cabinet was not in favour of what it 
called 'coloured immigration'. The middle-class background of the refugees did 
not match the labour needs of Britain. Moreover, the fact that most of the 
refugees from Egypt were Jewish was not considered an asset, as immigration 
policies were applied in such a way to prevent any major wave of Jewish 
immigration. 
 
The refugees from Egypt were granted asylum due to political and national 
obligation rather than on a humanitarian basis. Moreover, the reception of the 
refugees from Egypt was tainted with racial prejudice from some members of 
the government and the AERB. This attitude towards the refugees framed their 
reception. The two experimental hostels of Crowborough and Oxton also show 
that they knew little about the Anglo-Egyptians and how to resettle them 
successfully, when on top of those issues, only limited funds were available. 
The cases of Eastwood and Summerfield illustrate the limits of the refugee 
policy of the Home Office, and how it affected their resettlement, while no 
such disruption was reported with the Egyptian refugees in France. Although 
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not a complete failure, the Home Office policy of resettlement of the refugees 
from Egypt was ill-adapted and sometimes ineffective. As a consequence, it 
only achieved complete resettlement in early 1960, that is to say two years after 
the announced goal of resettling all the refugees by the end of 1957. 
 
This chapter has shown that the lack of public and financial support for Anglo-
Egyptians largely affected their treatment. While refugees from Hungary were 
on normal National Assistance rates, but benefited from large public funds, 
such as that of the Lord Mayor, there was only limited funds available for the 
refugees from Egypt. The government had to take the responsibility of 
financially supporting the refugees from Egypt, whereas the Hungarians were 
mainly funded by the Lord Mayor's fund. The Anglo-Egyptians did not receive 
direct financial assistance from the NAB, as press and popular pressure blamed 
the British government for their situation. It then gave the appearance that a 
special effort was made towards their resettlement, and that as British 
nationals, they were better treated than Hungarian refugees.185 Yet it also 
strengthened the belief of the Home Office according which the immigration of 
refugees from Egypt needed to be kept to a minimum, because of its cost and 
the deemed little economic potential benefit for Britain. 
 
Anglo-Egyptians were considered undesired migrants by the British 
government, but a special effort was made to dissociate the help they received 
from the Hungarians, which was considered not to have been enough by the 
Anglo-Egyptians. Unlike the French government, the British government thus 
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kept a tight control on the resettlement of both Hungarians and Anglo-
Egyptians. 
 
Considering the re-emigration rate among the refugees from Egypt, it is 
obvious that many did not want to resettle in Britain, or that they felt unwanted 
in Britain. The final report of the AERB demonstrates that despite their British 
nationality many among the refugees from Egypt needed to adapt to a new 
country and a new culture.186 Although the Jews from Egypt gladly associated 
themselves with French and, for some of them, British cultures before the Suez 
crisis, once in Britain the differences between them and the British were 
exacerbated. It is striking that the feeling of being British among the refugees 
was less common than in France where refugees could speak the language, 
whereas it was not always the case in Britain. The predominance of the French 
culture on the minority communities in Egypt contributed as a factor in the 
difficulty of resettlement in Britain, as well as did the middle- and upper-
middle-class background of the refugees from Egypt, hardly re-employable in 
1957 Britain in jobs equivalent to what they previously had occupied. The 
refugees from Egypt were no longer completely Egyptian as they had been 
expelled, and were not totally British, as they were not considered to be so by 
the British government. 
 
Despite the government's claims to provide special care to the Anglo-
Egyptians, this chapter has shown that refugees from Hungary and from Egypt 
were under the care of similarly staffed organisations, which gave the Home 
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Office more control . Yet the effects of this policy were different on the two 
groups of refugees. With less means and funds at their disposal, the refugees 
from Egypt had lower expectations than the Hungarian refugees according to 
the PEP report. Yet this chapter has shown that the refugees from Egypt in 
Eastwood Hostel managed to catch the attention of the Home Office to 
complain about their treatment. The lack of attention they received from the 
public and because they were not considered easily employable made them feel 
forgotten. There is no archival evidence of the Hungarians doing the same. 
 
The Board of Deputies facilitated to some extent the resettlement of the Jews 
from Egypt by using pre-Second World War refugee organisations in order to 
support them. Although the British government did not turn the Egyptian 
refugee situation into a Jewish question, the Board of Deputies managed to 
provide the Jewish refugees known to their services with better support. In that 
aspect, their help was comparable to the support provided for the Hungarian 
Jews although for different reasons. In both cases, the Board of Deputies action 
was much more limited than the Cojasor action, but this was mainly due to a 
difference between French and British policies regarding the resettlement of 
refugees from Egypt. 
 
Finally, the rate of re-emigration from Britain was much higher than in France. 
This can be explained by the fact that the Cojasor provided the refugees from 
Egypt with more adequate support by enabling them to resettle together for 
example than in Britain. The fact that many of the refugees from Egypt had a 
French culture is also a factor contributing to re-emigration.  
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8. Conclusion 
 
Refugees from Hungary were considered as assets in France and Britain 
whereas refugees from Egypt were treated as liabilities, which had effects on 
their treatment and resettlement in the two countries. This thesis has shown that 
both refugee groups were accepted on the basis of immigration policies and 
practices, based on professional background, demographic needs and domestic 
views of ethnicity. This study also analysed the influence of the Cold War on 
the application of these immigration policies and the effects on their 
resettlement. These policies and practices were more favourable to the 
Hungarians than to the Egyptian refugees, but their effects on the refugees 
were different in each country.  
 
The Cold War context was especially relevant before and just after refugees 
started to arrive in France and in Britain. Reactions following the Hungarian 
revolution were characterised by great popular support both in France and in 
Britain, which played a part in the reception of the Hungarian refugees. As far 
as the French and the British governments were concerned, they saw in the 
Hungarian revolution, and the subsequent refugee crisis in Austria, a way to 
divert attention from the Suez crisis, but also to be praised for their actions. 
Moreover, the thesis has suggested that, as NATO members, French and 
British humanitarian responses were motivated in large part by a desire 
foremost to weaken Soviet influence. It was considered a moral victory over 
Moscow to permanently resettle the Hungarian refugees in the West. In that 
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sense the Hungarian refugees were instrumentalized for propaganda purposes, 
and were political assets for Britain and France.  
 
A particular feature of the French case was that the Hungarian refugees became 
an issue in French national politics. The repression of the Hungarian 
revolution, and the population displacement which followed, was the occasion 
for the Left and the Right to try to weaken as much as possible the PCF, at least 
in the short term. This was done under the pretext of demonstrating in support 
of Hungary and the Hungarians, which eventually led to the physical assault on 
the L'Humanité and the PCF headquarters. This was not the case in Britain. 
 
The role of the PCF in France and the CPGB in Britain also played out in 
different ways, mostly due to their respective influences in national political 
life. Yet, both parties tried to present the Hungarian revolution and the refugees 
as fascists and antisemites in order to justify the repression of the revolution by 
the Soviet army with little success. The PCF and the CPGB's influence on the 
refugees' treatment was even more limited in the case of the refugees from 
Egypt. Following their frequently asserted support for Moscow after the 
suppression of the Hungarian revolution, both parties' focus was on the return 
of Communist order in Hungary and on a critique of the Suez campaign. 
 
In contrast with the public support for the Hungarians, governments’ responses 
to the refugees from Egypt was much less and was not primarily humanitarian. 
The initial efforts of Britain and especially France were to try to stop the 
expulsion by appealing to international laws and to the UN, and in particular by 
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focusing on the internment of their nationals in improvised prisons in Egypt. 
Yet, this was considered unadvisable in the end, as France feared it would be 
accused of the same in Algeria. It was only reluctantly that France and Britain 
accepted refugees from Egypt. 
 
The British public considered that the refugees from Egypt were the 
responsibilities of the government, as they believed that their expulsion was the 
consequence of the military intervention in Egypt. While in France, there was 
popular and parliamentary support for the military intervention in Egypt, 
reactions were more mixed in Britain. The refugees from Egypt, thus, did not 
benefit from public support comparable to that given to the Hungarians.  
 
If the Cold War played a part in the treatment of refugees, it does not alone 
explain why refugees from Hungary were accepted without limits while 
refugees from Egypt were not. The latter were, after all, Cold War refugees, 
just as the Hungarians were. The 1945 Ordinance on immigration and its 
application in France considerably favoured the immigration of Hungarian 
refugees because of their white European background, and because this group 
of refugees was mostly composed of single young men who could be employed 
in industrial or agricultural sectors. Missions of recruitment were sent to 
refugee camps in Austria and Yugoslavia to select refugees with the view of 
employing them in France in specific sectors. 
 
The same Ordinance applied to the refugees from Egypt. The thesis has 
discussed the national and ethnic preferences linked to immigration despite the 
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1945 Ordinance making no mention of those. Because of their North African 
and Jewish identities, the refugees from Egypt were not considered to be 
suitable for resettlement in France. Moreover, they were large family groups, 
and their professional background did not match those needed in France at the 
time. If refugees with a French passport could not be legally prevented from 
resettling in France, stateless refugees and those with other nationalities were 
only accepted if they had relatives already living there. Despite the restrictive 
nature of this policy, it ended being interpreted sometimes positively by the 
French local administration in sympathy for the situation of the refugees. 
France's recent past also influenced such decisions. After the Vichy regime, 
France tried to remain united in commemorating deportation, and refusing 
Jewish refugees in 1956 would have endangered this search for unity. 
 
The situation was slightly different in Britain for the Hungarians, as the Home 
Office was first opposed to their resettlement, on the principle that Britain was 
not a country generally open to immigration. However, the opportunity to 
employ Hungarians in sectors which lacked labour was not to be missed for the 
British government, and the vast majority of refugees were placed into 
employment quickly, as the refugees benefited from a positive interpretation of 
the 1953 Aliens Order. However, the recruitment of refugees by National Coal 
Board was a failure. The thesis has shown that, even if the Home Office 
eventually accepted the resettlement of Hungarians in Britain, it nevertheless 
remained suspicious on the nature of the refugees, and revived the Operation 
Post Report to watch them. 
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As far as the refugees from Egypt were concerned, Britain adopted a rule 
similar to France: only British nationals would be accepted for resettlement, 
and stateless refugees with relatives already established there. Britain applied 
this policy strictly. The refugees from Egypt were considered as a Jewish wave 
of immigration, and since 1905, Britain had regularly tried to control this type 
of immigration. The belief that Jews were responsible for antisemitism still 
existed in the 1950s.1 Yet, Britain was celebrated for granting asylum to protect 
Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany and the government could limit 
immigration from Egypt without fearing accusations of antisemitism or being 
unsympathetic to Jewish refugees.  
 
The colonial and postcolonial immigration contexts played out differently in 
both countries for the refugees from Hungary and Egypt. The fact that West 
Indian, Pakistani and Indian immigration was on the increase in Britain 
favoured the immigration of the Hungarian refugees, but limited the stateless 
refugees from Egypt to be accepted on strict conditions. Refugees from Egypt, 
whether British nationals or stateless, were associated with Commonwealth 
immigration, because of their North African origins.  
 
Similarly, Egyptian refugees, French and stateless, were associated with 
colonial immigration from Algeria. As the 1945 Ordinance recommended the 
imposition of limits on North African immigration, and because of the Algerian 
War context, refugees from Egypt felt, for the most part, discriminated against 
and challenged in their own identity. They realised that, although they 
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considered themselves French or of French culture, they were sometimes 
treated as foreigners in France, and even as undesirable immigrants. 
 
This study has assessed the impact of immigration policies had on the two 
groups of refugees. As the Hungarians were considered as labour immigrants 
rather than refugees, it caused some distress and misunderstandings about their 
situation between the refugees and the government. Both in France and in 
Britain some of the refugees refused to take up employment, with more explicit 
manifestations of this refusal in the French case. Most of the time, this situation 
was linked to the refugees' desire to emigrate somewhere else, as many 
expressed a preference for permanent resettlement in the United States or 
outside Europe. Yet, it was also linked to accommodation conditions, 
especially in France. The fact that the refugees were, for the most part, 
accommodated in isolated camps, usually old military barracks or forts made 
the refugees feel like prisoners. 
 
The reception of the refugees from Egypt differed between France and Britain. 
In France, all the refugees from Egypt were accommodated in hotels until they 
permanently resettled with already established families or were placed into 
permanent accommodation through the Cojasor or by their own means. The 
geographic situation of the hotels varied as many refugees were accommodated 
in Marseille, Paris, and also smaller cities like Vichy. The accommodation of 
refugees from Egypt depended on the good will of the prefects in each region. 
Moreover, the refugees from Egypt were largely supported by the Cojasor, 
instead of the French government, which saw little benefit in the resettlement 
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of the refugees from Egypt. Thanks to the Cojasor and the Fonds Commun,  
many refugees were accommodated in newly-built blocks of flats around Paris, 
which kept alive the traditions of the Jews from Egypt. As a result, the Jewish 
response, mostly through the Cojasor, provided better treatment to the refugees 
from Egypt in comparison to what the Hungarian refugees received.  
 
In Britain, the accommodation of refugees from Egypt was very similar to the 
one of the Hungarians. They too were accommodated in large refugee camps. 
To avoid criticism, the government gave Anglo-Egyptians the same treatment 
as any other British nationals on National Assistance Board's rate, and they 
remained the charges of governmental or semi-governmental organisations. 
The British government wanted to show that Anglo-Egyptians were treated like 
any other British citizens, despite being considered by some people as foreign 
to British culture and people. The fact that the great majority of the Anglo-
Egyptians were British nationals led to some resentment on the refugees' parts 
who felt that they were not adequately treated. The example of the petition in 
Eastwood Hostel, near Nottingham, shows that the Anglo-Egyptians felt 
forgotten while the Hungarian refugees benefited from a large public and 
financial support. The government's policy made them feel challenged in their 
own identity as British nationals. These problems explain why a fair part of the 
Anglo-Egyptians chose to re-emigrate rather than to resettle in Britain. 
However, in comparison with France, Anglo-Jewish organisations were less 
present in the Anglo-Egyptians' resettlement, as the government was in charge. 
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The thesis has also shown that the role of French and British Jewish 
organisations was different in both countries, and depended on views on 
refugees as well as the political context. In France, the Cojasor had a key role 
in the resettlement of the refugees from Egypt because the French government 
considered them a Jewish wave of refugees, and was less interested in their 
resettlement. In Britain, the role of the Board of Jewish Deputies was limited, 
as the Home Office wanted to make sure the public knew the Anglo-Egyptians 
were at the charge of the government. The involvement of the two Jewish 
organisations is however similar in the case of the Hungarian refugees. The 
Cojasor and the Board, along with the CBF, intervened in refugee camps to 
take care of Hungarian Jews following reports of antisemitism. 
 
The comparative aspect of the thesis has shown the limits of humanitarianism 
and joint decisions when it came to accept Hungarian refugees. The 
humanitarian objectives and the NATO directives to avoid a refugee crisis in 
Austria quickly were eventually replaced with France and Britain's own 
national interests, as shown by missions of recruitment in refugee camps in 
Austria and Yugoslavia in order to get the refugees who could take up 
employment in French and British industrial sectors needing workforce. 
 
The comparison of the two refugee groups in France and in Britain has 
therefore uncovered more similarities in the treatment of refugees than 
differences, despite different immigration policies, and the reasons for that. 
The thesis has highlighted a major similarity in the French and British views on 
refugees from Hungary and from Egypt: both countries initially wanted to limit 
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the number of refugees from Egypt because of their North African and Jewish 
identities. The French and British nationality or culture of the refugees from 
Egypt was confronted to the French and British administrations and 
governments considering them as undesirable colonial immigrants and 
sometimes foreigners. On the other hand, Hungarian refugees were not of 
French or British culture, but were accepted for permanent resettlement in both 
country in large numbers. Thus, in 1956, French and British reactions towards 
refugees largely depended on the origins and the identity of the refugees. 
Having French or British nationality was not enough to be considered French 
or British by governments. Hungarians were considered to be better candidates 
for permanent resettlement, which implies eventual naturalisation, despite not 
sharing the same culture. Hungarians were associated with a common 
European identity, in contrast with the North African, colonial and Jewish 
identities of the refugees from Egypt.2  
 
Yet, despite a similar policy of restricting refugee immigration from Egypt,  
French and British reasons for it varied. This thesis has shown that the main 
issue regarding refugees from Egypt was their Jewish and North African 
identities, which was associated with labour immigration from Algeria. On the 
other hand, the British government opposed their immigration based on Jewish 
and colonial identities, but also because of skin colour prejudice, as some 
officials believed the refugees from Egypt to be black. There is no evidence of 
similar prejudice linked to skin colour in France.3 
 
                                                 
2
 Gérard Noiriel, A quoi sert "l'identité nationale" ? (Marseille, 2007), p.48 
3
 Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of 
France (New York, 2006), pp.13-4. 
 351
Finally, because of the moral imperative linked to refugee immigration, France 
and Britain ended accepting refugees from Egypt but on different terms and for 
different reasons. As the refugees from Egypt were mainly French and British 
nationals, there was no other option than to accept them for resettlement. It is 
thus in handling the cases of stateless refugees that the terms of asylum were 
revealed. In both cases, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Office 
were willing to accept stateless refugees on the 1951 Geneva Convention 
terms. Yet, the Home Office managed to convince the Foreign Office to refrain 
from linking the expulsion to the creation of the State of Israel, denying the 
stateless refugees from a refugee passport. Contrary to the Hungarian refugees 
who had no connection with France and Britain, stateless refugees from Egypt 
had to have relatives in the country to be accepted for resettlement. The thesis, 
in comparing the two waves of refugees in France and in Britain, has thus 
revealed the exclusionary nature of asylum. It was only moderated by 
consideration of the hardship of the refugees by local administration in France, 
although on rare occasions, and by the work of refugee organisations. 
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